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ABSTRACT

This Article reports and comments on the results of an
assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic
freedom (an examination of its factual protection to be
undertaken at a future point) in EU member states, having
examined these countries' constitutions, laws on higher
education, and other relevant legislation. The assessment relied
on a standard scorecard, developed by utilizing indicators of
protection of academic freedom, notably as reflected in
UNESCO's Recommendation concerning the Status of HigherEducation Teaching Personnel, a document of 1997 that is not
legally, but "politically" binding, and which concretizes
internationalhuman rights requirementsin respect of academic
freedom--a right under international human rights law. The
results for the various countries have been quantified, and the
countries have been ranked in accordance with "their
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performance." Overall, the state of the legal protection of the
right to academic freedom in Europe appears to be one of "illhealth." Increasingly, European countries are merely paying lip
service to this important right. While the concept of institutional
autonomy is being misconstrued, self-governance in higher
education institutions and employment security are being
subjected to rigorousprocesses of erosion.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article builds on earlier research that undertook a
preliminary comparative analysis of the right to academic freedom in
Europe. At the time, Terence Karran had analyzed whether twentythree member states of the European Union provided a high,
medium, or low level of protection of the right; 1 alternatively, he
analyzed whether they complied fully, partially, or not at all with
parameters 2 of measurement based on UNESCO's Recommendation
concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel of
1997. In the meantime, there have been significant changes in the

1.
Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: A PreliminaryComparative
Analysis, 20 HIGH. EDUC. POL'Y 289 (2007).
2.
Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: Reviewing UNESCO's
Recommendation, 57 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 191 (2009).
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legislation on higher education (HE) in many European countries,
which have enhanced levels of autonomy (or, what policymakers
consider to constitute autonomy) of HE institutions and have limited
the extent to which academic staff are involved in the administration
(or "management," as it has come to be called) of institutions, which
has reduced the scope of their participation in strategic decisionmaking, while, simultaneously increasing that of rectors or
rectorates, deans and heads of departments, and external "experts."
Moreover, the law regulating conditions of employment of academic
staff in HE is more and more guided by notions of "flexibiization,"
which legitimizes the conclusion of fixed-term contracts of service
(without long-term perspectives) even at post-entry levels of the
academic career and assures that contracts of service can be
terminated on operational grounds "without undue restraints." It
appears paradoxical, therefore, that national constitutions and HE
laws all the same continue emphasizing the importance of the right to
academic freedom. In light of these circumstances, it is meaningful to
undertake a renewed assessment of the state of health of the right to
academic freedom in Europe, relying essentially on the standards of
3
UNESCO's Recommendation.
Karran considered his assessment to be a preliminary one. 4 This
Article relies on the parameters of the right to academic freedom used
by Karran (the protection of "academic freedom" in the constitution or
other legislation, the autonomy of institutions of HE, academic selfgovernance, and academic tenure) and adds a fifth: the ratification of
international agreements relevant to the protection of the right to
academic freedom. Furthermore, this Article refines the analysis by
defining thirty-seven specific indicators to measure compliance by
individual states. The focus, naturally, has been on defining human
rights indicators (i.e., indicators operationalizing the requirements of
the right to academic freedom as protected under international
human rights law). The indicators chosen will thus purposively not
measure whether HE reforms in the countries concerned comply with
requirements of economic or managerial efficiency, as such criteria

3.
Similar assessments of the state of HE, including that concerning the right
to academic freedom at the national level in the light of UNESCO's Recommendation
concerning the Status of Higher- Education Teaching Personnel of 1997, have, for
example, been undertaken with regard to Australia and Israel, the West Bank and
Gaza. See James S. Page, Australian Universities and International Standards:
Compliance with the 1997 UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of HigherEducation Teaching Personnel, 29 J. HIGH. EDUC. POL'Y & MGMT. 95 (2007); DAVID
ROBINSON, THE STATUS OF HIGHER EDUCATION TEACHING PERSONNEL IN ISRAEL, THE

WEST BANK AND GAzA (Education International & Canadian Association of University
Teachers, 2010), http://download.ei-ie.org/DocsfWebDepot/The
Status of Higher
Education Teaching Personnel in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SM8E-Y87C] (archived Mar. 22, 2016).
4.
See Karran, supra note 1, at 289 ("[The article] is preliminary ... , thereby
establishing the basis for subsequent.., work.").
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are irrelevant in-and, in any event, subordinate to-a human rights
approach that is binding on all the states considered in this
assessment. The approach has been to accord a numeric value to each
indicator in accordance with its relative weight as adjudged under
international human rights law. Adding up the scores of states for
each of these values not only makes it possible to rank states
regarding the five core aspects but also to rank them overall in their
protection of the right to academic freedom.
This Article is written in the context of a larger project on the
right to academic freedom conducted at the University of Lincoln,
United Kingdom, examining the doctrinal basis of the right to
academic freedom in terms of international human rights law and
further assessing the level of protection of that right in various
regional contexts, concentrating on the European and African
contexts for the moment. The Article looks at the legal protection of
the right to academic freedom in Europe (i.e., its protection in the
legislation of twenty-eight EU member states). 5 It presents an
overview of the findings and some observations on the purport of
these for the state of health of the legal protection of the right to
academic freedom in Europe. The factual protection of the rightinter alia as a result of institutional, faculty and/or departmental
regulations, policies, and customs-will be analyzed in subsequent
publications, relying primarily on the results of an online survey on
academic freedom carried out in Europe in 2015.6 An overall picture
of the situation of the right to academic freedom in Europe, to be
sure, will have to take account of the findings with regard to both its
legal and factual protection.

II.

THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw AND UNESCO's RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE
STATUS OF HIGHER-EDUCATION TEACHING PERSONNEL OF 1997

With higher-education teaching personnel in mind, "academic
freedom" has been described as:
[T]he right [of such personnel], without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to
freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and

5.
It may well be asked why this Article does not focus on states in their
capacity as member states of the Council of Europe, which, as a regional organization,
focuses on the promotion of human rights as one of its primary tasks, the EU's role
being to facilitate the economic and, to a more limited extent, the political integration
of its members. The reason simply is that it would have exceeded available resources to
study the legal situation in forty-seven states at very different stages of development
as opposed to that in twenty-eight more or less homogeneous states.
6.
The survey is accessible at https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/Academic
FreedomSurvey.
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disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely
their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from
institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or
representative academic bodies. All higher-education teaching personnel should
have the right to fulfil their functions without discrimination
of any kind and
7
without fear of repression by the state or any other source.

Apart from such freedom of teaching, freedom in carrying out
research, etc., "academic freedom" in HE-in a comprehensive
sense-covers at least three additional aspects, namely selfgovernance in HE by the academic community, employment security
(including "tenure"), and the autonomy of institutions of HE, all of
which will be described more fully in the discussion that follows. The
various rights thus entailed by "academic freedom" must, however, be
interpreted in the light of special duties and responsibilities for staff
and students as well as the fact that a proper balance between the
level of autonomy enjoyed by HE institutions and their systems of
8
accountability should be ensured.
In his chapter on the right to education in the first major
textbook on economic, social, and cultural rights in international law,
Manfred Nowak in 1995 still had to concede that international law
largely neglected the topic of academic freedom and institutional
autonomy. 9 This remains true today to the extent that international
"hard" law (treaties legally binding on states parties thereto) is
concerned. The right to academic freedom, as such, is not protected in
the two UN human rights covenants-the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)1 ° and the International Covenant

7.
General Conference (UNESCO), Recommendation concerning the Status of
Higher-Education Teaching Personnel, 27, UNESCO Doc. 29 C/Res. 11 (1997)
[hereinafter UNESCO Recommendation].
8.
See, e.g., Terence Karran, Academic Freedom in Europe: Time for a Magna
Charta? 22 HIGH. EDUC. POLy 163 (2009); JOGCHUM VRIELINK ET AL., ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT (League of European Research Universities,
Advice Paper No. 6, Dec. 2010), http://www.leru.org/files/publications/AP6_Academic_
final Jan 2011.pdf (discussing the various elements-rights, duties, responsibilitiesof the right to academic freedom); see also U.N., Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The Right of Education (Art. 13 of the
ICESCR), 77 38-40, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 13],
http://www.bayefsky.com//general/cescrgencomm_13.php
[https://perma.cc/TJ2F-J7TV] (archived May 10, 2016). The UNESCO Recommendation
thus contains provisions on "Institutional autonomy" (V.A.),
17-21, "Institutional
accountability" (V.B.), It 22-24, "Individual rights and freedoms: civil rights, academic
freedom, publication rights, and the international exchange of information" (VI.A.),
IT 25-30, "Self-governance and collegiality" (VI.B.), TT 31-32, "Duties and
responsibilities of higher- education teaching personnel" (VII),
33-36 and "Security
of employment" (IX.B.), TT 45-46.
9.
Manfred Nowak, The Right to Education, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 189, 209-10 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995).
10.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 11 both of 1966or in any other binding instrument of international law at the global
or regional level. Certain provisions of the various human rights
treaties applicable globally or regionally may, however, be relied on to
12
protect (particular aspects of) the right to academic freedom.
Focusing specifically on the UN human rights covenants, 13 these
include Article 7 of the ICCPR, which prohibits torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (also when this
takes place because a scholar holds or expresses certain academic
views); Article 9 of the ICCPR, which addresses the right to liberty
and security of the person (which, for example, protects a scholar
from being arbitrarily arrested, detained, or falsely prosecuted in
retaliation for certain academic content); Article 12 of the ICCPR on
the right to liberty of movement; Article 13 of the ICCPR on the right
of aliens not to be arbitrarily expelled from a state (Articles 12 and 13
collectively guarantee the ability of members of the academic
community to travel abroad, to return home, and to move freely
14
within a state for the purposes of study, teaching, and research);
Article 18 of the ICCPR on the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion (this provision probably also encompasses the
right of scholars to object to teaching or carrying out research on the
grounds that doing so would be contrary to their conscience, religion,
or beliefs); 15 Article 21 of the ICCPR on the right of peaceful
assembly (affording protection, for example, to scholars organizing a
conference, in which opinions critical of a government's policies in one
area or another are expressed); and Article 22 of the ICCPR on the

11.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
12.
For an overview of relevant provisions in this respect in the major global
and regional human rights instruments (including the non-binding Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948), see Robert Quinn & Jesse Levine, IntellectualHRDs and Claims for Academic Freedom under Human Rights Law, 18 INT'L J. HUM.
RTS. 898, 904 (2014).
For an analysis of the Covenant provisions referred to in the discussion
13.
that follows and their relevance to the right to academic freedom in the light of
relevant international legal materials (decisions of international human rights
tribunals, General Comments of UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, reports of
UN Special Rapporteurs, etc.), see id. at 902-12.
14.
See Klaus Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Academic Mobility under
International Human Rights Law, in ACADEMIC MOBILITY 243 (Malcolm Tight & Nina
Maadad eds., 2014) (discussing the aspect of the right to freedom of movement of
scholars as one aspect of the right to academic freedom and how to rely on provisions of
the Covenants to construct a right to academic mobility as a constituent element of the
right to academic freedom).
15.
It is not entirely clear whether Article 18 of the ICCPR covers a general
right of "conscientious objection." See MANFRED NOWAK, Article 18: Freedom of
Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief, in U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
10-11, 421-25,
27-32 (2d rev. ed.
RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 406, 412-13,
2005).
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right to freedom of association (on which members of the academic
community would rely, for instance, to protect their right to form and
17
join trade unions 16 attending to their interests).
Three Covenant provisions provide protection for the right to
academic freedom more comprehensively: Article 19 of the JCCPR on
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 18 Article 15 of the
ICESCR on cultural rights-notably giving expression, in
Paragraph 3, to the right to respect for "the freedom indispensable for
scientific research"; and Article 13 of the ICESCR on the right to
education. Some commentators consider the right to freedom of
opinion and expression and the right to education to constitute the
two essential pillars of the right to academic freedom. 19 Others argue
that the right to freedom of opinion and expression must be viewed as
the essential premise of the right to academic freedom. 2 0 Yet others
hold that, whereas all the various provisions cited above should play
a role in protecting relevant aspects of the right to academic freedom,
Article 13 of the ICESCR on the right to education constitutes a
complete locus for the right to academic freedom: "Article 13

16.
Article 22 of the ICCPR "only applies to private associations." See Human
Rights Committee, Wallmann v. Austria, Comm. No. 1002/2001, U.N. Doe.
CCPR/C/80/D/1002/2001 (Apr. 1, 2004),
9.4. It seems thus not to apply to public
universities, but to, for example, trade unions or private universities.
17.
In a wider sense, one could also mention Articles 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 of the
ICESCR on the right to just and favorable conditions of work, the right to form and join
trade unions, the right to social security, the right to an adequate standard of living
and the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,
respectively. Ultimately, academic freedom can only be enjoyed if the terms and
conditions of employment are conducive for effective teaching and research. See
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 40 (calling upon the employers of highereducation teaching personnel to establish terms and conditions of employment of the
nature contemplated).
18.
Article 19 of the ICCPR needs to be read in conjunction with Article 20 of
the Covenant, which 'limits" the right to freedom of opinion and expression in that it
prohibits "[a]ny propaganda for war" and "[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence."
19.
See, e.g., Quinn & Levine, supra note 12, at 903-05; Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, Academic Freedom as a Human Right: An InternationalistPerspective, 89
ACADEME, May-June 2003, at 25, 27-28 ("Academic freedom can be asserted as a
human right in two ways. One is to defend it as a human right to free expression; the
other is to defend it as a human right to education."). Similarly, the Belgian Court of
Arbitration in a decision of 2005 held that the right to academic freedom represented
an aspect of freedom of expression (BELGIAN CONSTITUTION, art. 19) and was also a
part of the freedom of education (BELGIAN CONSTITUTION, art. 24, § 1). See Judgment of
Nov. 23, 2005 (No. 167/2005), Cour d'arbitrage, MONITEUR BELGE, Dec. 2, 2005,
B.18.1. For a discussion of the decision, see Michel P~ques, Libert acad~mique et
Cour d'Arbitrage, in LIBER AMICORUM PAUL MARTENS, L'HUMANISME DANS LA
RESOLUTION DES CONFLITS: UTOPIE OU RtALIT? 399 (2007).
20.
See, e.g., Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, A Theoretical Review of the Origins of
Academic Freedom, SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (July 3, 2014, 2:20 PM), http://salsa4.
salsalabs.com/o/50943/p/salsawebblog/public/?blog-entryKEY=33
[https://perma.ec/
SJ3C-AUN6] (archived Mar. 1, 2016) (arguing that there has been a progression from
freedom of expression to the right to education to academic freedom).
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ICESCR ... constitutes the provision which concurrently assembles
all aspects of academic freedom under 'a single roof and whose
for
framework
proper
the
provides
context
normative
interpretation."2 1 There are writers who agree that all the various
provisions cited should play a role as described but maintain that
"Article 13 ICESCR alone is too weak a basis to support academic
22
freedom."

21.
See, e.g., KLAUS D. BEITER, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO
ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, U. VALUES: BULL.
ON INT'L AcAD. FREED'M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (July 2011), http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.edu/
documentsfLUVJULY_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/6APS-UG32] (archived Mar. 1, 2016);
KLAUS D. BEITER, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER
THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A REJOINDER TO ANTOON DE BAETS,
U. VALUES: BULL. ON INT'L ACAD. FREED'M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (Dec. 2013),
[https://perma.cc/69V2http://scholarsatrisk.nyu.eduldocuments/UVDEC-2013.pdf
SRMJ] (archived Mar. 1, 2016).
See, e.g., ANTOON DE BAETS, THE DOCTRINAL PLACE OF THE RIGHT TO
22.
ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER THE UN COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A REJOINDER,
U. VALUES: BULL. ON INT'L ACAD. FREED'M, AUTONOMY & RESP. (May 2012), http:/!
[https://perma.ccM2GF-JSP7]
scholarsatrisk.nyu.edudocuments/UVMAY_2012.pdf
(archived Mar. 1, 2016); Antoon de Baets, Some Puzzles of Academic Freedom (Part 1),
SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (July 3, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://salsa4.salsalabs.com/
[https://perma.cc/
o!50943/p/salsalwebfbloglpublic/?blog-entryKEY=32&killorg=True
J4WG-CK7E] (archived Mar. 2, 2016) (stating that "Article 13 is essential but
incomplete."); Antoon de Baets, Some Puzzles of Academic Freedom (Parts 2 and 3),
SCHOLARS AT RISK NETWORK (Jan. 9, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://salsa4.salsalabs.com/
[https://perma.cc/
o!50943/p/salsalweblblog/public/?blog-entryKEY=46&killorg=True
4EST-H27G] (archived Mar. 2, 2016) (discussing the degree to which various human
rights determine academic freedom). Problems associated with considering the right to
freedom of opinion and expression as the basis of the right to academic freedom are,
firstly, the fact that academic freedom entails much more than "free speech" rights,
namely, also rights of "free action" (e.g. conducting an experiment), and, secondly, the
fact that the free speech rights covered are, in fact, special speech rights, circumscribed
by the requirements of learning, teaching and research. See ERIC BARENDT, ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 17-21 (2010). Regarding the right to
respect for "the freedom indispensable for scientific research" in Article 15(3) of the
ICESCR, it should be noted that this is a general right belonging to all persons
undertaking scientific research (including, for example, researchers in private industry
or those in public or private specialist institutes). It may be rendered as what is termed
"Wissenschaftsfreiheit" in German constitutional theory, perhaps best translated as
"the right to free scholarship." The right to academic freedom, on the other hand,
accrues to a smaller group of right-holders-namely academic staff in HE institutions
(or research institutions "close" to the educational milieu)--but it entails entitlements
which are more far-reaching in their scope. As has been pointed out by a commentator,
"[a]cademic freedom as it is understood in the United Kingdom and the United States
is, in contrast [to "Wissenschaftsfreiheit"], a special right to which only those engaged
in teaching and research at universities and other comparable institutions are
entitled." The freedom of those not working at the latter institutions "may be narrower
than it is for university professors." The right to academic freedom is, however, also
enjoyed by students in HE, but the scope of their right is reduced when compared to
that of academic staff. See id. at 37-38. For a detailed account of the doctrinal place of
the right to academic freedom under the UN human rights covenants, see Klaus D.
Beiter, Terence Karran & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Yearning to Belong-Finding a
"Home" for the Right to Academic Freedom in the U.N. Human Rights Covenants, 11
INTERCULTURAL HUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
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There have been noteworthy developments at the international
level pertaining to the right to academic freedom. Three of these
should briefly be referred to. Firstly, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, the body of independent human rights
experts supervising the implementation of-and "authoritatively
interpreting"-the ICESCR, has, in its General Comment No. 13 on
the Right to Education, made some interesting observations
regarding "academic freedom and institutional autonomy." It states,
for example, that it "has formed the view that the right to education
can only be enjoyed if accompanied by the academic freedom of staff
and students" and that "[a]ccordingly, even though the issue is not
explicitly mentioned in Article 13, it is appropriate and necessary for
the Committee to make some observations about academic
23
freedom."
Secondly, the European Court of Human Rights, deciding on
applications alleging violations of the rights set out in the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1950,24 as amended and
supplemented, has recently begun commenting on certain aspects of
the right to academic freedom. It has resolved cases turning on issues
of free speech in an academic context on the basis of Article 10 of the
Convention, which protects the right to freedom of expression. The
first judgment that expressly referred to academic freedom was
Sorguq v. Turkey. 25 In this case, the Court "underline[d] the
importance of academic freedom, which comprises the academics'
freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or
system in which they work and freedom to distribute knowledge and
truth without restriction." 26 It found an award of damages for

23.
General Comment No. 13, supra note 8, T 38. The Committee then goes on
to provide a definition of "academic freedom," essentially resembling that cited at note
7 above, and to describe the concept of "institutional autonomy." Id. It 39, 40. Finally,
the Committee stresses that, although "staff and students in higher education are
especially vulnerable to political and other pressures which undermine academic
freedom," "staff and students throughout the education sector are entitled to academic
freedom." Id.
38. General Comments are interpretative tools. The Committee
generates them in an attempt to clarify Covenant provisions. Though not legally
binding, they do have considerable legal weight.
24.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR].
25.
Sorgu v. Turkey, App. No. 17089/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2009), http://
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-93161
[https://perma.cc/8F4D-VFZ8?type=image]
(archived Mar. 2, 2016).
26.
Id.
35. When making its comments on academic freedom, the Court
referred to Recom. 1762 (2006) on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy of the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17469&lang-en
[https://perma.cc/D2KC-FQC2] (archived May 10, 2016). Id. 21. It may be mentioned
that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has recently adopted another
document on the subject, Committee of Ministers, Recom. CM/Rec(2012)7 on the
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defamation against a professor to have violated the latter's right to
freedom of expression. In a paper, the professor had criticized
procedures for recruiting and promoting academics in his discipline.
An assistant professor, who felt the criticism to have been directed at
his person (although he had not expressly been mentioned),
27
subsequently had successfully claimed damages for defamation.
Thirdly, in 1997, UNESCO-the United Nations' specialized
agency with primary responsibility for international cooperation in
the fields of education, the natural, social and human sciences,
Recommendation
the
communication-adopted
and
culture,
Personnel. The
Teaching
concerning the Status of Higher-Education
teaching
to all higher-education
"applies
Recommendation
'28
This means "all those persons in institutions or
personnel.
programmes of higher education who are engaged to teach and/or to
undertake scholarship and/or to undertake research and/or to provide
educational services to students or to the community at large." 29 The
following matters are covered by the Recommendation:
- guiding principles (regarding HE and teaching personnel in HE)
3-9);
(part III,
- educational objectives and policies (in the sphere of HE) (part IV,

10-16);
-

institutional rights, duties and responsibilities
autonomy and institutional accountability) (part V,

(institutional
17-24);

Responsibility of Public Authorities for Academic Freedom and Institutional
Autonomy, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, https://wcd.coe.intNiewDoc.jsp?id=1954741&Site=CM
[https://perma.cc/7C3U-NRQ3] (archived Mar. 2, 2016).
Other cases dealing with academic freedom include Lombardi Vallauri v.
27.
Italy, App. No. 39128/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng#{"itemid":["001-95150"]} [https://perma.cc/GA5W-H4V6] (archived Mar. 2, 2016);
Sapan v. Turkey, App. No. 44102/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2010),
[https://perma.cc/
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-99160#"itemid": ["001-99160"]"
FUK9-MAY81 (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Aksu v. Turkey, App. Nos. 4149/04, 41029/04,
Eur. Ct. H.R., Grand Chamber (2012), http:/Jhudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109577
[https://perma.cc/SQ8Z-Q3Z7] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Hasan Yazici v. Turkey, App.
No. 40877/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001142637 [https://perma.ccKB2K-VSZR] (archived Mar. 2, 2016); Mustafa Erdo -an and
Others v. Turkey, App. Nos. 346/04, 39779/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 2nd Sec. (2014),
(archived
[https://perma.cc/Y9RP-7T6N]
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-144129
Mar. 2, 2016). In the last case, see also the interesting Joint Concurring Opinion of
Judges Saj6, Vu6ini6 and Kuiris, developing criteria for the protection of "extramural"
speech of academics.
28.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 2.
Id.
1(f). Predating this Recommendation is another Recommendation
29.
adopted by UNESCO: The Recommendation on the Status of Scientific Researchers of
1974. This instrument, applicable, as it is, to scientific researchers, and protecting,
amongst others, their freedom of research, covers a wider group of researchers than
only those in HE. The Recommendation defines "scientific researchers" as "those
persons responsible for investigating a specific domain in science or technology""sciences" meaning the sciences concerned with social facts and phenomena, to the
extent that theoretical elements are capable of being validated-irrespective of the type
of establishment in which such researchers work, the motivation underlying the
1.
research, and the kind of application to which it relates most immediately. Id.
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-

rights and freedoms of higher-education teaching personnel
(individual rights and freedoms, including civil rights, academic
freedom, publication rights, and the international exchange of
information, as well as self-governance and collegiality) (part VI,
1 25-32);
- duties and responsibilities of higher-education teaching personnel
(part VII, IT 33-36);
- preparation for the profession (part VIII, 11 37-39);
- terms and conditions of employment (entry into the academic
profession; security of employment; appraisal; discipline and
dismissal; negotiation of terms and conditions, of employment;
salaries, workload, social security benefits, health and safety;
study and research leave and annual holidays; terms and
conditions of employment of women, disabled and part-time
higher-education teaching personnel) (part IX, 1 40-72);
- utilization and implementation (part X, 1 73-76); and
- final provision (providing that the Recommendation may not be
invoked to diminish a more favorable status already granted to
higher-education teaching personnel) (part XI, 1 77).
The Recommendation is more than a mere code regulating the
profession of HE teaching. Apart from improving the professional,
material, and social position of higher-education teaching personnel,
it is also, as a result of improvements in that position, aimed at
enhancing the quality of the HE system. 30 It is appreciated that HE
is "instrumental in the pursuit, advancement and transfer of
knowledge" in enabling students to fully satisfy their higher
educational needs in accordance with their right to education and for
industry to be able to rely on a well-qualified workforce, but that
these goals can only be accomplished if there exists a HE system of
high quality. 31 Recognizing the decisive role that higher education
teaching personnel has towards reaching the stated goals, such
32
personnel "[must] enjoy the status commensurate with this role."
Although the Recommendation is not, as such, "an international
instrument on academic freedom," guaranteeing academic freedom in
HE is a fundamental concern of the document. Already the Preamble
to the Recommendation, in Recitals 8 and 9,
[e]xpress[es] concern regarding the vulnerability of the academic community to
untoward political pressures which could undermine academic freedom, [and]

30.
See KLAUS D. BEITER, THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INCLUDING A SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 280 (2006).

31.
32.

UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, at pmbl. (recitals 3, 4).
Id. recitals 5, 10.
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[c]onsider[s]that the right to education, teaching and research can only be fully
enjoyed in an atmosphere of academic freedom and autonomy for institutions of
higher education and that the open communication of findings, hypotheses and
opinions lies at the very heart of higher education and provides the strongest
guarantee of the accuracy and objectivity of scholarship and research.

It thus recognizes the importance of ensuring academic freedom and
institutional autonomy if HE is to achieve the objectives identified
above. Various provisions of the Recommendation address aspects of
academic freedom. As these constitute the most current expression of
agreed upon international standards on the topic, they will be used as
the basis for assessing compliance with the right to academic freedom
in Europe in the discussion that follows.
UNESCO's Recommendations are not legally binding. However,
it would be wrong to hold them to be legally irrelevant. They "bind" as
soft law. Appreciating that Recommendations have been adopted by
the General Conference of UNESCO, they must be considered to
reflect an international consensus on their specific subject matter.
Recommendations "have a normative character in their intent and
effects and the States concerned regard them as political or moral
commitments."3 3 Of note is Paragraph 74 of the Recommendation of
1997, which calls upon "Member States and higher education
institutions [to] take all feasible steps to apply the provisions [of the
Recommendation] to give effect, within their respective territories, to
the principles set forth in [the] Recommendation." Moreover, under
UNESCO's Constitution, UNESCO's members are obliged to submit
the various recommendations adopted to their competent authorities
so that the latter may take cognizance of their provisions and are
further obliged to report on the measures taken towards and the
progress made in implementing recommendations. 3 4 As the 1997
Recommendation deals with international labor and international
education law, a Joint ILO/UNESCO Committee of Experts on the
Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel
(CEART) supervises its implementation by UNESCO member

33.
YVES DAUDET & KISHORE SINGH, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: AN ANALYSIS
OF UNESCO's STANDARD-SETTING INSTRUMENTS 45 (2001), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0012/001238/123817e.pdf [https://perma.ccfVFQ7-4CYR] (archived Mar. 1,
2016). Examples of other UNESCO Recommendations are the Recommendation
against Discrimination in Education (1960), the Recommendation concerning the
Status of Teachers (1966), and the Recommendation on the Status of Scientific
Researchers (1974).
34.
UNESCO, Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, art. IV(4), (6), opened for signature Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S.
275 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1946), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php.URLID=152
[https://perma.cc/N8T6-NHDV]
44&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html
(archived Mar. 1, 2016).
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states. 35 The Committee is composed of twelve independent expertssix appointed by UNESCO and six by the ILO. It holds sessions every
three years. The Committee essentially performs two tasks: it
examines relevant data, including the reports referred to, to adjudge
application of the Recommendation, and it examines allegations
received from teachers' organizations on the non-observance of
36
provisions of the Recommendation in member states.

III. DEVELOPING A STANDARD SCORECARD "TO MEASURE" THE RIGHT TO
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE

A. The "Legal"Protectionof the Right to Academic Freedom: The
Requirement of Legislation
The Human Rights Committee, the body of independent human
rights experts supervising implementation of the ICCPR, has
stressed, in one of its General Comments, that "unless Covenant
rights are already protected by ... domestic laws or practices, States

Parties are required on ratification to make such changes to domestic
laws and practices as are necessary to ensure their conformity with
the Covenant. ' 37 Likewise, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights entertains the view that, in realizing rights under
the ICESCR, "in many instances legislation is highly desirable and in

35.
Already in 1966, UNESCO adopted a Recommendation concerning the
Status of Teachers, applicable to teachers in schools from the pre-primary up to
completion of the secondary level of education.
36.
For more information on the supervision of the relevant Recommendations,
see BEITER, supra note 30, at 282-84. See also Rep. of the Joint ILO/UNESCO Comm.
of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel
on Its Tenth Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc. CEART/10/2009 (2009); Rep. of the Joint
ILO/UNESCO Comm. of Experts on the Application of the Recommendations
concerning Teaching Personnel on Its Eleventh Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc.
CEART/11/2012/9 (2012); Rep. of the Joint ILO/UNESCO Comm. of Experts on the
Application of the Recommendations concerning Teaching Personnel on Its Twelfth
Session, ILO/UNESCO Doc. CEART/12/2015/14 (2015).
37.
General Comment No. 31 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the
Covenant,
13, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). In fact, Article 2(2) of the
ICCPR provides that "[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the... Covenant undertakes to take the necessary
steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of
the ...Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the ...Covenant." (emphasis added); see also
MANFRED NOwAK, Article 2: Domestic Implementation and Prohibition of
Discrimination, in U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITIcAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 27, 59-60,
56 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (stating that "the formulation
'legislative or other measures' demonstrates the priority of legislative measures.").
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some cases may even be indispensable."3 8 Although the Covenants do
not unequivocally make the adoption of legislation mandatory, these
Committee statements, it is submitted, suggest that-to secure the
effective realization of human rights and to respect fundamental
principles of democracy-all salient elements in the definition of the
various human rights, the general framework authorizing measures
aimed at fulfilling them, and possible limitations of those rights be
contained in legislation adopted by national parliaments. 3 9 Such
legislation will increase the visibility of the rights to those entitled to
claim them, bind organs of government to respect, protect and fulfill
them, and enable right-holders

administrative

or judicial

to enforce them before competent

tribunals.

Subordinate

legislation

as

adopted by executive/administrative organs of state may then "add

flesh to the bones" and operationalize the norms contained in primary
legislation, but cannot substitute the latter where it is mandatory.

Ultimately, the functionaries/organs adopting subordinate legislation
are (usually) not directly legitimated by and accountable to the
electorate. Protective standards contained in subordinate legislation
40
may, moreover, easily be changed or abrogated again.

The present assessment of compliance
UNESCO's

Recommendation

of

1997

will

with the criteria of
essentially

examine

whether states have complied with the requirement of adopting
legislation protecting the different aspects of the right to academic
freedom,

as described

in

the Recommendation.

It

will apply the

standards in respect of "legislation" as just described with regard to

38.
General Comment No. 3 of the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Article 2(1) of
the ICESCR),
3, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III, 86 (1991). Article 2(1) of the
ICESCR provides that "[e]ach State Party to the... Covenant undertakes to take
steps ... with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized in the... Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the
adoption of legislative measures." (emphasis added); see also MATTHEW C. CRAVEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 125 (1995) (stating that "it has commonly been
asserted that the enactment of legislation is essential to the implementation of
economic, social, and cultural rights on the domestic plane."); MANISULI SSENYONJO,
2.14 (2009)
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55,
(remarking that "[l]egislative measures are indispensable in the protection of all
human rights including ESC rights.").
39.
In fact, for limitations of rights, this is confirmed in the various general
and specific limitation provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
Where essential aspects of the right to academic freedom have been
40.
provided for in government regulations or directives, or university statutes (but not in
parliamentary legislation), this ordinarily does not therefore satisfy (or fully satisfy)
requirements for adequate 'legal" protection. The same holds true with regard to
collective agreements, which, as such, constitute neither primary nor secondary
legislation. The assessment undertaken in this article has borne out that a number of
the states analyzed regulate essential aspects of the right to academic freedom only at
the level of secondary legislation (e.g. Denmark, Portugal, Sweden or the UK) or
collective agreements (e.g. Austria or the Netherlands).
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the UN Covenants. Clearly, parliamentary legislation on its own does
not suffice to realize human rights. Other means (governmental
policies, regulations and directives, university statutes, financial
resources,
infrastructure, personnel,
information,
etc.) will
additionally have to be relied on. The large-scale absence of primary
legislation on the topic, as the case of the United Kingdom
demonstrates, does not necessarily mean that academic freedom may
not, all the same, enjoy protection in practice. However, the chances
of academic freedom enjoying such protection are greatly enhanced
where an adequate legislative framework is provided for.
B. The Provisionson Academic Freedom in UNESCO's
Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education
Teaching Personnel of 1997
The relevant provisions of UNESCO's Recommendation may, for
purposes of the assessment of the legal protection of the right to
academic freedom in Europe undertaken here, be divided into four
41
groups:
There are provisions on individual rights and freedoms in
Paragraphs 25 to 30. These include all "internationally recognized
civil, political, social and cultural rights applicable to all citizens"
(Paragraph 26) and further "the principle of academic freedom"
(Paragraph 27)42 (the latter constituting academic freedom stricto
sensu, academic freedom lato senso encompassing all claims
relevant to sustaining academic freedom, including the three
below).
There are provisions on institutionalautonomy in Paragraphs 17
to 21, institutional autonomy being "that degree of self-governance
necessary for effective decision-making by institutions of higher
education regarding their academic work, standards, management
and related activities consistent with systems of public
accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the
state, and respect for academic freedom and human rights"
(Paragraph 17).
There are provisions on self-governance and on collegiality in
Paragraphs 31 and 32. Self-governance means the right of highereducation teaching personnel "to take part in the governing bodies
and to criticize the functioning of higher education institutions,
including their own," and "the right to elect a majority of
representatives to academic bodies within the higher education
institution" (Paragraph 31).

41.
See Karran, supra note 2, at 195-96.
42.
The UNESCO Recommendation's definition of "academic freedom" has
been cited at note 7 above.
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There are provisions to the effect that higher-education teaching
personnel should enjoy security of employment, including "tenure
or its functional equivalent, where applicable," in Paragraphs 45
and 46.
A few words should be said with regard to each of the aspects
43
protected, starting with "the principle of academic freedom."
-

Scholars have been described as "dangerous" minds. 44 As one of the
Recommendation's guiding principles articulates, "[i]nstitutions of
higher education . . . are communities of scholars preserving,
disseminating and expressing freely their opinions on traditional
knowledge and culture, and pursuing new knowledge without
constriction by prescribed doctrines." 45 Challenging orthodox ideas
and beliefs and creating new knowledge means that, "because of the
nature of their work, academics are more naturally led in to conflict
46
with governments and other seats of authority."
For this reason, advances in HE not only depend on
infrastructure and resources but also need to be underpinned by
academic freedom. 4 7 Higher-education teaching personnel thus "have
a right to carry out research work without any interference, or any
suppression,... subject to . . . recognized professional principles of
intellectual rigour, scientific inquiry and research ethics."4 8 They
"should also have the right to publish and communicate the
conclusions of the research of which they are authors or coauthors."49 They further "have the right to teach without any
interference, subject to accepted professional principles," "should not
be forced to instruct against their own best knowledge and
conscience," and "should play a significant role in determining the
curriculum." 50 Academic freedom is subject to important duties and
responsibilities, as described in Paragraphs 33 to 36. There is, for
example, a duty of higher-education teaching personnel "to teach
students effectively," as there is a duty "to base . . . research and

UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 27; for analyses of academic
43.
freedom as an individual right, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 170-75; Andr6 Prilm
& Rusen Ergec, La libertg acaddmique, No. 1 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE
POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'tTRANGER [RDP] 1, 13-17 (2010), https://orbilu.
uni.lulbitstream10993/l1016/lfRDP_2010.AP RE liberte-academique.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/4BLS-W8MX] (archived Mar. 1, 2016); VRIELINK ET AL., supra note 8, at 9-18,
27-59.
44.
Robert Quinn, Defending "Dangerous"Minds: Reflections on the Work of
the Scholars at Risk Network, 5 ITEMS & ISSUES 1, 1 (2004).
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 4.
45.
46.
Karran, supra note 2, at 191.
5 (one of the
See UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7,
47.
Recommendation's guiding principles).
Id. 29.
48.
Id.
49.
50.
Id. 28.
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scholarship on an honest search for knowledge with due respect for
'5 1
evidence, impartial reasoning and honesty in reporting.
UNESCO member states are obliged "to protect higher education
institutions from threats to their autonomy coming from any
source." 52 Threats need not, therefore, necessarily emanate from the
state, but they may, for example, originate with private actors such
as private companies commissioning research. As has been indicated,
institutional autonomy is "that degree of self-governance necessary
for effective decision-making by institutions of higher education
regarding their academic work, standards, management and related
activities ....53 It is important to appreciate that there is no
automatic link between institutional autonomy and individual
academic freedom: "[A] highly autonomous institution may offer its
members only a limited degree of academic freedom. In other words,
in today's relationship between university autonomy and the state,
university autonomy does not subsume academic freedom." In fact,
"[a]s certain responsibilities move gradually from public authorities
to higher education institutions, academic freedom could be
endangered. Even if the rationale for institutional autonomy were
specifically to ensure academic freedom, one does not produce the
other." 54 It is for this reason that the UNESCO Recommendation
stresses that a proper interpretation of institutional autonomy needs
to render that term as autonomy "consistent with . .. respect for
academic freedom." 55 As it were, the Recommendation understands
autonomy to be "the institutional form of academic freedom." 56
Autonomy should further "not be used by higher education
institutions as a pretext to limit the rights of higher-education
teaching personnel provided for in [the] Recommendation. '5 7
Autonomy must go hand in hand with public accountability. The
Recommendation requires "Member States and higher education
institutions [to] ensure a proper balance between the level of

51.
Id.
34(a), (c); see, e.g., DONALD KENNEDY, ACADEMIC DuTY (1997)
(arguing in support of rigorous standards of academic responsibility).
52.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7,
19. For analyses of
institutional autonomy as an aspect of the right to academic freedom, see, e.g., Proim &
Ergec, supra note 43, at 18-21; VRIELINK ETAL., supra note 8, at 18-22,
60-76.
53.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 17.
54.
Pavel Zgaga, Reconsidering University Autonomy and Governance: From
Academic Freedom to Institutional Autonomy, in UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND
REFORM: POLICY, FADS, AND EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 11, 19 (Hans
G. Schuetze et al. eds., 2012).
55.
UNESCO Recommendation, 17.
56.
Id.
18;
see
Walter
Berka,
Die Quadratur des Kreises:
Universitdtsautonomie
und
Wissenschaftsfreiheit,
7
ZEITSCHRIF
FUR
HOCHSCHULRECHT, HOCHSCHULMANAGEMENT UND HOCHSCHULPOLITIK 37 (2008)
(describing the general difficulty of reconciling institutional autonomy and academic
freedom, emphasizing the Austrian context).
57.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 20.
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autonomy enjoyed by higher education institutions and their systems
of accountability." 58 HE institutions are thus accountable for a
commitment to quality and excellence in teaching and research,
ensuring high quality education, the creation of codes of ethics to
guide teaching and research, honest and open accounting, and an
efficient use of resources. 59 They are also accountable for "assistance
in the fulfilment of economic, social, cultural and political rights,"
"ensuring that they address themselves to the contemporary
problems facing society" and "[playing] an important role in
60
enhancing the labour market opportunities of their graduates."
Very importantly, HE institutions are accountable for "effective
61
support of academic freedom and fundamental human rights."
Academics pursue their scholarly activities within an
institutional setting. The institutions in which they work will have to
organize themselves-their structures, governance, and activities-in
one way or another. Respect for academic freedom implies that the
organization be such as will ensure that free teaching and research
can take place in the institutions. This will be the case if a specific
HE institution organizes itself in a way that guarantees
persons/organs make decisions that are "in the best interest of science
and scholarship" ("wissenschaftsaddquat").This, in turn, will only be
the case if academics as those entitled to claim academic freedom can
sufficiently participate in the taking of these decisions. Clearly, by
virtue of their training and competence, their long-lasting
professional occupation with certain subject matter, as well as the
fact that such decisions will have a long-term effect on their scholarly
work, academics are best qualified to ensure that decisions taken are
"in the best interest of science and scholarship" and support academic
62
freedom.
UNESCO's Recommendation contains provisions on selfgovernance and collegiality. As already indicated, self-governance

58.
Id. 22 (caput).
59.
See id. 22(b), (d), (k), (i), (j).
60.
Id. 22(1), (in).
Id. 22(c).
61.
DES
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
Hochschulgesetz,
See
Hamburgisches
62.
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20,
88-95 (Ger.) (the court, relying on important
2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, at 114-18,
earlier case law, proposed this line of reasoning in justification of the right of selfgovernance, observing that the goal here had to be to ensure that relevant decisions
were "in the best interest of science and scholarship" ("wissenschaftsaddquat"));Ralf
Miiller-Terpitz, Neue Leistungsstrukturen als Gefdhrdung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit?,
44 WISSENscHAFTSRECHT 236 (2011) (discussing when governance arrangements of HE
institutions may be considered to be consistent with academic freedom; although the
article deals with the situation in Germany, most of its statements are equally
applicable in a more general sense); for analyses of self-governance as an aspect of the
right to academic freedom, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 175-76; Proim & Ergec,
65-66.
supra note 43, at 21-25; VRIELINK ETAL., supra note 8, at 19-20,
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entails that higher-education teaching personnel should have the
right, "without discrimination of any kind, according to their abilities,
to take part in the governing bodies and to criticize the functioning of
higher education institutions, including their own, while respecting
the right of other sections of the academic community to participate"
and the right further "to elect a majority of representatives to
academic bodies within the higher education institution." 63 The
closely related principles of collegiality that are to apply in terms of
the
Recommendation
"include
academic
freedom,
shared
responsibility, the policy of participation of all concerned in internal
decision-making structures and practices, and the development of
consultative mechanisms." 64 It is pointed out that "[c]ollegial
decision-making
should encompass
decisions regarding the
administration and determination of policies of higher education,
curricula, research, extension work, the allocation of resources and
other related activities, in order to improve academic excellence and
quality for the benefit of society at large." 65 If it has been explained
above that institutional autonomy should be interpreted so as to be
consistent with academic freedom, it should be added that "[s]elfgovernance, collegiality and appropriate academic leadership are
essential components of meaningful autonomy for institutions of
higher education." 66 Consequently, a HE institution that enjoys
substantial autonomy, but in which higher-education teaching
personnel cannot sufficiently participate in the taking of decisions
having a bearing-whether in a wider or a narrower sense-on
science and scholarship fails to comply with the requirement of
institutional autonomy as understood by the Recommendation.
Finally, UNESCO's Recommendation emphasizes that highereducation teaching personnel should enjoy security of employment,
including "tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable."67 In
the Recommendation's perception, tenure (or its equivalent)
"constitutes one of the major procedural safeguards of academic
freedom and against arbitrary decisions." 6 8 Tenure may seem
anomalous in the modern working environment, characterized by

63.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 31.
64.
Id. 32.
65.
Id.
66.
Id. 21.
67.
Id. 99 45, 46.
68.
Id. 9 45; for analyses of "tenure" as an aspect of the right to academic
freedom, see, e.g., Karran, supra note 8, at 177-85; Prim & Ergec, supra note 43, at
26; cf. Margherita Rendel, Human Rights and Academic Freedom, in ACADEMIC
FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 74, 87 (Malcolm Tight ed., 1988) (explaining that tenure
also protects institutional autonomy, remarking that it "is important because it can
defend not only the individual academic but also the institution from ideological and
managerial pressures, by helping them to continue to teach unfashionable or
unpopular subjects, to research inconvenient topics and to provide more centres of
initiative than hierarchical management can.")
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high employment mobility, regular retraining for new jobs, previous
ones becoming obsolete, fixed-term contracts awarded in respect of
projects rather than "life-time jobs," and contracts of service that may
easily be terminated on operational grounds. Yet, it is important to
remember that tenure is not granted to academics as "a mere
proprietary benefit," as it were.
In its caput, the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, adopted by the American Association of
University Professors and the Association of American Colleges
(today the Association of American Colleges and Universities),
underlines that "[i]nstitutions of higher education are conducted for
the common good and not to further the interest of either the
individual teacher or the institution as a whole," "[t]he common good
69
depend[ing] upon the free search for truth and its free exposition."
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its landmark decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, solemnly declared that "[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendental value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers
concerned. '70 Hence, tenure-and academic freedom, which it
protects by ensuring that academics can engage in a free search for
the truth without having to fear losing their jobs because of the views
closely linked to scholars' responsibility for
expressed 7 1-are
promoting the interests of society as a whole through their teaching
72
and research.
Paragraph 46 of UNESCO's Recommendation envisages tenure
(or its equivalent) to be granted "after a reasonable period of
probation" 73-"following rigorous evaluation" 7 4-"to those who meet
stated objective criteria in teaching . . . [and] research to the

American Association of University Professors, 1940 Statement of
69.
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, caput, first paragraph.
70.
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
See CONRAD RUSSELL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM 23 (1993) (stating that "[tihe
71.
point is not that academics may not be dismissed for their opinions: it is that they need
freedom from fear that they might be so dismissed. Without it, they cannot be counted
on to do their work well.").
72.
The justification for safeguarding academic freedom and tenure is, in fact,
two-fold: first, to ensure that scholars can engage in a free search for the truth for the
benefit of society as a whole and, second, to advance "ethical individualism" (values of
intellectual independence). See Ronald Dworkin, We Need a New Interpretation of
Academic Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 185-89 (Louis
Menand ed., 1996) (describing both the instrumental and ethical bases of protection for
academic freedom in this context).
42
46; see also id.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7,
73.
(stipulating that the duration of probation should be known in advance and conditions
for its satisfactory completion strictly related to professional competence, that reasons
should be provided in the event a candidate fails to complete the probation
satisfactorily, and that there should be a right to appeal).
74.
Id. 46.
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satisfaction of an academic body." 7 5 Tenure (or its equivalent) entails
''continuing employment" and potential dismissal "on professional
grounds and in accordance with due process" only. 76 The
Recommendation allows release "for bona fide financial reasons,
provided that all the financial accounts are open to public inspection,
that the institution has taken all reasonable alternative steps to
prevent termination of employment, and that there are legal
safeguards against bias in any termination of employment
procedure." 7 7 Moreover, tenure (or its equivalent) "should be
safeguarded as far as possible even when changes in the organization
78
of or within a higher education institution or system are made."
C. The Scorecard
There is no reason why the four parameters of the right to
academic freedom, as defined above, should not, in an assessment of
the protection of the right to academic freedom in Europe, be given
equal weight. Academic freedom (individual freedom to teach and
carry out research) is as important as are each of institutional
autonomy, self-governance, and tenure to buttress academic
freedom. 79 The standard scorecard used "to measure" the right to
academic freedom in each country examined will, therefore, accord
the four parameters equal weight-20 percent each. The final 20
percent to arrive at an overall percentage score for each country
assessed is accorded to the parameter "ratification of international
agreements and constitutional protection." Altogether, thirty-seven
specific indicators measuring state compliance, concretizing the main
parameters, have been identified. These are human rights
indicators-indicators essentially operationalizing the requirements
of the right to academic freedom as protected under international
human rights law. A numeric value has been assigned to each
indicator, mirroring its relative weight as adjudged in terms of
international human rights law. When adding up the scores of states
in respect of each of these values, it is possible to rank states for each
of the five parameters, as well as to give them overall rankings. To
eliminate subjectivity in "giving marks," the approach with regard to
each indicator-following Karran's earlier method in this respecthas been to determine whether there is "full compliance" (full mark),
"qualified compliance" (half of the mark), or "non-compliance" (no

75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
See Karran, supra note 1, at 291-92 ("Inn the absence of data as to the
relative importance of various parameters of academic freedom, [it may be] assume[d]
that all such parameters are equally important.").
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mark). 80 Hence, a three-point scale is generally applied. In three
instances, it was found expedient to apply a five-point scale, to
highlight positions "between full and partial compliance" and
"between partial and non-compliance" (see B., D.2.3. and E.3. of the
scorecard shown below). A two-point scale ("full compliance" or "noncompliance") is used for indicators in A.1. on the ratification of
international agreements.
Some detail on the scorecard, its parameters, and the various
indicators will now be provided-for purposes of illustration, the
example of the scorecard (with the results for Austria), reproduced at
the end of this subpart, should be referred to. The first column (A)
reflects whether the states at issue accept obligations of "superior
normative force" (in the sense of obligations not "merely" originating
under ordinary legislation) relevant to the right to academic freedom
(i.e., whether states have ratified relevant international agreements
(10 percent) and whether their constitutions provide appropriate
protection (10 percent)). Regarding international agreements, the
inquiry is whether states have ratified the following four global
agreements: the ICCPR of 1966 (with its Article 19 on the right to
freedom of expression); the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1966
(setting up a procedure in terms of which allegations of violations of
Covenant rights may be brought before the Human Rights
Committee); the ICESCR of 1966 (with its Article 13 on the right to
education); and the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR of 2008 (setting
up a procedure in terms of which allegations of violations of Covenant
rights may be brought before the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights); and the following regional agreement: the ECHR of
1950, as amended and supplemented (with its Article 10 on the right
to freedom of expression). 81 In view of their universal character,
slightly more weight has been accorded to the global instruments (60
percent). A state that has ratified a treaty but has expressed a
reservation to, notably, the right to freedom of expression or the right
to education problematic from the perspective of the right to academic
freedom will be considered "non-compliant." Regarding constitutional

80.
See Karran, supra note 2, at 198 ("For these reasons, . .. each nation was
adjudged to be in compliance, qualified compliance, or non-compliance with the
UNESCO Recommendation.").
81.
Although the ECHR also protects the right to education in Article 2 of its
Protocol No. 1, it does so negatively, stating that "[nlo person shall be denied the right
to education." It has convincingly been argued that "[t]he right to university education
is a human right" under the ECHR. See Tarantino v. Italy, 2013-IT Eur. Ct. H.R. 397,
416 (Pinto de Albuquerque, J., partly dissenting). The nature and scope of any such
right remain contentious, however. See BEITER, supra note 30, at 162-66 (commenting
on the nature and scope of the right to education in the first sentence of Article 2, in
particular the nature of state obligations). The European Social Charter (opened for
signature Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965)) does not, also not
in its revised version (opened for signature May 3, 1996, E.T.S. 163 (entered into force
July 1, 1999)), contain a right to higher education.
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protection, it will be assessed whether there are adequate,
problematic, or seriously deficient/no provisions in the constitutions
of states in respect of each of the following: (1) the right to freedom of
expression; (2) the right to academic freedom; and, as aspects of the
latter, (3) institutional autonomy; and (4) academic self-governance
(60 percent). 82 It will further be assessed whether the normative
context of constitutions (for example, values reflected by relevant
provisions and specific or general limitations clauses) fully supports
the effective protection of the rights concerned (40 percent).
The second to fifth columns consider whether states have
complied with the requirement of adopting legislation providing
expressly that academic freedom is to be protected (column B), and
autonomy
concretizing
institutional
legislation satisfactorily
(column C), self-governance (column D), and job security (including
"tenure") (column E) in HE. Under column B, there is only one
indicator that inquires whether HE legislation contains express
provisions on academic freedom (primarily in the sense of individual
freedom to teach and carry out research). Do these comply notably
with the Recommendation's criteria on academic freedom, and do
they show that academic freedom should serve as a guiding principle
for activity within HE (full compliance)? Or is there a mere reference
to academic freedom, alternatively, are there more elaborate
provisions on academic freedom, which, however, reveal various
deficits (partial compliance)? Or is there no reference to academic
freedom at all (non-compliance)? Or is there, in fact, a situation that
may be described as being "between full and partial compliance" or
"between partial and non-compliance?" The indicator of column B
thus applies a five-point scale to assess compliance.
Column C covers indicators on institutional autonomy. The
European University Association (EUA) monitors, on an ongoing
basis, the extent to which HE institutions in the various European
states enjoy autonomy. As part of these efforts, it has produced two
reports 83 and administers an online platform, 84 which may usefully

82.
Provisions on the right to education have not been taken into account.
Full-fledged provisions on the right to education are found in only some European
constitutions. The notion of protecting economic, social, and cultural rights as entailing
extensive positive obligations for states is still foreign to constitutional theory in most
parts of Europe. Also tenure has not been considered separately here because "tenure"
as a technical concept is unknown in many European counties.
83.
THOMAs ESTERMANN & TERHI NOKKALA, UNIvERsITY AUTONOMY IN
STUDY (European University Association, 2009),
EUROPE I: EXPLORATORY
http://www.eua.be/typo3conf/ext/bzb-securelinklpushFile.php?cuid=3040&fle=fileadmi
THOMAS
nuser-upload/files/Publications/UniversityAutonomy-inEurope.pdf;
ESTERMANN, TERHI NOKKALA & MONIKA STEINEL, UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY IN EUROPE
II: THE SCORECARD (European University Association, 2011) [hereinafter ESTERMANN
ET AL., SCORECARD], http://www.eua.be/Libraries/Publications/UniversityAutonomyinEuropeII - TheScorecard.pdf [http://perma.cc/3E3W-FLY3] (archived Feb. 26,
2016).
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be consulted in establishing the elements encompassed by
institutional autonomy. UNESCO's Recommendation does not
provide detail in this respect and only remarks that "the nature of
institutional autonomy may differ according to the type of
establishment involved. ' 85 The EUA thus distinguishes between
organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy and, for
each of these, applies various indicators to measure compliance. Some
of these may usefully be applied in establishing to what extent HE
institutions in the European states enjoy autonomy for purposes of
this study. At the same time, it needs to be emphasized that the work
of the EUA reveals flaws when adjudged from a human rights
perspective.
Although the reports quote literature on academic freedom,
academic freedom has in many ways been sacrificed on the altar of a
notion of institutional autonomy misconceived in various respects. To
mention but a few examples: the EUA considers autonomy to cover
the ability to charge tuition fees, 8 6 without mentioning that, under
Article 13(2)(c) of the ICESCR, fees in higher education should
principally be reduced and eventually be abolished. 87 It considers
autonomy to cover the capacity to generally decide on dismissals,
without mentioning that, in accordance with criteria on tenure-as
has been and will be further explained-dismissals may occur in
defined cases only. 88 It considers autonomy to cover the freedom to
include external members in governing bodies, without mentioning
that academic self-governance, by its very nature, would require
there to be restrictions on the inclusion of such members in the
governing bodies. 89 Furthermore, the EUA does not-as it shouldtake account of threats to university autonomy emanating from
actors other than governments, for example, private companies

84.
See University Autonomy in Europe, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY ASSOCIATION
(archived
[http://perma.cc/2A87-BVC9]
(2012), http://www.university-autonomy.eu
Feb. 26, 2016) (showing scorecards on university autonomy for twenty-nine European
countries).
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 17.
85.
86.
See ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 34-36 (stating that
"[u]niversities' ability to set fees and decide on their level is often essential to ensuring
their financial capacity.").
87.
See BEITER, supra note 30, at 387-88, 400-01, 458, 526, 572-73, 594, 651
(stressing that, by introducing or increasing study fees in HE, states parties to the
ICESCR, unless they can present sound reasons for doing so, violate the Covenant).
See ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 42 (revealing that
88.
the EUA considers the level of institutional autonomy to be higher, the easier it is for
HE institutions to be able "to fire" academic staff).
89.
Id. at 27-28 (stating that "[t]he inclusion and appointment of external
members is an important aspect of a university's governing structure," clearly
supporting the notion that the management of HE institutions should have a free hand
in including and appointing external members).
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commissioning research. 90 In the light of these observations, the
indicators chosen inquire: whether there is a satisfactory,
problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision in HE legislation
expressly protecting institutional autonomy (C.1.) (20 percent); how
each of organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy is
realized by reference to one or two legitimate key indicators in each
instance, with each aspect of autonomy weighted equally (C.2.) (40
percent); 9 1 overall, how wide or narrow the extent of governmental
powers are (C.3.) (20 percent); 9 2 and, finally, as to the extent to which
institutional independence is protected against private interests
93
(C.4.) (20 percent).
Column D covers indicators on self-governance. The first
indicator ascertains whether there is a satisfactory, problematic, or
seriously deficient/no provision in HE legislation expressly protecting
self-governance (D.1.) (10 percent). This is followed by a group of
indicators examining the state of self-governance at the level of the
HE institution (D.2.), and another set of indicators measuring this at
the faculty/departmental level (D.3.). As institutional decisions
usually bind those adopting decisions at the faculty/departmental
level, self-governance at the institutional level has been accorded
double
the
weight
assigned
to
self-governance
at the
faculty/departmental level (60 percent to 30 percent). The indicators
seek to ascertain whether HE legislation safeguards the right of
academic staff to sufficiently participate in the taking of decisions
directly or indirectly related to science and scholarship.
UNESCO's Recommendation requires academic staff to be able
"to elect a majority of representatives to academic bodies within the

90.
Id. at 8 (it is thus merely stated that "[u]niversity governance and the
relationship between the state and higher education institutions are issues that have
generated intense debate in recent years." (emphasis added)).
91.
The indicators are organizational autonomy (autonomy to determine the
rector, and autonomy to decide on the internal structure (faculties, departments, etc.)),
financial autonomy (block grants with/without restrictions or line-item budgets, and
express competence to perform commissioned research), staffing autonomy (right to
define academic positions and their requirements, and to recruit and promote academic
staff), and academic autonomy (capacity to determine the selection criteria for bachelor
students and to select the latter, and whether or not bachelor programs need not be
accredited).
92.
This covers the aspect of the form state supervision takes, i.e., the question
whether, in addition to supervising whether legal requirements have been complied
with (German: "Rechtsaufsicht"), the state is also required to review decisions on their
merits (German: "Fachaufsicht").The former should always be an obligation of the
state, but the latter constitutes a diminution of institutional autonomy.
93.
For example, is there a clear statement in HE legislation emphasizing that
private funding should not compromise the independence of teaching and research in
HE institutions? Is there a requirement to the effect that HE institutions reveal the
sources and scope of private funding? Is there a clear restriction of undue influence
exercised by the representatives of private interests on the HE institution's governing
bodies?
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higher education institution." 94 Countries will earn half the mark
where they provide that 50 to 59 percent of the members of the senate
(or its equivalent) are to be representatives of academic staff (D.2.1.).
The same applies with regard to the composition of collegial bodies at
faculty/departmental level (D.3.1.). A higher percentage, ideally
95
between 60 and 70 percent, will earn them the full mark.
Whereas the taking of decisions on essentially academic matters
constitutes the core competence of the senate (or its equivalent) or a
faculty/departmental representative body, the primary responsibility
of directing the institution/faculty/department accrues to the
who
is
the
of
department,
rector/dean/head
chief executive officer. The
institution's/faculty's/department's
UNESCO Recommendation does not comment on these positions
separately. It does, however, state that academic staff should have
the right "to take part in the governing bodies" 96 and further
enshrines the principle of collegiality, remarking that this includes
shared responsibility, the participation of all in internal decisionmaking and consultative mechanisms. 9 7 Clearly, this is closest to the
primus inter pares model, in terms of which academic staff are to
decide on "their leaders" themselves, choosing them from among
themselves, for a certain period of time, after which they become
ordinary members of staff again. Under this model, academic staff
should also be able to express a lack of confidence in their leaders'
ability to lead, where appropriate. 98 Specifically with regard to the
rector, Karran has pointed out that, if these arrangements apply, the
rector "is unlikely to take decisions that undermine the academic
freedom of the staff, as [he/she] knows that at the end [of his/her]
term of office, someone else could be elected as Rector and take
retaliatory actions against [him/her]. ' 9 9 Indicators on the rector
(D.2.2.) or dean/head of department (D.3.2.) (accorded the same

94.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 31.
95.
The assessment also takes into account whether the provisions on the
composition of the senate (or its equivalent) or collegial bodies at the
faculty/departmental level also comply in all other respects with accepted requirements
of academic self-governance (for example, all categories of academic staff should take
part in the election of representatives).
96.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 31.
97.
Id. 32.
98.
The Latin phrase "primus inter pares" signifies that the rector or
dean/head of department under this model is considered to be "first among equals," as
it were, that he or she is not an unelected professional manager with far-reaching
executive powers under what has been described as a management model. See Egbert
de Weert, Pressures and Prospects Facingthe Academic Profession in the Netherlands,
in THE CHANGING ACADEMIC WORKPLACE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 116, 118
(Philip G. Altbach ed., 2000) ('"These managers have increased budgetary
responsibilities and ... authority for staffing matters-including appointments,
personnel assessments, and so on.").
99.
Karran, supra note 1, at 303-04.
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weight as indicators on the senate (or its equivalent) or
faculty/departmental representative body, respectively) will thus
ascertain, firstly, whether these officers come from within the
institution and hold a PhD or are a professor; secondly, whether
academic staff can exercise "control" over who is chosen as the rector
or dean/head of department; and thirdly, whether they can exercise
"control" over the dismissal of the rector or dean/head of department
by virtue of a vote of no-confidence.
Apart from questions related to how purely academic matters
should be dealt with and how HE institutions/faculties/departments
should be directed, a final issue relates to the particularway strategic
decision-making takes place. Also, in this respect, academic staff
should have a right to take part in the relevant governing bodies (i.e.,
those bodies responsible for strategic planning, general teaching and
research policy, overall institutional development, preparing the
budget, and adopting the HE institution's statutes). 10 0 Strategic
decision-making--only considering that which occurs at the
institutional level herell-would customarily be the task of the
rector (rectorate) and/or the senate (or its equivalent) and/or, notably
and increasingly nowadays, a separate board to which academic staff,
external experts, and other stakeholders are elected/appointed. 10 2 In
view of the increased importance of the latter boards in the
governance of HE institutions and as the extent to which science and
scholarship can flourish within a HE institution significantly depends
on how "strategic issues" have been resolved, indicator D.2.3., which
focuses on the composition of the body/bodies taking strategic
decisions, has been assigned the same weight as indicators under
D.2.1. and D.2.2.. together. It is submitted that academic staff should
ideally have at least 50 percent representation on any such
103
body/bodies.

100.
Ultimately, Paragraph 32 of the UNESCO Recommendation highlights
that "[c]ollegial decision-making should encompass decisions regarding the
administration and determination of policies of higher education, curricula, research,
extension work, the allocation of resources and other related activities."
101.
At faculty/departmental level, these questions should be resolved by the
dean/head of department and/or staff (representative body).
102.

See EURYDICE, THE INFORMATION NETWORK ON EDUCATION IN EUROPE,

HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: POLICIES, STRUCTURES, FUNDING AND
ACADEMIC
STAFF
33-42
(2008),
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/
documents/thematic reports/091EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5D7-YH3K]
(archived
Mar. 10, 2016) (discussing the typical governance bodies encountered in (European) HE
institutions).
103.
A five-point scale is applied to measure compliance with regard to
indicator D.2.3.: at least 50 percent representation = full compliance; 40-49 percent
representation = between full and partial compliance; 30-39 percent representation =
partial compliance; less than 30 percent, but some form of representation = between
partial and non-compliance; and no noteworthy representation = non-compliance.
Where there is a board consisting of external members, and academic staff may
determine at least 50 percent of its members, this is considered to constitute partial
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Finally, Column E covers indicators on security of employment,
including "tenure or its functional equivalent, where applicable."
Indicators concern three topics: duration of contract of service (40
percent) (E.1.), termination of contract of service on operational
grounds (30 percent) (E.2.), and prospect of advancement based on
objective assessment of competence (30 percent) (E.3.). Regarding the
first topic-UNESCO's Recommendation referring to "continuing
employment following rigorous evaluation" 1 04-it is to be assessed
whether the legal framework of the states concerned envisages
permanent contracts for academic staff, or, alternatively,
commencement on a tenure-track (i.e., during a first phase, 10 5 a
probationary period or fixed-term contracts with long-term
prospects). A lowering of the standards of protection may take on
various forms: permanent contracts or commencement on a tenuretrack at the level of senior positions (for example, that of associate
professor) only (partial compliance), leaving the conclusion of
permanent contracts generally to the discretion of the employer
(partial or non-compliance), 10 6 or expressly providing for fixed-term
contracts without long-term prospects at even senior levels (non10 7
compliance).
Indicators on the second topic, the termination of contracts of
service on operational grounds, relate to requirements in UNESCO's
Recommendation to the effect that potential dismissal of "tenured"
staff should occur "on professional grounds and in accordance with
due process" only. 108 Dismissals on grounds of serious misconduct, a
flagrant violation of scholarly duties (for example, fabrication of
research results or plagiarism), or two or more consecutive negative
appraisals of work quality will be permissible, if due process rules are
observed. 10 9 Dismissals on operational grounds (i.e., restructuring,
compliance. Where they are not in a position to determine at least 50 percent of those
members, this is considered to constitute non-compliance.
104.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 46.
This would normally be the phase following the award of a doctoral degree.
105.
It has been held that this phase typically (and legitimately) is between five to seven
years. See Karran, supra note 8, at 178.
Much will depend on whether fixed-term contracts are subject to strict or
106.
lax requirements as regards legitimate cases of use, maximum number of successive
contracts, and maximum cumulated duration.
107.
Indicator E. 1.1. on the legal framework is supplemented by indicator E. 1.2.
on the situation in practice. This has been included in light of the fact that the legal
criteria existing in this context are multi-layered and complex, and often containing
loopholes or having unexpected effects in practice, so that only a look at the situation in
practice explains the true purport of legal provisions: 66.7 percent or more of academic
staff at post-entry levels (i.e. following any stage of doctoral employment) having
permanent contracts of service or on a tenure-track = full compliance; 50-66.6 percent
= partial compliance; and less than 50 percent = non-compliance.
108.
UNESCO Recommendation, supra note 7, 46.
109.
Note should be taken of Paragraph 47 of the UNESCO Recommendation
on "Appraisal", Subparagraph (e) stating that the results of appraisal may legitimately
be taken into account when "considering the renewal of employment," and of
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down-sizing, reorganization or economic difficulties), however, should
ideally not take place. They will only be justifiable exceptionally and
provided all alternatives have been considered, appropriate priority
criteria observed, a formalized procedure followed, and procedural
safeguards respected. 110 A first indicator (E.2.1.) ascertains whether
there is an adequate, problematic, or seriously deficient/no provision
in HE legislation expressly prohibiting dismissals of specifically (but
not solely) academic staff with permanent contracts on operational
grounds, alternatively, providing strict protection in cases of such
dismissals. 11 1 A second indicator of equal weight (E.2.2.) inquires as
to the level of protection afforded to academic staff, as defined, in
cases of dismissals on operational grounds under "ordinary" civil
service and/or labor law.
Finally, regarding the topic of a prospect of advancement based
on an objective assessment of competence, since academic freedom is
to be protected by restricting dismissal, it follows, by way of
implication, that academic freedom should also not be infringed by
preventing advancement in the academic career where it should take
place. There should be procedures in place (also capable of being
initiated by the academic concerned) in terms of which promotion is
granted, provided defined scholarly criteria have been met as
objectively assessed, without the need for the academic having to
newly apply for a higher position within his/her institution on a
competitive basis. Indicator E.3. thus assesses whether legislation
makes adequate provision (including, for example, through a tenuretrack system) for advancement to a higher position based on an
112
objective assessment of competence.

Paragraphs 48-51 on "Discipline and dismissal", specifically Paragraph 50 on
"dismissal as a disciplinary measure." For a description of due process rules in this
context; see Karran, supra note 8, at 181-85 (figs. 7, 8).
110.
For a description of due process rules in this context, see Karran, supra
note 8, at 179-81, 184-85 (figs. 5, 6, 8).
111.
Such a provision may largely be dispensed with where academic staff are
civil servants whose discharge on very limited grounds, notably serious misconduct, is
strictly regulated in civil service legislation.
112.
This indicator applies a five-point scale: adequate legislation = full
compliance; legislation with certain deficits = between full and partial compliance;
legislation with more serious deficits = partial compliance; legislation with substantial
deficits = between partial and non-compliance; and no legislation = non-compliance.
Where relevant procedures are provided for in a prominent and sector-wide collective
agreement, in government regulations or in the statutes of HE institutions generally,
these will, depending on their specific nature, be rated to be "in partial compliance" or
"between partial and non-compliance."
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Standard Scorecard "to Measure" the Right to Academic
Freedom
A.The
Ratification
of
International
Constitutional Protection (20%)
Austria
.3

Agreements

1. The Ratification of International Agreements (10)

and

M.5

1.1. Global Level (6)
1.1.1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 19,
Right to Freedom of Expression) [0-1.5] ;.-1
1.1.2. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights (International Petition Procedure) [0-1.5] 1.5
1.1.3. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights
(Art. 13, Right to Education) [0-1.5] 1,,
1.1.4. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (International Petition Procedure)
[0-1.5] o
1.2. Regional Level (4)
European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 10, Right to Freedom of
Expression) [0-4] 4
2. Constitutional Protection (10) 9
2.1. Provision on Right to Freedom of Expression [0-1-2] 2
2.2. Provision on Right to Academic Freedom [0-1-2] 2
2.3. Reference to Institutional Autonomy [0-0.5-1] 1
2.4. Reference to Academic Self-Governance [0-0.5-1] 0
2.5. Robustness of Provisions [0-2-4] 4
To.~tal: 1 .5
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Standard Scorecard "to Measure" the Right to Academic
Freedom (cont.)
B. The Express Protection of Academic Freedom in HE Legislation (20%)
[0-2.5-5-7.5-10 (x2)] 10
- 0 - No Reference to Academic Freedom at All (Non- Compliance)
- 2.5 - Provision(s) Seriously Falling Short of Defined Standards (Between
Partial and Non-Compliance)
- 5 - Mere Reference to Academic Freedom/Provisions Revealing Various Deficits
(Partial Compliance)
- 7.5 - Some or Other Deficit in Otherwise Commendable Provisions (Between
Full and Partial Compliance)
- 10 - Academic Freedom Serves as Guiding Principle for Activity within HE
(Full Compliance)
Total: 10x2=20
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Standard Scorecard "to Measure" the Right to Academic
Freedom (cont.)
C. The Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation (20%)
1. Provision on Institutional Autonomy [0-2-41 2
2. Autonomy in Detail (8) ii
2.1. Organizational (2)
2.1.1. Autonomy to Determine Rector [0-0.5-1] 1
2.1.2. Autonomy to Determine Internal Structures [0-0.5-1] I
2.2. Financial (2)
2.2.1. State Grant as Block Grant [0-0.5-1] 1
2.2.2. Express Competence to Perform Commissioned Research [0-0.5-1]
2.3. Staffing (2)
Right to Define Academic Positions in HE Institutions and their Requirements, and
to Recruit and Promote Academic Staff [0-1-2] 1
2.4. Academic (2)
2.4.1. Capacity to Determine Selection Criteria for Bachelor Students and to Select
the Latter [0-0.5-1] 0
2.4.2. Whether or Not Bachelor Programs Need to be Accredited [0-0.5-1] 1
3. Extent of Governmental Powers [0-2-41 2
4. Institutional Independence vis-&-vis Private Interests [0-2-41 2
T,.r- : 12
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Standard Scorecard "to Measure" the Right to Academic
Freedom (cont.)
D. The Protection of Self-Governance in HE Legislation (20%)
1. Provision on Academic Self-Governance [0-1-21 1
2. Academic Self-Governance at Institutional Level (12) 7
2.1. Senate (or its Equivalent) - Composition [0-1.5-3] 3
2.2. Rector (3)
2.2.1. Academic Position/Qualification of Rector [0-0.5-1] 0
2.2.2. Determining the Rector [0-0.5-1] 0.5
2.2.3. Dismissing the Rector [0-0.5-1] 0.5
2.3. Participation in Strategic Decision-Making (through Senate or its Equivalent,
or Otherwise) [0-1.5-3-4.5-6] 3
3. Academic Self-Governance at Faculty/Departmental Level (6) 1
3.1. Collegial Bodies (3)
3.1.1. Existence of Collegial Bodies [0-0.5-1] 0
3.1.2. Composition of Collegial Bodies [0-1-2] 0
3.2. Dean/Head of Department (3)
3.2.1. Academic Position/Qualification of Dean/Head of Department [0-0.5-1] 0.5
3.2.2. Determining the Dean/Head of Department [0-0.5-1] 0.5
3.2.3. Dismissing the Dean/Head of Department [0-0.5-1] 0
Total: 9
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Standard Scorecard "to Measure" the Right to Academic
Freedom (cont.)
E. The Protection of Job Security (including "Tenure") in Relevant
Legislation (20%)
1. Duration of Contract of Service (8)
1.1. Regulatory Framework [0-2-4] 2
1.2. Situation in Practice [0-2-4] (.1
2. Termination of Contract of Service on Operational Grounds (6)
2.1. Provision on Termination on Operational Grounds in HE Legislation [0-1.53] 1.5
2.2. Protection in the Case of Termination on Operational Grounds in Terms of
Civil Service/Labor Legislation [0-1.5-3] t
3. Prospect of Advancement Based on Obiective Assessment of Competence [01.5-3-4.5-61 1-5

TcdLa

,5
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IV. MODUS OPERANDI AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN
THE ENDEAVOR

The assessment of the legal protection of the right to academic
freedom in Europe undertaken here considers only public institutions
of HE and, among these, only universities. 11 3 The right to academic
freedom naturally needs also to be respected in private institutions of
HE, though there may be differences in the scope of that right in that
context. 114 Infringements of academic freedom further seem more
prevalent in universities than, for example, polytechnics, which may
115
not be as extensively involved in original research as universities.
These restrictions in the ambit of the inquiry were necessary in the
light of limited human and time resources available to examine all
relevant data. The analysis entailed an examination of thirty
European HE systems. States with a federal structure in the field of
HE required a particular approach. In the case of Belgium, the HE
systems of Flanders and Wallonia were considered separately,
omitting the German-speaking region. In the case of Germany, with
different HE systems in each of the sixteen Lander, it has been
decided to study the situation in the two Lander with the most
inhabitants, Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia, one-third of
Germany's population living in these Ldnder. The two HE systems
also reveal interesting differences, both Lander traditionally having
been governed by conservative and social-democrat governments,
respectively. As Germany's Hochschulrahmengesetz (Framework Act
on Higher Education) in its version of 1999116 is still on the law books
(its abolition lingering on the political agenda), differences among the
various HE systems, though increasing, remain within bounds.
Where appropriate, developments in the other Lander have been
taken note of. Regarding Spain, certain powers in the field of HE

113.
Moreover, it only considers academic freedom of academic staff, but not
that of students. It also does not consider artistic freedom, which is a related, but
separate concept.
114.
See, e.g., Tarantino v. Italy, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 397, 419 (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., partly dissenting) ("States Parties' margin of appreciation is wider
with regard to the regulation of State schools and narrower with regard to that of
private schools. An even narrower margin of appreciation applies a fortiori to higher
education, where institutional autonomy plays a pivotal role. (footnote omitted)
Conversely, the more the State funds private schools and universities, the wider its
margin of appreciation. (emphases omitted)").
Paragraph 1(e) of the UNESCO Recommendation states that 'institutions
115.
of higher education' means universities, other educational establishments, centres and
structures of higher education, and centres of research and culture associated with any
of the above, public or private, that are approved as such either through recognized
accreditation systems or by the competent state authorities."
116.
HOCHSCHULRAHMENGESETZ in the version of Jan. 19, 1999, BGBL. I, at 18,
last amended by Art. 2 of Law, Apr. 12, 2007, BGBL. I, at 506.
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regulation rest with the autonomous regions. As for the United
Kingdom, the situation in England has been studied primarily (more
than 80 percent of the United Kingdom's population living there),
giving some consideration to elements of the Scottish system.
The actual legislation of EU states constituted the primary
source of information for purposes of the assessment. Legislation as
in force at the beginning of 2014 has been studied. 117 Where relevant
language competencies existed (Dutch/Flemish, English, French,
German, and Spanish), the original language versions of the
legislation were consulted. In other cases, recourse was had to official
or unofficial English-language translations that seemed reliable. In a
few cases, no reliable English-language versions could be traced
(Croatia, Greece, and Italy), probably because the states concerned
had adopted new HE legislation relatively recently. In these cases,
but also to take account of recent amendments to HE laws in the case
of other states, online translation tools had to be utilized. 118 In all
instances, it has been sought to verify the correctness of information
by studying relevant secondary literature (journalistic and academic
texts, and information available in online databases 1 19) or
information provided by states themselves. 120 It will be appreciated
that coping with voluminous and diverse sets of legislation in

Hence, attempts by the current Polish government, dominated by the
117.
right-wing national conservative Law and Justice party (PiS), directed at "undermining
the constitutional order" in Poland could not yet negatively impact on "the
performance" of that country in this assessment. Further, as North Rhine-Westphalia
(Germany) adopted a new HOCHSCHULZUKUNFTSGEBETZ (Act on the Future of Higher
Education) in September 2014, this was examined for purposes of the comparison.
Citations from the constitutions, laws and regulations used here should
118.
not be seen to reflect official translations, but rather are own renderings of the texts in
the light of all sources available.
the
consulted:
were
databases
these
online
In
particular,
119.
Eurydice/Eurypedia website (maintained by the European Commission's Education,
Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency (EACEA)), Eurydice and Eurypedia
providing information on European education systems and policies: https://webgate.ec.
europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/eurydice/index.php/MainPage; the website of the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), making available online, inter
alia, the OECD Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education's
journal HIGH. EDUC. MGMT. & POLY: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/highereducation-management-and-policy_17269822; the website of the European University
Association, supplying useful information on university autonomy: http://www.eua.be;
the website of the Center for Higher Education Policy Studies of the University of
Twente (Netherlands), containing a collection of publications on HE adopting an
international comparative perspective: http://www.utwente.nl/bms/cheps.
Amongst others, the websites of the ministries responsible for HE in the
120.
various EU member states were thus consulted. Furthermore, a questionnaire asking
EU member states to provide information on the legislative framework in place for the
protection of academic freedom was sent out to states on Oct. 3, 2013. The response
rate has been rather modest, with only one third of the states having responded.
Nevertheless, of the replies that were received, some, like those from Denmark,
Hungary, Slovakia or Sweden, were very instructive.
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different languages is a daunting task. An error margin of up to three
percent is thus conceivable.

V. THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN

EUROPE: THE RESULTS OF THE ASSESSMENT

The following six headings provide a brief overview of state
performance with regard to each of the five columns of the scorecard
and overall. Each heading provides concise information on trends
identified, some examples, and a country ranking in the form of a
table.121

A. The Ratification of InternationalAgreements and Constitutional
Protection
All twenty-eight EU member states have ratified the ICCPR and
the ICESCR of 1966. The United Kingdom is the only member state
not to have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR of 1966.
Claims under Article 19 on the right to freedom of expression alleging
that the United Kingdom has violated academic freedom thus cannot
be brought before the Human Rights Committee. In view of the
recentness of the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in
2008, only eight states so far (Belgium, Finland, France, Italy,
Luxemburg, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) have ratified it. The
Optional Protocol to the ICESCR entered into force on May 5,
2013.122 A number of states have expressed reservations with regard
to Article 20 of the ICCPR, which prohibits "any propaganda for war"
(Paragraph 1) and "any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence" (Paragraph 2). Malta and the United Kingdom reserve the
right not to adopt legislation with regard to Article 20 as a whole.
Belgium and Luxemburg do so as regards Article 20(1) on war
propaganda. Ireland defers the right to adopt legislation on a specific
criminal offense in the sphere of Article 20(1). Also Denmark,

121.
Where appropriate, the footnotes include references to literature on
academic freedom as protected in the states assessed, available in English, French,
German or Spanish, focusing on more recent literature adopting a legal or quasi-legal
approach. Regarding the three EU states with the largest populations, Germany, the
UK and France, reference should, as regards Germany and the UK, be had to
BARENDT, supra note 22 (see, specifically, the references to further literature at 31618) and, as regards France, to OLIVIER BEAUD, LES LIBERTtS UNIVERSITAIRES A
L'ABANDON?

POUR

UNE

RECONNAISSANCE

ACAD9M1QUE (2010) (and the references
122.
Status of ratification as
databases
of the
U.N. Treaty
Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en

PLEINE

ET

ENTIPRE

DE LA

LIBERT]

to further literature there).
at Mar. 19, 2015 as reflected in the online
Collection at https:/treaties.un.org/Pages/
(archived Mar. 12, 2016).

2016!

"MEASURING" THE EROSION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE

635

Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden do not want to apply
Article 20(1), with Finland stating that applying this provision "might
endanger the freedom of expression referred [to] in article 19 of the
Covenant." Reservations to Article 20 have not been considered to
amount to "non-compliance" in the present analysis. As Jack
Donnelly comments:
Here the issue is balancing two competing human rights, rather than a conflict
between human rights and another value. Any resolution will require
restricting the range of at least one of these rights. Therefore, any approach
that plausibly protects the conceptual integrity of both rights must be described
123
as controversial but defensible.

The reservations expressed, it is submitted, should perhaps be
understood in this context. Malta, however, has made a problematic
reservation with regard to Article 22 of the ICCPR on the right to
freedom of association, stipulating that it "reserves the right not to
apply article 22 to the extent that existing legislative measures may
not be fully compatible with this article." All EU member states are
further bound by the relevant provisions of the ECHR, as amended
and supplemented.

12 4

The constitutions of all EU member states 125 protect the right to
freedom of expression. Express provisions are found in the (written)
constitutions of twenty-seven countries. In the United Kingdom, this
right should be considered part of that country's unwritten
constitution. 126 Whereas the provisions of the Greek, Irish, and
Romanian Constitutions are problematic ("partial compliance"), that
of the Hungarian Constitution is seriously deficient ("noncompliance"). Article 14(3) of the Greek Constitution, for example,
allows the seizure of newspapers and other publications in cases of
"an offence against the Christian or any other known religion" or "an
insult against the person of the President of the Republic."' 12 7 The

123.
Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS.
Q. 281, 302 (2007).
124.
Status of ratification as at Mar. 21, 2015 as reflected on the Council of
Europe's
official
Treaty
Office
website
at
http://conventions.coe.int
[https://perma.cc/2K8C-AKVA] (archived Mar. 23, 2016). The focus regarding the
ECHR has been on Article 10 on the right to freedom of expression, ignoring notably
Protocol No. 12 on an "autonomous" non-discrimination provision.
125.
This refers to the constitutional texts as in force on Jan. 1, 2014. It is
refrained from providing full official citations of constitutions here.
126.
There is some case law holding that there exists "a constitutional right to
freedom of expression in England." Moreover, the Human Rights Act, 1988, ch. 42, has
modified the largely "residual nature" of human rights protection available under
common law. See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under
the Human Rights Act 1998, 84 IND. L.J. 851, 852-55 (2009).
127.
The Constitution of Ireland forbids blasphemy. See CONSTITUTION OF
IRELAND 1937, art. 40(6)(1)(i). The Romanian Constitution forbids "defamation of the
country and the nation." See CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA 1991, art. 30(7).
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Hungarian
Constitution
substantially
constrains
political
campaigning in non-public media and provides that freedom of speech
may not violate "the dignity of the Hungarian nation" in Article IX(3)
and (5), respectively.
Express provisions on the right to academic freedom-in the form
of a right to freedom of science 128 -may be found in the constitutions
of eighteen countries. 129 These protect the right either as part of
provisions (also) addressing the right to freedom of expression
(Germany and Spain), 130 the right to education/educational rights
(Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, and Sweden), 131 rights related to
science, arts, culture, universities, and research institutions
(Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia), 13 2 the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion (Czech Republic), 133 or both the right to
education/educational rights and rights related to science, arts, and
culture (Portugal).134 The provisions contained in the Czech, Greek,
and Hungarian Constitutions may be considered to be problematic
("partial compliance"). Regarding the Czech Republic, the right to
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion provides too narrow a
basis as to cover all aspects of the right to academic freedom. Article
16(8) of the Greek Constitution prohibits the establishment of private
universities, thereby also preventing opportunities for diversified
135
notions of academic freedom to flourish in different contexts.
Although academic freedom does require regulation, the provisions of
Article X(1) of the Hungarian Constitution-also in the light of the

128.
Although, as has been explained at note 22 above, there are differences
between the right to freedom of science, potentially in the sense of
"Wissenschaftsfreiheit" or "the right to free scholarship," and the right to academic
freedom, the latter probably providing more extensive protection to academic staff, the
approach here has been not to differentiate between the two. The CONSTITUTION OF
SPAIN 1978 protects both freedom of science (art. 20(1)(b)) and academic freedom ("la
libertad de cdtedra," literally meaning "the freedom of the academic chair") (art.
20(1)(c)).
129.
In the UK,"there is no constitutional guarantee of academic or scientific
freedom." See BARENDT, supra note 22, at 74-75.
130.
See GERMAN BASIC LAW 1949, art. 5(3); SPANISH CONSTITUTION 1978,
art. 20(1)(b), (c).
131.
See AUSTRIAN BASIC LAW OF 1867, art. 17(1); FINNISH CONSTITUTION 1999,
§ 16(3); GREEK CONSTITUTION 1975, art. 16(1); ITALIAN CONSTITUTION 1947, art. 33(1);
SWEDISH INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT 1974, ch. 2, art. 18(2).
132.
See BULGARIAN CONSTITUTION 1991, art. 54(2); CROATIAN CONSTITUTION
1990, art. 69(1); ESTONIAN CONSTITUTION 1992, § 38(1); HUNGARIAN FUNDAMENTAL
LAW 2011, art. X(1), (2); LATVIAN CONSTITUTION 1922, § 113; LITHUANIAN
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 42; POLISH CONSTITUTION 1997, art. 73; SLOVAKIAN
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 43(1); SLOVENIAN CONSTITUTION 1991, art. 59.
133.
See CZECH CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 1992,
art. 15(2).
134.
See PORTUGUESE CONSTITUTION 1976, arts. 42(1), 73(4).
135.
Article 13(4) of the ICESCR protects "the liberty of individuals and bodies
to establish and direct educational institutions."
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Constitution's generally paternalistic, even authoritarian, stance-to
the effect that the right to academic freedom is ensured "within the
framework laid down in an Act" does not augur too well for the
protection of that right.
Express provisions on institutional autonomy are contained in

fifteen constitutions (Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Finland,

North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain), while
provisions on self-governance are contained in only three (Bavaria
(Germany), Portugal, and Spain). All of these are "fully compliant,"

except for Hungary's provisions on institutional autonomy, which
must be held to be "non-compliant."'

13 6

Article X(3) of the Hungarian

Constitution provides that
Higher education institutions shall be autonomous in terms of the content and
the methods of research and teaching; their organization shall be regulated by
an Act. The Government shall, within the framework of an Act, lay down the
education
rules governing the financial management of public 13higher
7
institutions and shall supervise their financial management.
Finally, regarding the robustness of constitutionalprovisions, the
question was whether the normative context of constitutions (values

reflected by relevant provisions, specific or general limitations
clauses, etc.) fully supports the effective protection of the rights
concerned,

specifically

the

right

to

academic

freedom.

138

The

Constitution of Poland, for example, in Article 31(3), contains a
general limitation provision reflecting internationally accepted
standards, stating that limitations upon human rights
may be imposed only by statute, and only when necessary in a democratic state
for the protection of its security or public order, or to protect the natural
environment, health or public morals, or the freedoms and rights of other
persons. Such limitations shall not violate the essence of freedoms and rights.

The Romanian Constitution, in Article 20(1), requires constitutional
provisions concerning rights and freedoms "[to] be interpreted and
enforced in

conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human

136.
See HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE, EOTvOS KAROLY POLICY INSTITUTE
& HUNGARIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, MAIN CONCERNS REGARDING THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY point 9 (Statement, Feb. 26,
2013) (stating that "the Fourth Amendment entirely abolishes the autonomy of
universities in financial questions.").
The Hungarian Constitution further provides for the President of the
137.
Republic to appoint university rectors. See HUNGARIAN FUNDAMENTAL LAW 2011,
art. 9. A similar provision may be found in the Slovakian Constitution. See SLOVAKIAN
CONSTITUTION 1992, art. 102.
It may be noted that all those states whose constitutions do not contain
138.
express provisions on the right to academic freedom have maximally been considered to
be in "partial compliance" in this respect.
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Rights, with the covenants and other treaties Romania is a party to."
Many constitutions, such as those of Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Italy,
Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, or Spain, moreover, call upon states to
actively promote the development of science, arts, and culture, this
implicitly requiring that respect for academic freedom be furthered.
Factors negatively affecting protective standards encompass, for
example,
excluding
non-citizens
from
protection
against
discrimination on the ground of political opinions (see Malta) or
adopting far-reaching constitutional amendments entailing a general
erosion of universally accepted constitutional principles (see
Hungary).139

Table 1: Country Ranking: Ratification of International
Agreements and Constitutional Protection
Country

Percentage & Score out of

1.
2.
3.
4.

100
95
90
87.5

Portugal, Spain
Finland, Italy
Slovakia
Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia,

20 in parentheses

(20)
(19)
(18)
(17.5)

Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia

5.
6.

Latvia, Sweden
Czech Republic, Greece

82.5 (16.5)
77.5 (15.5)

Average

78.04 (15.61)

7.

Belgium, France, Luxemburg

70

(14)

Cyprus, Denmark, Netherlands,

62.5

(12.5)

8.

Romania
9.

Hungary, Ireland

10. Malta, United Kingdom

57.5 (11.5)

55

(11)

B. The Express Protectionof Academic Freedom in Higher Education
Legislation
If constitutional provisions on the right to academic freedom
legitimately may be rather concise, then-in accordance with what
has been stated regarding the requirement of "legislation"14 0-all
salient aspects of that right need to be concretized and
operationalized by way of parliamentary legislation. Further detail

139.
Supra note 136 (regarding Hungary); see infra Annex, Indicator A.2.5.
(noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Bay. (F.R.G.),
N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Italy, Lat., Lith., Pol., Port., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed.;
Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Fr., Hung., Ir., Lux., Malta,
Neth., Rom., U.K.; Non-compliance = none).
140.
See Part III.A., supra.
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can be regulated in subordinate legislation. A state's Act on Higher
Education should thus make it clear that academic freedom (stricto
sensu) entails a right to carry out research, a right to teach, and a
right to study without restrictions. Ideally, each of these elements
should then be defined. The Higher Education Act of 2006 of Bavaria
(Germany), for example, 14 1 provides in Article 3:
(2)
1. Freedom of research (first sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic Law and
Article 108 of the [Bavarian] Constitution) shall cover in particular the topic of
research, the methodological approach applied and the evaluation and
dissemination of research findings. 2. Decisions on research matters may be
taken by the competent bodies of an institution of higher education to the
extent that they refer to the organization of research activities, the promotion
and coordination of research projects and the formulation of the areas of focus
for research; such decisions shall not impair freedom of research as defined in
the first sentence...
(3)
1. Without prejudice to the second sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic
Law, 142 freedom of teaching (first sentence of Article 5(3) of the Basic Law and
Article 108 of the [Bavarian] Constitution) shall, within the framework of the
teaching duties allocated, cover in particular the holding of classes, including
the way they are structured in terms of content conveyed and methods applied,
as well as the right to express scholarly . . . views on doctrinal issues. 2.
Decisions on questions of teaching may be taken by the competent bodies of an
institution of higher education to the extent that they refer to the organization
of teaching activities and the adoption and observance of study and
examination regulations; such decisions shall not impair freedom of research as
defined in the first sentence.
(4)
1. Without prejudice to study and examination regulations, freedom of
study shall cover in particular the free choice of classes, the right, within a
study course, to freely choose one's areas of focus, as well as the formulation
and expression of scholarly . . . views. 2. Decisions on study issues may be
taken by the competent bodies of an institution of higher education to the
extent that they refer to the organization and proper implementation of
teaching and study activities and to guaranteeing the orderly pursuit of
studies. 143

141.
BAYERISCHES HOCHSCHULGESETZ [BAYHSCHG], May 23, 2006, GVBL.
2006, 245; see BARENDT, supra note 22, at 117-60 (for an analysis of the legal
protection of academic freedom in Germany); see id. at 317-18 (for a select bibliography
of relevant literature on the situation in Germany).
142.
GERMAN BASIC LAW 1949, art. 5(3), second sentence ("Freedom of teaching
shall not absolve any person from allegiance to the Basic Law.").
143.
A somewhat different approach is that followed by Lithuania in its Law on
Higher Education and Research of 2009 (LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS MOKSLO IR STUDIJV
ISTATYMAS Apr. 30, 2009, Nr. XI-242, ZIN., 2009, Nr. 54-2140, 61, 101). Two provisions
enumerate a whole series of rights that should be considered encompassed by
"academic freedom." Article 53 states that academic freedom includes freedom of
thought and freedom of expression; freedom to choose the methods of research and
teaching (provided they are in conformity with accepted principles of ethics); and
protection against restrictions to and sanctions for publishing the results of research
and manifesting beliefs (unless information constitutes a state/official secret and/or is
in violation of the law). The provision further mentions intellectual property rights,
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Furthermore, legislation should reflect that academic freedom
serves as a guiding principle for activity within HE, as would be
evidenced by "academic freedom" forming part of a general part of the
HE Act on "general principles" and/or it being referred to in various
contexts throughout HE legislation. In Austria's Universities Act of
2002, for example, Section 2, entitled "Guiding Principles," refers to
freedom of the sciences and their teaching, diversity of scientific
theories, methods and opinions, and freedom of study as essential
principles to be observed by universities in the pursuance of their
tasks. 144 References to academic freedom then recur in various
sections of the Act. Target agreements concluded with academic staff
must respect freedom of science and "leave sufficient room" to
individual members of the academic staff in their research and
teaching. 14 5 Students are entitled to freedom of study in accordance
with the provisions of the law.146 Academic staff may not be required
to participate in scholarly work if this conflicts with their
conscience. 147 The dismissal of a member of the academic staff is null
and void if this has occurred because that member supported a
certain opinion or method in his or her research or teaching. 148
Legislation should, moreover, spell out essential duties of
academic staff related to the enjoyment of academic freedom.

equal rights to take part in competitions, and objective and open reviewing of scholarly
works. Article 64 also provides a list of rights of academic staff: to participate in
competitions for research projects and research funding, and to utilize any funding
allocated; to participate in competitions for postdoctoral scholarships in Lithuania and
abroad; to obtain from state institutions information for research purposes (in the case
of state/official secrets, in accordance with special procedures provided for); to
participate in the deliberation of laws and regulations of their institution; to
participate in trade unions and other associations, including those abroad; to work
independently or in groups; and to independently publish their scholarly work.
144.
BUNDESGESETZ UBER DIE ORGANISATION DER UNIVERSITATEN UND IHRE
STUDIEN [UNIVERSITTSGESETZ] StF: BGBL. I Nr. 120/2002 (NR: GP XXI RV 1134 AB
1224 S. 111; BR: 6697 AB 6717 S. 690). To mention another example, also Croatia's
recent Act on Science and Higher Education of 2013 (ZAKON 0 ZNANSTVENOJ
DJELATNOSTI I VISOKOM OBRAZOvANJU, NARODNE NOVINE broj 123/03, 198/03, 105/04,
174/04, 2/07 - OUSRH, 46/07, 45/09, 63/11, 94/13, 139/13) clearly articulates that
academic freedom constitutes a guiding principle: Article 2(3) states: "Iigher education
shall be based on: - Academic freedom, academic self-governance and university
autonomy,.. . - Reciprocity and partnership among members of the academic
community - the European humanistic and democratic tradition...- Respect for and
recognition of human rights, .... " Article 4(2) and (3) further provide for academic
freedom, academic self-governance and university autonomy "in accordance with the
Constitution, international agreements and this Act."
UNIVERSITATSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144, § 20(5).
145.
146.
Id. § 59(1).
147.
Id. § 105.
148.
Id. § 113; see Walter Berka, Wissenschaftsfreiheit an staatlichen
Universitdten: Zur Freiheit und Verantwortung des Wissenschaftlers, in VOM
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT AM SCHEIDEWEG: FESTSCHRIFr FOR PETER PERNTHALER 67 (Karl
Weber et al. eds., 2005), (discussing the protection of the right to academic freedom in
public universities in Austria in terms of the Universities Act of 2002).
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Article 310 of the Romanian National Education Law of 2011,149 for
example, stipulates that plagiarism, the fabrication of research
findings, and the provision of false information in applications for
funding constitute "serious violations of proper conduct in scientific
research and university activities."
Finally, legislation should make it clear that HE institutions
themselves are also obliged to respect the academic freedom of
members of the academic staff. Institutional structures need to be
established to facilitate the internal enforcement of rights in this
respect. Latvia's Law on Institutions of Higher Education of 1995,150
for instance, in Section 6(5), emphasizes that "[tihe administration of
an institution of higher education shall have a duty to guarantee and
respect the rights of students and academic staff [entailed by
academic freedom]." Section 19 then proceeds to provide for an
academic arbitration tribunal, competent to receive "submissions of
students and academic staff regarding a restriction or infringement of
academic freedom and [other] rights."
The assessment revealed that the express protection of academic
freedom in HE legislation in the states examined occurs at varying
levels. The HE legislation of Austria, Croatia, France, North RhineWestphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia contains
express provisions on academic freedom largely in compliance with
generally agreed criteria on academic freedom. The provisions show
that academic freedom serves as a guiding principle for activity
within HE ("full compliance").
A second group of HE systems were considered to have
performed less than wholly satisfactorily ("between full and partial
compliance")-namely those of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland,
Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, Luxemburg, Romania, and Spain.
Within this group, some or other deficit in the otherwise
commendable legislative provisions could be identified in each case.
The Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995,151 in Article 19(3),
provides that "[alcademic autonomy shall include academic freedom,
academic self-governance and inviolability of the premises of an
institution of higher education." It should rather have been made
clear that "academic freedom" is the superseding right covering the
others, including institutional autonomy. The latter finds its confines
in individual academic freedom, not the other way around. 152 The

149.
LEGEA EDUCATIEI NATIONALE, Law No. 1, Jan. 5, 2011, MONITORUL
OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI, Partea I, Aug. 30, 2013.
AUGSTSKOLU LIKUMS, Nov. 2, 1995, LATVIJAS V STNESIS 179 (462),
150.
Nov. 17, 1995, ZINOTAJS 1, Jan. 11, 1996.
3aKoH 3a BHCwUTO o6pa3oBaHHe, 06H., aB, 6p. 112 OT 27.12.1995 r. [Higher
151.
Education Act, prom. STATE GAZETTE No. 112, Dec. 27, 1995].
152.
A similar conceptual problem is encountered in Article 6 of the Italian Law
of May 9, 1989, No. 168, on the Establishment of the Ministry of Universities and
Scientific and Technological Research (LEGGE del 9 maggio 1989, n. 168, ISTITUZIONE
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preferable way of formulation is reflected in Article 2(3) of the
Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 2001:153 "The activity of the
university and its autonomy are based on the principle of academic
freedom, which encompasses the freedom to teach, carry out research
and study." A problem at another level may be identified in
Section 14 of the Irish Universities Act of 1997.154 Whereas
Paragraph 2 provides a definition of academic freedom, Paragraph 1
lays down inter alia these two principles that rank on a par: on the
one hand, a university is "to preserve and promote the traditional
principles of academic freedom," while, on the other hand, in
regulating its affairs, "it shall have regard to ... the effective and
efficient use of resources." This seems to imply the legitimacy of
trade-offs between academic freedom and purely economic
considerations. It is one thing to say that institutional accountability
entails the efficient use of resources, but yet another-and fatal-to
state that academic freedom may find its limits in an economic
calculus. 155
A third group of HE systems (held to be in "partial compliance"),
namely those of Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Cyprus, the
Netherlands, and Poland, merely refer to the principle of academic
freedom in their HE legislation. 156 Article 1.6. (Chapter 1, Title 1) of
the Dutch Law on Provisions concerning Higher Education and
Scientific Research of 1992,157 for example, solely states that "[a]t the
institutions, academic freedom shall be respected."
The legislation in a fourth group of HE systems, those of
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom, does address academic freedom, but in a less satisfactory
way than that in the previous group ("between partial and nonDEL MINISTERO DELL'UNIVERSITA E DELLA RICERCA SCIENTIFICA E TECNOLOGICA, GAZz.
UFF. May 11, 1989, No. 108, S.O.), Article 74 of the Portuguese Law on the Legal
Status of Institutions of Higher Education of 2007 (LEI n.0 62/2007 de 10 de Setembro,
REGIME JURIDICO DAS INSTITUIQOES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR, DIuRIO DA REPUBLICA 1st
Ser., No. 174, Sept. 10, 2007), and Article 6 of the Slovene Law on Higher Education of
1993 (ZAKON 0 VISOKEM SOLSTVU [ZVIS], URADNI LIST RS, No. 67/93, Dec. 17, 1993).
153.
LEY ORGANICA 6/2001, de 21 de diciembre, DE UNIVERSIDADES, BOE
No. 307, Dec. 24, 2001.
154.
Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997).
,155.
Similar formulations may be found in Article 4(3) of the Greek Law
No. 4009 on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies and
Internationalization of Higher Education Institutions of 2011 (N6po4 wr' apt0 . 4009,
Aout, W-roupyie,
otampkto-il T% iotdnpe; OC
o
oou6fv Kat 5c0vouroiloi Tow avoTe&tov
sKnat8neuKv t~puto wv, EsHMERIE THE KYBEPNHEDI, T6Xoq FIp~ro, Ap. (NXkou 195
[GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 1st Iss., Ref. Sheet 195], Sept. 6, 2011, 4255) and
Article 118(1) of the Romanian National Education Law of 2011 (LEGEA EDUCATIEI
NATIONALE 2011, supranote 149).
156.
In the case of Italy and Portugal, HE legislation contains more than mere
references to academic freedom. The overall situation in these countries, however,
reflects a situation best described to be in "partial compliance."
157.
WET van 8 oktober 1992, HOUDENDE BEPALINGEN MET BETREKKING TOT
HET HOGER ONDERWIJS EN WETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK [WVHW], STB. 1992, 593.
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compliance"). There may, therefore, be a mere reference to academic
freedom, simultaneously flawed in some respect or another, or there
may be more structured provisions, which, however, fall seriously
short of the standards defined in UNESCO's Recommendation.
Section 14(6) of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on Universities of
2012,158 for instance, provides:
Academic staff enjoy freedom of research ("forskningsfrihed') and, within the
bounds of the university's research strategy, are free to perform independent
research during the time when not performing allocated tasks ....Academic
staff may not be directed to perform specific tasks during the entirety of their
working hours for an extended period of time, which would in essence deprive
them of their freedom of research ("forskningsfrihed').

Restricting the enjoyment of freedom of research and academic
freedom to the time when academic staff work on independent
research seriously depletes the meaning of this right. Academic staff
must enjoy academic freedom whenever acting in their academic
capacity. The exact nature of their entitlements, of course, will
depend on the particular circumstance. To mention another example,
the United Kingdom's Education Reform Act of 1988,159 in Section
202(2)(a), stipulates that "academic staff have freedom within the law
to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas
and controversial or unpopular opinions." However, the Act
recognizes this freedom only whilst simultaneously, and in the
context of, abolishing academic tenure. In terms of Sections 202 to
204, university commissioners are to be appointed to ensure that
dismissals notably for reasons of redundancy (which the Act
legitimizes) do not violate academic freedom. It seems that, in
practice, no such commissioners have been appointed to perform that
function. Altogether, the Act reflects a minimalist view of academic
60

freedom.1

Finally, there is a fifth group of HE systems (Estonia and Malta),
whose HE legislation contains no reference to academic freedom
whatsoever ("non-compliance").

158.

BEKENDTGORELSE AF LOV OM UNIVERSITETER [UNIVERSITETSLOVEN],

LBK

No. 960, Aug. 14, 2014.
159.
Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40.
160.
See BARENDT, supra note 22, at 73-116 (for an analysis of the legal
protection of academic freedom in the UK); see id. at 316-17 (for a select bibliography
of relevant literature on the situation in the UK).
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Table 2: Country Ranking: Express Protection of Academic
Freedom in HE Legislation
Country
Austria, Croatia, France, North RhineWestphalia (Germany), Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia
2. Germany
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland,
3.
Bavaria (Germany), Ireland, Luxemburg,
Romania, Spain
Average
4. Belgium, Cyprus, Flanders (Belgium),
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Wallonia (Belgium)
5. Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia,
Sweden, United Kingdom
6.
Estonia, Malta

Percentage & Score out
of 20 in parentheses

1.

100

(20)

87.5 (17.5)
75

(15)

59.38 (11.88)
50

(10)

25

(5)

0

(0)

C. The Protection of InstitutionalAutonomy in Higher Education
Legislation
HE legislation should expressly provide for HE institutions to be
autonomous, detailing the various constituent elements of meaningful
autonomy (organizational, financial, staffing, and academic), to then
weave the parameters of these into the fabric of the legislative
framework as a whole. Thirty HE systems having been assessed, the
HE Acts of nine contain an express and adequate provision on
autonomy, twenty an express but in certain respects problematic or
incomplete provision, and one a seriously deficient provision.161
Article 2 of the Spanish Organic Law on Universities of 2001,162
for example, contains a provision on university autonomy by and
large satisfying criteria to be considered "adequate." Paragraph 1
specifies that universities are endowed with legal personality and
carry out their functions autonomously, and it stresses that the
objective of autonomy is achievement of the goals of university
education defined in the Law. Paragraph 2 goes on to mention
various aspects covered by autonomy, including, for instance,
development of the university statutes; election, designation, and

161.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg.,
Croat., Czech Rep., Fin., Lith., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus.,
Beig. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece,
Ir., Italy, Lat., Lux., Neth., Malta, Pol., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Non-compliance = Hung).
LEY ORGANICA 6/2001 DE UNIVERSIDADES, supra note 153.
162.
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removal of the governing and representative organs; creation of
specific structures supporting teaching and research; development of
syllabuses; selection and promotion of teaching, research, and
administrative staff, and the determination of their working
conditions; admission of students; preparation of budgets and
administration of assets; and establishment of relations with other
relevant organizations. Accordingly, it broadly encompasses all four
elements of autonomy. Additionally, it is stated that universities have
"[a]ny other competence necessary for the appropriate fulfillment of
[their] functions." Paragraph 3 underlines that university autonomy
is based on academic freedom. Paragraph 4, finally, points out that
universities are accountable to society for the use of their means and
resources. 163
Externally, university autonomy should be buttressed by
guaranteeing the inviolability of university premises, a principle long
since recognized by human rights bodies. 164 Article 55 of Croatia's
Act on Science and Higher Education of 2013,165 for example,
provides
(1)

The premises of the university shall be inviolable.

Competent state bodies may enter the premises of the university only
(2)
with the consent of its head, pursuant to a decision of a competent court or if
there is immediate danger to life and health of persons or to property.
(3)
Search of the premises of the university may exceptionally be ordered
only by a competent court if all conditions prescribed by the Criminal
Procedure Act are fulfilled.

For some more recent literature on academic freedom, institutional
163.
autonomy, and self-governance in Spain, see, e.g., Enriqueta Exp6sito, Libertad de
cdtedra del professor universitario: Contenido y amenazas en el contexto actual de
reforma del modelo de universidad pablica, LA REVISTA DE EDUCACI6N Y DERECHO No.
7 (2013); Lucas A. Galindo, Academic Freedom and Higher Education Regulations:
Spanish Universities before the European Systems, 2 J.L. & CONFLICT RESOL. 20 (2010);
Georgeta Ion & Diego Castro, Governance in Spanish Universities: Changing
Paradigms, 11 J. HIsP. HIGH. EDUC. 336 (2012); Juan P6rez de Munguia, New
Requirements for Higher Education, Academic Freedom and Business Interests,
ESPECIAL EDUCACI6N SUPERIOR No. 10, 37 (2009); David Vallespin Perez, La
gobernanzade la universidad:El camino hacia un "Cambio Razonable" compatible con
el respeto de la autonomia universitariay la libertad de cdtedra, LA REVISTA DE
EDUCACI6N Y DERECHO No. 7 (2013).
164.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supervising
implementation of the ICESCR, has thus, following the examination of state reports,
expressed its concern in cases where university campuses have been put under military
guardianship or has commented that "police presence on university campuses may
infringe on the freedoms necessary for academic and cultural expression." See BEITER,
supra note 30, at 599-600.
165.
ZAKON 0 ZNANSTVENOJ DJELATNOSTI I VISOKOM OBRAZOVANJU 2013, supra
note 144.
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(4)
A search on the premises of a higher education institution may be
undertaken in the absence of its head, or the person authorized by him or her,
only if he or she has not responded to a timely notification without justified
reason.

Similar provisions may be found in the HE Acts of Bulgaria,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Universities in Greece
benefited from a very wide "university asylum" in the past. This has
been abolished in the course of the reform of university laws in 2011
and thereafter, 16 6 and the new laws do not mention the principle of
16 7
the inviolability of university premises.
Concerning the assessment of institutional autonomy in detail in
terms of compliance (or not) with certain key requirements on
organizational, financial, staffing, and academic autonomy (i.e.,
requirements, compliance with which may be considered to be highly
indicative of a more general compliance with institutional autonomy),
the following may be stated: 168 Regarding determinationof the rector:
The state should not be involved in this; that is, the rector should not
be required to be appointed or the election to be confirmed by the
state-also not formally at the highest executive level by the state
president, the cabinet, or a minister, as this conveys an undesirable
image of "closeness" of state and HE institutions. In fourteen of the
HE systems examined, the state is involved in the process in some
way or another-usually in the stated symbolic manner. 169
Regarding competence to decide on internal structures, the law
should clearly not prescribe the specific faculties, departments, or
institutes to be created. Article 15(3) of the Law of 12 August 2003 on
the University of Luxemburg, 170 for example, prescribes a Faculty of
Science, Technology, and Communication; a Faculty of Law,
Economics, and Finances; and a Faculty of Letters, Human Sciences,
Arts, and Educational Sciences. The state should further not be

166.
See, e.g., William Dearden, Tackling Ancient Problems: Higher Education
Reform in Greece, 30 PERSP. Bus. & ECON. (Greece: The Epic Battle for Economic
Recovery) 75, 75-81 (2012).
167.
On the situation of Greek HE following the most far-reaching reforms in
this sphere since the HE law of 1982, see, e.g., id.; Dionysios Gouvias, The Post-Modern
Rhetoric of Recent Reforms in Greek Higher Education, 10 J. CRIT. EDUC. POL'Y STUD.
282 (2012); Vangelis Tsiligiris, The Debt Crisis and Higher Education Reforms in
Greece: A Catalyst for Change, 4 ANGLOHIGHER 15 (2012).
168.
For an assessment of compliance by European states in the light of the
indicators addressed in this paragraph (but also other indicators), see ESTERMANN ET
AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 20-52.
169.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus.,
Belg. (nl.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Den., Est., Fin., Fr., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Lith., Malta,
Pol., Slovn., U.K.; Partial compliance = Neth., Port.; Non-compliance = Belg. (fr.), Czech
Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lux., Rom., Slovk., Spain, Swed.).
170.

LOI du 12 aofit 2003 PORTANT CREATION DE L'UNIVERSITE DU LUXEMBOURG,

MEMORIAL JOURNAL OFFICIEL DU GRAND-DUCH]
Oct. 6, 2003, 2989.

DE LUXEMBOURG A - No. 149,
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required to set up or dissolve faculties, departments, or institutes or
to confirm their establishment/dissolution (the latter being the case,
for example, in Cyprus), and it should not of itself be able to create a
faculty, department, or institute within a HE institution (e.g.,
Romania).

17

1

Financial

autonomy

requires,

amongst

others,

that

HE

institutions receive state funds as a block grant (global budgets),

leaving them "free to divide and distribute their funding internally
according to their needs." Whereas eleven HE systems fully comply
with this requirement, another seventeen accept it in principle but
apply minor restrictions. It appears that only Cyprus and Greece still
make use of a line-item budget, which "pre-allocates university
172
funding to cost items and/or activities.
HE institutions should further be competent to acquire funding
additional to that directly allocated by the state from various sources.
Notably, they should be able to perform (publicly or privately)
commissioned research against payment. Although this is the case in
all HE systems analyzed, 173 not all of them clearly spell this out in
their primary legislation. 174 While not all the powers of HE
institutions need to be elaborated on in parliamentary legislation,
core competences entailed by institutional autonomy should be
addressed in primary legislation.
Staffing autonomy means that the law should lay down a
minimum of detail regarding the academic positions available and the
requirements for positions. In the United Kingdom, in fact, the law
refrains from regulating these matters. In Finland, a minimum of
detail is laid down; Section 31 of the Finnish Universities Act of
2009175 merely states that "[a] university has professors and other
teaching and research staff," leaving the detail to be dealt with in
university regulations. Further, there should be no or only minor

171.
This is not to say that the state may not encourage and promote certain
structural developments within HE institutions. See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.1.2.
(noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Den., Est., Fin., N.R.W.
(F.R.G.), Ir., Lat., Lith., Pol., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Partial compliance = Croat., Czech
Rep., Fr., Hung., Italy, Malta, Neth., Port., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Bulg., Cyprus,
Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Lux., Rom., Spain).
ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at 30-31; see infra Annex,
172.
Indicator C.2.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Den., Est., N.R.W.
(F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Lux., Neth., Spain, U.K.; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg.,
Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.) (in the process of moving from line-item to global
budgets), Hung., Fin., Fr., Lat., Lith., Malta, Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Swed.;
Non-compliance = Cyprus, Greece).
173.
See EURYDICE, supra note 102, at 77-78.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus.,
174.
Bulg., Croat., Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol.,
Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain; Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Czech
Rep., Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Malta, Neth., Slovn., Swed., U.K.; Non-compliance none).
YLIOPISTOLAKI (LAG), No. 558/2009, July 24, 2009.
175.
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restrictions concerning the recruitment and promotion of academic
staff at faculties and departments. There should also be no
requirement to the effect that the appointment of professors be
performed or confirmed by the state. For instance, the Bavarian
Higher Education Institution Personnel Law of 2006 (Germany)
stipulates that, in principle, the competence to decide on the
appointment of professors rests with the responsible minister.176
With regard to the selection of first-cycle (Bachelor)students, HE
institutions should be granted the competence to determine the
selection criteria for and conduct the actual selection of such students
largely themselves. This is the case in nine HE systems. In thirteen,
the responsibilities in this regard are shared between the state and
HE institutions. In eight, the state plays a dominant role in this
respect. 177
Finally, considering that quality control in HE should essentially
be left to be organized by HE institutions themselves (jointly and/or
severally), the requirement of having degree programs accredited
must be considered inimical to academic autonomy. Only six of the
HE systems examined dispense with the requirement of accreditation
17 8
of first-cycle programs.
Generally addressing the extent of government powers regarding
HE institutions, a reading of a state's HE legislation should reflect
wide competences for HE institutions and a minimal measure of
involvement of the state in regulating their activity. This is not to say
that the state does not retain ultimate responsibility in respect of the
HE sector. Article 121 of the Romanian National Education Law of
of Education,
2011179
thus states that
"[t]he Ministry
Research ....controls the way universities exercise their autonomy,

GESETZ UBER DIE RECHTSVERHXLTNISSE DER HOCHSCHULLEHRER UND
176.
UND
SOWIE
DES WEITEREN
WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN
HOCHSCHULLEHRERINNEN
AN
DEN
HOCHSCHULEN
[BAYERISCHES
KUNSTLERISCHEN
PERSONALS
HOCHSCHULPERSONALGESETZ - BAYHSCHPG], May 23, 2006, GVBL. 2006, 230,
Art. 18(6), (10); see infra Annex, Indicator C.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Fin.,
Malta, Neth., Swed., U.K.; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (ni.), Den., Est., N.R.W.
(F.R.G.), Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol., Slovn.; Non-compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat.,
Cyprus, Czech Rep., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain).
177.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.4.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Croat.,
Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, U.K.; Partial compliance - Bulg., Cyprus,
Czech Rep., Lat., Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed.; Noncompliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Den., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.),
Greece).
178.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.2.4.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus.,
Croat., Ir., Lux., Malta, U.K.; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Est., Fin., Pol.; Noncompliance = Belg. (nl.), Bulg., Cyprus, Czech Rep., Den., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W.
(F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lith., Neth., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain,
Swed.).
179.
LEGEA EDUCA:IEI NAIIONALE 2011, supra note 149.
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assume their overall and their own mission and exercise their
18 0
accountability."
The state should, however, merely supervise whether legal
requirements have been complied with (German: "Rechtsaufsicht"),
but not review decisions on their merits (German: "Fachaufsicht").
HE institutions should be in a position to enact most regulations and
take most decisions without these requiring prior approval or
subsequent confirmation by the state. Section 5 of the Austrian
Universities Act of 2002181 thus stresses that universities are not
subject to ministerial instructions. In Section 45 then, the Act states
that universities "shall be subject to supervision by the Federal
Government. This shall comprise monitoring of compliance with laws
and regulations,
including
the university statutes
(legal
supervision)." In a handful of the HE systems examined, HE
legislation reflects a very high degree of proximity between state and
universities. In terms of the Danish (Consolidation) Act on
Universities of 2012,182 for example, the responsible minister is
granted wide-ranging competences to regulate matters or to lay down
general or specific rules on a variety of topics, using formulations
such as "The minister may set maximum enrolment quotas for degree
programmes," 183 "The minister shall lay down the rules regulating
the acquisition of doctoral degrees,"'18 4 "The minister shall lay down
rules regarding the education provided, including tests, examinations
and grading,"'18 5 or "The minister may lay down rules on the
appointment of academic staff and teachers." 18 6 Most of the HE
systems examined may be considered to be in "partial compliance,"
and about one fifth in "full compliance," in respect of ensuring that

180.
On university autonomy and academic freedom in Romania, see, e.g.,
Camelia F. Stoica & Marieta Safta, University Autonomy and Academic Freedom:
Meaningand Legal Basis, 2 PERSP. BUS. L.J. 192 (2013).
181.
UNIVERSITATSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144.
182.
UNIVERSITETSLOVEN 2014, supra note 158.
183.
Id. § 4(5).
184.
Id. § 6(2).
185.
Id. § 8(1).
186.
Id. § 29(3). On the extensive regulation of the HE sector by the Danish
government in furthering HE "as a component of the national economy" and limited
self-governance in Danish universities, see, e.g., Evanthia Kalpazidou Schmidt &
Kamma Langberg, Academic Autonomy in a Rapidly Changing Higher Education
Framework: Academia on the ProcrusteanBed?, 39 EUR. EDUC. 80 (2007-08); Susan
Wright & Rebecca Boden, Markets, Managerialism, and Measurement: Organisational
Transformations of Universities in UK and Denmark, in UNIVERSITY PERFORMANCE
MANAGEMENT: THE SILENT MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION AT DANISH UNIVERSITIES 79
(Jens E. Kristensen et al. eds., 2011); Susan Wright & Jakob W. 0rberg, Autonomy and
Control: Danish University Reform in the Context of Modern Governance, 1 LEARNING &
TEACHING 27 (2008).
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their HE legislation reflects restraint in granting governments
powers to regulate HE institutions. 187
Finally, the independence of HE institutions vis-&-vis private
interests should enjoy a notable measure of protection in HE
legislation. There should be a clear statement emphasizing that
private funding may not compromise the independence of teaching
and research in HE institutions, linking this to an obligation of HE
institutions to reveal the sources and scope of private funding. It
seems only one HE system roughly complies with this requirement.
The recent Act on the Future of Higher Education of September 2014
of North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany), 188 in Section 71 on "Third
party-funded research," provides that a member of the academic staff
may undertake such research, "provided this does not prejudice the
performance of other tasks of the HE institution, his or her freedom
in science, research, teaching and study as well as the rights and
duties of other persons" (§ 71(2)). In Section 71a, entitled
"Transparency regarding third party-funded research," the HE Act
then calls upon "[t]he rector [to inform] the public in an adequate
manner about completed research projects in terms of [Section] 71(1)"
(§ 71a(1)). A similar requirement, obliging public research
institutions to provide an annual overview of private financing of
research conducted at such institutions, also exists in Denmark. This
has not been provided for in terms of legislation, however, but by way
of guidelines issued by the Ministry of Science, Technology, and
Innovation. 18 9 In sum, one HE system may be held to be in "full
compliance," five in "partial compliance," and all the others in "noncompliance," with the requirement of adopting legislation protecting
the independence of HE institutions against threats to autonomy
190
emanating from private sources.

187.
See infra Annex, Indicator C.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. (nl.),
Fin., Ir., Lat., U.K.; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech
Rep., Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Italy, Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth.,
Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Non-compliance = Den., Hung., Swed.).
HOCHSCHULZUKUNFTSGESETZ [HZG NRW], Sept. 16, 2014, GV. NRW.
188.
2014, No. 27, Sept. 29, 2014, 543.
189.
See EURYDICE, supra note 102, at 85.
190.
On accountability measures for private funds in HE in Europe, see id.; see
infra Annex, Indicator C.4. (noting that, Full compliance = N.R.W. (F.R.G.); Partial
compliance = Aus., Croat., Cyprus, Den., Italy; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.),
Bulg., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux.,
Malta, Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain, Swed., U.K.).
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Table 3: Country Ranking: Protection of Institutional
Autonomy in HE Legislation
Country
1.
2.
3.

Finland
United Kingdom
Croatia, North Rhine-Westphalia
(Germany)
Ireland
4.
5. Austria
Lithuania
6.
7. Estonia, Flanders (Belgium), Malta
8. Latvia
9. Poland
Average
10. Germany
11. Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy,
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal
12. Belgium, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
13. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Romania
14. France
15. Sweden, Wallonia (Belgium)
16. Bavaria (Germany)
17. Greece
18. Hungary

Percentage & Score out of 20
in parentheses
(15)
75
67.5 (13.5)
65
(13)
62.5 (12.5)
(12)
60
(11)
55
52.5 (10.5)
50
(10)
47.5 (9.5)
46.29 (9.26)
46.25 (9.25)
45
(9)
42.5
40
35
32.5
27.5
22.5
1.2.5

(8.5)
(8)
(7)
(6.5)
(5.5)
(4.5)
(2.5)

D. The Protection of Academic Self-Governance in Higher Education
Legislation
Also the core elements of the right of academic self-governance
should be clearly articulated in HE legislation and then be given
the
on
provisions
various
the
in
shape
concrete
governing and representative
institutional/faculty/departmental
organs of HE institutions. The right of self-governance being a central
component of meaningful academic freedom, HE legislation that does
not articulate and operationalize its essential features does not
comply with the right to academic freedom. Granted, it is in the
interest of enhanced institutional autonomy to leave the regulation of
many aspects in this context to institutions of HE themselves;
nevertheless, criteria such as those requiring academic staff to be
able to elect a majority of representatives to the senate or requiring
them to be entitled to exercise "control" over who is chosen as the
rector, need to be guaranteed at the level of primary legislation.
Where the United Kingdom's Education Reform Act of 1988 thus
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merely refers to "the academic board of an institution," providing no
further particulars, 19 1 this falls short of minimum standards of
compliance. The same holds true where HE legislation does not deal
with issues of governance at faculty/departmental level at all, as is
the case, for example, in Flanders (Belgium), Ireland, or Lithuania.
Of the thirty HE systems having been assessed, the HE Acts of
only three contain an express and adequate provision on selfgovernance, twelve an express, but in certain respects problematic or
incomplete provision, and fifteen no express provision.192 An example
of an express and adequate provision on self-governance would
perhaps be that of Section 26 of the Latvian Law on Institutions of
Higher Education of 1995:193
(3)
A staff member shall have the right to participate in the governance of an
institution of higher education and decisions of self-governance, and the
formulation of internal laws and regulations of that institution, in accordance
with the constitution of the institution, as well as to take part in the taking of
decisions related to the interests of staff, to participate in the meetings of
collegial governing bodies of an institution of higher education, and to be given
the opportunity to be heard.
(4)
A staff member shall have the right to participate in elections of selfgovernance of an institution of higher education and to be elected therein.

A majority-ideally between 60 and 70 percent--of the members
of the senate (or its equivalent) should be representatives of academic
staff. Students should, however, also be adequately represented.194
Article 12(1) of the University of Cyprus Law 1989 to 2013,195 for
example, provides that the senate is to consist of the rector and the
vice-rectors (elected from among the professors by the boards of the
departments (i.e., academic staff and student representatives)), the
deans of faculties (elected from among the professors and associate
professors by the boards of the departments of the faculties
concerned), three representatives of the teaching staff of each faculty
elected by the board of the faculty (i.e., certain academic staff and
student representatives), and the representatives of the students

191.
Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, § 125(2), sched. 7A, para. 3.
192.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bay.
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat.; Partial compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep.,
Den., Fr., Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.),
Cyprus, Est., Fin., Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, Slovn., Spain, Swed., U.K.).
193.
AUGSTSKOLU LIKUMS 1995, supranote 150.
194.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Aus.,
Cyprus, Hung., Italy, Spain; Partial compliance = Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep.,
Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Ir., Lat., Lux., Malta, Pol., Port., Rom.,
Slovk., Slovn., Swed.; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.), Est., Fin., Fr., Lith., Neth., U.K.).
195.
Ot ictpi faveitajqpiou K,6npou N6tot ro) 1989-2013 [University of Cyprus
Law 1989 to 2013] (AptiO6g 144 roi 1989 - AptOp[6 116(I) Too 2013 [No. 144 of 1989 No. 116(1) of 2013]).
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(whose number is to correspond to the number of faculties). Clearly,
there will always be at least 80 percent representatives of academic
staff on the senate.
Quite a number of HE Acts remain vague when providing for the
composition of the senate (or its equivalent). The Estonian
Universities Act of 1995 thus provides for academic staff
representatives on the council of the university, not stipulating how
many representatives there should be, adding that there may also be
"other persons prescribed by the statutes" on the council. 19 6 The
French Code de l'Education provides for the conseil acaddmique to
comprise members of the commission de la recherche and the
commission de la formation et de la vie universitaire. Depending on
how exactly the provisions of the Education Code are implemented,
the former may have between 40 and 73 percent representatives of
197
academic staff, the latter between 37.5 to 40 percent.
There should further not be too many representatives of students
on the senate (or its equivalent). In the Czech Republic, there may be
198
up to 50 percent representatives of students on the senate.
Academic staff other than professors should also be adequately
represented. In Bavaria (Germany), the ratio of representatives of
staff
academic
of
other
representatives
to
professors
99
("wissenschaftlicheMitarbeiter")is six to one.1
Rectors should be scholars coming from within the HE
institution they are to serve, the academic staff of that institution
should be able to exercise "control" over who is chosen as the rector
(for instance, by holding a majority of votes), rector and staff should
govern "co-operatively," and the academic staff should also be able to
exercise "control" over the rector's dismissal by means of a vote of noconfidence. Although principles of "managerial efficiency" may
perhaps call for a different governance regime, the one above is that
most beneficial to promoting "the free search for truth" and is
required in terms of human rights criteria, including the principles of
self-governance and collegiality as enshrined in the UNESCO
Recommendation. 200

196.
197.

ULIKOOLISEADUS, Jan. 12, 1995, RIIGI TEATAJA RT I 1995, 12, 119, § 14(2).
See CODE DE L'EDUCATION, arts. L. 712-4-L. 712-6; see BEAUD, supra note

121 (for an analysis of the protection of the right to academic freedom in France).
ZAKON 111/1998 Sb., Apr. 22, 1998, 0 VYSOKYCH KOLACH A 0 ZMNt A
198.
DOPLNtNi DALACH ZAKONO [ZAKON 0 VYSOKYCH KOLACH] [Act on Higher Education
Institutions], SBIRKA ZAKONO CR No. 39/1998, 5388, § 8(1).
199.
BAYERISCHES HOCHSCHULGESETZ [BAYHSCHGI 2006, supra note 141,
art. 25(1).
See Georg Krticken, Ldsst sich Wissenschaft managen?, 41
200.
WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT 345 (2008) (generally expressing doubt as to whether science
and research are susceptible to "management principles" whatsoever).
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Article 20(2) of the Spanish Organic Law on Universities of
2001,201 for example, states that "[t]he rector shall be elected... from
among officials of the body of university professors ("cuerpo de
catedrdticosde universidad')active in it." Clearly, the rector here is
"a scholar" coming from within the HE institution. The assessment
has shown that rectors increasingly may come from outside the
institution and often it is not expressly stated that they should be
2 02
academics.
Regarding the particular manner in which rectors are chosen,
the models employed in this respect in the HE systems examined are
highly varied. 20 3 Academic staff may be entitled to directly elect the
head of the institution. Pursuant to the Wallonian Loi sur
l'organisation de l'enseignement universitaire par l'Etat of 1953
(Belgium), the rector is elected from among the ordinary professors of
the university by academic staff, administrative personnel, and
students, with the vote of academic staff weighted 75 percent. 20 4 The
government then appoints the rector.205 Article 23 of the Slovene Law
on Higher Education of 1993206 provides that "[t]he rector shall be
elected by all higher education teachers, scientific staff and higher
education employees ....Students shall also have a voting rightnamely, a fifth of the votes ...." Academic staff may be entitled to
take part in the rector's election indirectly through the senate (or its
equivalent). Section 10(2) of Slovakia's Act on Higher Education
Institutions of 2002207 thus stipulates that "[tlhe rector shall be
appointed and dismissed at the proposal of the senate ... by the
President of the Slovak Republic."
The general trend, however, is "to do away with" direct or
indirect participation of academic staff and to have the rector
appointed by a "third body," to wit HE institution boards, With many
introduced in the wake of "new university management" policies en
vogue since the 1990s. Customarily, all or the majority of the

201.
LEY ORGANIcA 6/2001 DE UNIVERSIDADES, supra note 153.
202.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg.
(ni.), Beig. (fr.), Buig., Croat., Cyprus, Pol., Spain; Partial compliance = Den., Est., Fin.,
Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Lith., Lux., Port., Rom.; Non-compliance Aus., Czech Rep., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Malta, Neth., Slovk., Slovn., Swed., U.K.).
203.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Slovn.;
Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech Rep.,
Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Italy, Lat., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain;
Non-compliance = Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Ir., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Swed., U.K.).
The assessment has also taken into account whether or not general principles of
democratic elections/selection procedures have been complied with.
204.

Loi SUR L'ORGANISATION DE LENSEIGNEMENT UNIVERSITAIRE PAR LETAT,

Law 11338, Apr. 28, 1953, MONITEUR BELGE, May 1, 1953, art. 11.
205.
Id. art. 6.
206.
ZAKON 0 VISOKEM OLSTVU [ZVIS] 1993, supra note 152.
207.
ZAKONY 131/2002 Z.z., Feb. 21, 2002, 0 VYSOKYCH 8KOLACH A 0 ZMENE A
DOPLNENI NIEKTORYCH ZAKONOV, ZBIERKE ZAKONOV No. 58/2002, 1462.
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members of these boards are external, representing a variety of
government and corporate. The bodies
interests-including
sometimes merely perform a supervisory function, but in many cases
they play a decisive role in strategic decision-making. 20 8 Under the
Maltese Education Act of 1988, the council, "the supreme governing
body of the university," 20 9 thus elects the rector. There must be
external members on the council, and, depending on the
circumstances, "academic" members would constitute between 10 and
45 percent of council members. 2 10 In the Netherlands, the Law on
Provisions concerning Higher Education and Scientific Research of
1992 envisages all members of the rectorate (college van bestuur),
including the rector, to be appointed by the supervisory board (raad
van toezicht), consisting of three to five external members, appointed
by the minister. 2 1 1 In terms of the Swedish Higher Education Act of
1992 and the accompanying Ordinance of 1993, the government is to
appoint a rector based on the proposal of the board of governors, the
latter making the proposal following consultations with academic and
other staff, and students. 2 12 The board roughly comprises 50 percent
external members, appointed by the government, and 252 13percent
representatives of academic staff and students, respectively.
A study of HE laws shows that the dismissal of rectors follows a
similar logic as the particular manner in which they are chosen,
discussed above. Some HE systems leave the powers in this respect to
academic staff. In Estonia, the university council (the equivalent of a
senate) may thus, by virtue of Section 14(3)(18) of the Universities
Act of 1995,214 adopt a vote of no-confidence in the rector. Article 2(e)
of the Italian Law of 30 December 2010, No. 240, on Rules on the
Organization of Universities, Academic Staff and Recruitment, as
well as Governance to Enhance the Quality and Efficiency of the
University System, 2 15 provides that the senate is to be granted the
competence "to propose to the electorate with a majority of at least

208.
EURYDICE,
20-29.
209.
210.

Attesting to these developments, but commenting on them neutrally, see
supra note 102, at 33-42; ESTERMANN ET AL., SCORECARD, supra note 83, at

211.

WET OP HET HOGER ONDERWIJS EN WETENSCHAPPELIJK ONDERZOEK [WHW]

Education Act, Act XXIV of 1988 (Cap. 327, Laws of Malta, 1988), art. 77.
See id. arts. 74(10), 76.

1992, supra note 157, ch. 9, tit. 1, arts. 9.3.1-2., 9.7., 9.8.1.a.
HOGSKOLEFORORDNING, Feb. 4, 1993, SFS No. 1993:100, ch. 2, §§ 8, 11.
212.
§ 4;
ch. 2,
No. 1992:1434,
SFS
1992,
Dec. 17,
HOGSKOLELAG,
213.
HOGSKOLEFORORDNING 1993, ch. 2, §§ 1, 7a, 7b.
ULIKOOLISEADUS 1995, supra note 196.
214.
215.
LEGGE, 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240, NORME IN MATERIA DI ORGANIZZAZIONE
DELLE UNIVERSITA, DI PERSONALE ACCADEMICO E RECLUTAMENTO, NONCHt DELEGA AL
GOVERNO PER INCENTIVARE LA QUALITA E L'EFFICIENZA DEL SISTEMA UNIVERSITARIO,

GAzz. UFF. Jan. 14, 2011, No. 10, S.O. No. 11.
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2 16
two thirds of its members a motion of no-confidence in the rector."
Nevertheless, also in this respect, the trend is for those systems in
which the rector is chosen by a board to also grant the board the
competence to dismiss the rector. Thus, in Denmark or Lithuania, the
2 17
board appoints or elects the rector and dismisses him or her.
In some of the HE systems assessed, the rector and the senate
(or its equivalent) retain responsibility for strategic decision-making.
This is so, for example, in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Latvia, and Romania. In these cases, there may additionally be
certain other bodies that include external experts, but these are then
assigned solely advisory or supervisory powers. 2 18 As has been
pointed out, however, provision is increasingly made for separate
boards, composed entirely or to a large extent of external members,
with important decision-making powers in strategic matters. They
are usually competent to appoint and dismiss rectors, often coming
from outside the HE institution. The rectors (or sometimes rectorates)
may be granted far-reaching executive powers. Together, rector and
board decide on issues such as internal structure, the heads of units,
teaching and research strategy, budgets, and administrative setup.
It may well be asked to what extent the principles of selfgovernance and collegiality permit "managerial" governance
structures to be introduced in HE institutions. Strengthening the
rector's (rectorate's) powers or providing for a board making external
expertise available and involved in strategic decision-making would
probably be permissible provided these measures are adequately
counterbalanced by securing effective participatory and control rights
for academic staff, ensuring the system of governance does not
219
become "detached" from the academic staff whom it should serve.

216.
On recent changes in the governance of HE institutions in Italy, see, e.g.,
Davide Donina et al., Higher Education Reform in Italy: Tightening Regulation Instead
of Steering at a Distance, 28 HIGH. EDUC. POL'Y 215 (2015).
217.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Rom.,
Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.),
N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Hung., Italy, Pol., Port., Slovk.; Non-compliance = Belg. (ni.), Cyprus,
Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Greece, Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Slovn., Swed., U.K.).
218.
In terms of the Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995, for example, a
board of trustees representing the interests of society is to "express its comments" on
various matters (Higher Education Act 1995, supra note 151, art. 35a-35c). Likewise,
under the Czech Act on Higher Education Institutions of 1998, a board of trustees
representing the public interest, apart from granting its consent to certain legal acts,
"expresses its views" on different issues (ZAON 0 VYSOKYCH KOLACH 1998, supra note
207, §§ 14-15).
219.
See
Hamburgisches
Hochschulgesetz,
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 20,.
2010, BVerfGE 127, 87, at 114-18,
88-95 (Ger.). The court in this case, in the
German context, pointed out that, where bodies such as the rector (rectorate) or dean
(dean's office) are granted substantive decision-making powers that have a bearing on
science and scholarship, academic staff must retain effective participatory and control
rights.
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It is submitted that academic staff should thus retain the power to
elect the rector from among their midst and, where appropriate, to
express a lack of confidence in him or her. Further, academic staff
should ideally have at least 50 percent representation on the
board. 220 An arrangement in terms of which there are principally
external members on the board, most of whom are determined by
academic staff, would perhaps still pass muster, but only at the level
of "partial compliance" (e.g., Austria 22 1). In Portugal, the general
council (replacing general assembly and senate) has a majority of
representatives of academic staff and at least 30 percent external
members. 2 22 The governing authority in Irish universities could
include up to about 75 percent external members. Representation of
academic staff may be as low as 13 or as high as somewhat more than
50 percent. 22 3 In post-1992 English universities, at least half of the
12 (13) to 24 (25) members of the governing body must be
"independent." Up to two members may be teachers at the institution
nominated by the academic board. There are further one to nine coopted members among the members 22 4 who could potentially be
225
teachers at the institution.
The above inquiry has been replicated at the level of the units of
HE institutions (faculties and departments). First of all, have
collegial bodies been provided for at the faculty and departmental
22 7
level? 2 26 Do these bodies adequately represent academic staff?

Cf. Lewis Elton, Collegiality and Complexity: Humboldt's Relevance to
220.
British Universities Today, 62 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 224, 232 (2008) (stressing the need for "a
democratic form of leadership, distributed throughout an organisation, very different
from the current form of top-down leadership" in HE); id. at 233 (emphasizing that the
vice-chancellor should be the "university's first servant"); Michael Shattock, Rebalancing Modern Concepts of University Governance, 56 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 235, 240
(2002) (arguing in support of "moving back to a more evenly balanced approach to
governance-the 'shared governance' concept").
UNIVERSITATSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144, § 21(6) (providing that 50
221.
percent of the board members are "to be determined" by academic staff, and 50 percent
by the government).
LEI n.' 62/2007, REGIME JURIDICO DAS INSTITUICOES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR,
222.
supra note 152, art. 81. For an account of the more recent changes in Portuguese HE,
see, e.g., Antonio Magalhaes et al., Governance of Governance in Higher Education:
Practicesand Lessons Drawn from the Portuguese Case, 67 HIGH. EDUC. Q. 295 (2013);
Rui Santiago & Teresa Carvalho, Managerialism Rhetorics in Portuguese Higher
Education, 50 MINERVA 511 (2012).
Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24 of 1997), § 16.
223.
Education Reform Act, 1988, ch. 40, sched. 7A, para. 3 (composition of
224.
governing body).
See infra Annex, Indicator D.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg.,
225.
Croat., Pol., Port., Slovk.; Between full and partial compliance = Belg. (nI.), Belg. (fr.),
Czech Rep., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Hung., Lat., Lith., Rom., Slovn.; Partial
compliance = Aus., Cyprus, Est., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Neth., Spain; Between partial and
non-compliance = Den., Fin., Ir., Italy, Lux., Malta, Swed.; Non-compliance = U.K.).
See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg.
226.
(nl.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.),
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Further, are deans and heads of departments required to be scholars
from within their institution?22 8 Do academic staff exercise "control"
over who is chosen as the dean or head of department, or do they
exercise certain, but more restricted rights of participation in this
respect, or, in fact, none at all? 229 Likewise, are they able to exercise
''control" over the dean's or head of department's dismissal by means
of a vote of no-confidence, or have they been accorded qualified or no
rights of participation in this regard?2 30 The criteria of compliance
and the rationale underlying these resemble those at the institutional
level and need not be repeated here. A number of the HE systems
assessed (Austria, Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Estonia,
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) fail to regulate the right
of self-governance at the unit level whatsoever or they do so in a
clearly insufficient way. As has been underlined, although the
particular manner in which governance at the unit level is
concretized should as far as possible be left to HE institutions
themselves to decide, human rights aspects of self-governance at this
level need to be provided for in primary legislation.

Greece, Italy, Lat., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Partial
compliance = Den., Port.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Hung., Ir., Lith., Swed.,
U.K.).
227.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.1.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Cyprus;
Partial compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.),
Greece, Italy, Malta, Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Slovn., Spain; Non-compliance = Aus.,
Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Est., Fin., Fr., Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Neth., Swed., U.K.).
228.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg.,
Cyprus, Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), Greece, Lux., Slovn., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus.,
Croat., Den., N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Malta, Neth., Pol., Rom.; Non-compliance = Beig. (nl.),
Belg. (fr.), Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Port., Slovk., Swed.,
U.K.).
229.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Cyprus,
Slovn.; Partial compliance = Aus., Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W.
(F.R.G.), Greece, Lat., Lux., Malta, Rom., Slovk., Spain; Non-compliance = Belg. (nl.),
Belg. (fr.), Den., Est., Fin., Fr., Hung., Ir., Italy, Lith., Neth., Pol., Port., Swed., U.K.).
230.
See infra Annex, Indicator D.3.2.3. (noting that, Full compliance = none;
Partial compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech Rep., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Rom.,
Slovk.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Den., Est., Fin., Fr.,
Greece, Hung., Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol., Port., Slovn., Spain,
Swed., U.K.).
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Table 4: Country Ranking: Protection of Academic SelfGovernance in HE Legislation

Country

Percentage & Score out of

1.

Bulgaria

72.5

(14.5)

2.

Croatia

70

(14)

3.

Cyprus, North Rhine-Westphalia

6 2,5

(12.5)

20 in parentheses

(Germany), Poland, Romania, Slovakia
4.
5.

Germany
Bavaria (Germany), Spain

61.25 (12.25)
(12)
60

6.
7.

Portugal
Czech Republic, Slovenia

57.5
55

8.

Greece, Latvia

52.5 (10.5)

Austria, Hungary
9.
Average

(12.5)
(11)

4.5
(9)
42. 99 (8.6)

(8)

10.

Wallonia (Belgium), Italy

40

11.

Belgium

37.5 (7.5)

12. Flanders (Belgium)
13. Denmark, France
14. Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta

35
(7)
32.5 (6.5)
(6)
30

15.
16.
17.
18.

27.5
22.5
15
0

Netherlands
Estonia
Finland, Ireland, Sweden
United Kingdom

(5.5)
(4.5)
(3)
(0)

E. The Protectionof Job Security (including "Tenure') in Relevant
Legislation
The legal framework governing the duration of contracts of
service of academic staff in HE at post-entry levels (i.e., following any
stage of doctoral employment) should envisage permanent contracts
or commencement on a tenure-track. HE systems whose laws are in
compliance with this requirement include, among others, Flanders
(Belgium), Bulgaria, and France. 23 1 Article V.28 of the Flemish
Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher Education

See infra Annex, Indicator E.1.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Belg. (nI.),
231.
BeIg. (fr.), Bulg., Fr., Greece, Hung., Port., Spain; Partial compliance = Aus., Cyprus,
Den., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Lith., Lux., Rom., Slovn., Swed.; Noncompliance = Croat., Czech Rep., Est., Fin., Lat., Malta, Neth., Pol., Slovk., U.K.).
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of 2013 (Belgium)23 2 thus provides for full-time members of the
"independent academic staff' to be appointed, further stating that
[t]he university administration may, in the case of a first appointment as a
member of the independent academic staff, appoint a person on a fixed-term
basis ... for a period not exceeding three years with the prospect of a
permanent appointment without new vacancy, if the university administration
assesses the performance of the person concerned positively.

Article V.29 further provides for an optional tenure-track system (see
below when addressing the issue of promotion of academic staff).
The legal framework of some of the HE systems assessed-for
example that in place in Austria or the Czech Republic-leaves it to
HE institutions themselves to decide whether or not to offer
permanent contracts. 233 In these cases, the use of fixed-term
contracts may be subject to fairly strict limitations as to legitimate
cases of use, maximum number of successive contracts, and their
maximum cumulated duration. The Austrian Universities Act of
2002234 thus states that "[e]mployment contracts for a limited term
shall, on pain of the invalidity of the employment contract, be
concluded for a maximum period of six years" 235 and that "[t]he
conclusion of limited-term contracts immediately succeeding each
other shall only be permissible for staff employed in connection with
third party-funded or research projects, for staff engaged exclusively
in teaching as well as for temporary replacement staff," adding that
"[t]he total duration of such contracts immediately succeeding each
other shall not exceed six years .... "236 The use of fixed-term
contracts may, however, also be subject to rather lax requirements. In
terms of Section 39 of the Czech Labor Code of 2006,237 a fixed-term
contract may be concluded for a maximum period of three years, it
being permissible to renew this twice. The overall labor relation can,
therefore, last up to nine years (3+3+3)! Whereas cases such as that
of Austria should be held to constitute instances of "partial

232.

CODIFICATIE van

11 oktober 2013 VAN DE DECRETALE BEPALINGEN

BETREFFENDE HET HOGER ONDERWIJS [CODEX HOGER ONDERWiJS], as endorsed by
DECREET TOT BEKRACHTIGING VAN DE DECRETALE BEPALINGEN BETREFFENDE HET

HOGER ONDERWIJS, gecodificeerd op 11 oktober 2013 (1), Dec. 20, 2013, BELGISCH
STAATSBLAD, Feb. 27, 2014.
In Austria, in terms of the Collective Agreement for Employees of
233.
Universities of 2013, permanent contracts are to be concluded with professors (§ 25(3))
and associate professor (§ 27(5)). Such security of employment should, however, already
be available under parliamentary legislation and not depend on volatile collective
bargaining.
234.
UNIVERSITATSGESETZ 2002, supra note 144.
Id. § 109(1).
235.
236.
Id. § 109(2).
237.
Z~kon 262/2006, Apr. 21, 2006, ZAKONfK PRACE, SBtRKA ZAKON: oR
No. 84/2006, 3146.
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compliance," those in the nature of the Czech example should be
considered cases of "non-compliance."
Clearly also "in non-compliance" are HE systems, whose legal
framework expressly envisages fixed-term contracts for academic
staff at post-entry levels, even those with senior positions (associate
or full professors), with there being little or no prospect of permanent
contracts being concluded. The Estonian Universities Act of 1995,238
in Section 39(1), thus states that "[t]he positions of regular teaching
and research staff at a university shall be filled for up to five years by
way of public competition with equal conditions for all
participants . . . ." It is further stipulated, in Section 391(1), that
"[tihe successive conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts with
teaching or research staff shall not cause the employment
relationship to become one for an unlimited term." In fact, "[a]n
employment contract for an unlimited term shall [only] be concluded
with a person who has been employed in the same university and has
worked as a professor for at least eleven years, following evaluation
under conditions and procedures established by the council of the
2 39
university"!
In practice, the situation regarding the duration of contracts of
service is in many instances not as one would expect it to be in terms
of the letter of the law in force. 240 In some cases, protective
legislation does not actually have a protective effect. Hence, the effect
of the provisions of the Austrian Universities Act of 2002, referred to
above, in practice is not that universities conclude permanent

ULIKOOLISEADUS 1995, supra note 196.
238.
Id. § 391(2); see also European Commission, Commission Asks Estonia to
239.
Apply the Fixed-Term Employment Directive Fully in Academia and the Arts,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 24, 2012), http://ec.europa.eulsocial/main.jsp?langld=de&
(archived
[https://perma.ccK389-9CT7]
catld=157&newsld=1707&furtherNews=yes
Apr. 10, 2016) (reporting that the European Commission has asked Estonia to provide
fixed-term staff in universities with protection against successive fixed-term
employment contracts in accordance with Council Directive 99/70, 1999 O.J. (L 175) 43
(EC) (Directive concerning the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work Concluded
by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP), this establishing a framework to prevent abuse arising
from the use of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relationships).
Legislative provisions similar to those in Estonia exist in Croatia, Latvia and Slovakia.
240.
See infra Annex, Indicator E.1.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Bulg., Fr.,
Greece, Hung., Ir., Malta, Neth., Slovn., Spain, U.K.; Partial compliance = Cyprus,
Czech Rep., Den., Italy, Pol., Port., Rom., Swed.; Non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.),
Belg. (fr.), Croat., Est., Fin., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Lat., Lith., Lux., Slovk.).
Various sources of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this
indicator. See, e.g., Gulay Ates & Angelika Brechelmacher, Academic Career Paths, in
THE WORK SITUATION OF THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS OF A
SURVEY IN TWELVE COUNTRIES 13 (Ulrich Teichler & Ester A. Hihle eds., 2013); IDEA
CONSULT ET AL., SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
CONCERNING MOBILITY PATTERNS AND CAREER PATHS OF RESEARCHERS (Final Report
MORE2, Prepared for European Commission, Research Directorate-General, Brussels,
Aug. 2013), http://ec.europa.euleuraxesspdflresearch_policies/more2/Final%20report.
pdf [http://perma.cc/Y3LX-8PAT] (archived Feb. 27, 2016).

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

662

[VOL. 49:597

contracts with academic staff after six years. Rather, they prefer not
to retain staff. Many Austrian scholars accordingly leave their
country at that point to find employment abroad. 24 1 In Germany, the
provisions of the Act on Fixed-Term Contracts of Employment in
Academia of 2007,242 intended to restrict the use of fixed-term
contracts, allowing these only where staff are financed primarily out
of third-party funds, are being abused by converting ordinary
academic positions into third-party-funded positions. 2 43 In other
cases, a legal framework may not be in accordance with required
standards, yet does not prevent a high level of protection in practice.
In the United Kingdom, for instance, despite the absence of
parliamentary legislation on the matter, almost 90 percent of
academic staff either have permanent contracts or fixed-term
244
contracts with long-term prospects.
The HE legislation of roughly a third of the HE systems assessed
either contains provisions prohibiting dismissals of academic staff on
operational grounds (restructuring, down-sizing, reorganization, or
economic difficulties) or contains provisions laying down protective
standards for cases where such dismissals take place. 245 Ireland and
Portugal expressis verbis require academic staff to enjoy "tenure."
Section 25(6) of the Irish Universities Act of 1997 insists that "[a]
university ...shall provide for the tenure of officers." 24 6 Article 50 of
the Portuguese Law on the Legal Status of Institutions of Higher
Education of 2007247 states that, "[s]o as to guarantee their scientific
and pedagogical autonomy, higher education institutions must have a
permanent staff of teachers and researchers benefiting from an
enhanced level of employment stability (tenure)."
In the case of Greece and Poland, dismissals of certain academic
staff for reasons of redundancy are not allowed or restricted. In

241.
See Ingrid Brodnig, Osterreich vergrault seinen Wissenschaftsnachwuchs,
http://www.zeit.de/studiumhochschule/2012-O1/
ZEIT ONLINE
(Jan. 19,
2012),
oesterreich-nachwuchs [https://perma.cc/K27L-2HBV] (archived Feb. 27, 2016); Fabian
Kretschmer, Ein Vertrag, der die Forschung in Ketten legt, DERSTANDARDAT (Mar. 7,
2012), http://derstandard.at/1330390685392/Externe-Lehrbeauftragte-Ein-Vertrag-derdie -Forschung-in-Ketten-legt [https:Hperma.cc/KBY4-5PNG] (archived Feb. 27, 2016).
242.

GESETZ

UBER

BEFRISTETE

ARBEITSVERTRAGE

IN

DER WISSENSCHAFT

[WISSENSCHAFrSZEITVERTRAGSGESETZ - WISSZEITVG], Apr. 12, 2007, BGBL. I, at 506.
243.
See, e.g., Annika Sartor, Forschen auf Zeit: Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiter
sind meistens befristet angesteit-Warum eigentlich?, ZEIT ONLINE (June 18, 2013),
[https://
http://www.zeit.de/campus/2013/04/wissenschaftliche-mitarbeiter-befristung
perma.cc/SXJ8-7RMX] (archived Feb. 27, 2016).
See Ates & Brechelmacher, supra note 240, at 27 (figures for 2007/08).
244.
245.
See infra Annex, Indicator E.2.1. (noting that, Full compliance = Greece;
Partial compliance = Aus., Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Bulg., Croat., Cyprus, Fin., Fr., Bay.
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Ir., Italy, Pol., Port., Rom., Spain, U.K.; Non-compliance =
Czech Rep., Den., Est., Hung., Lat., Lith., Lux., Malta, Neth., Slovk., Slovn., Swed.).
246.
Universities Act, 1997 (No. 24/1997) (defining the term "officer" in § 3).
°
247.
LEI n. 62/2007, REGIME JURiDiCO DAS INSTITUIQOES DE ENSINO SUPERIOR,
supra note 152.
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Greece, professors may only be dismissed for reasons of a criminal
conviction, a grave disciplinary breach, illness or disability, or
professional incompetence. 248 In Poland, those "appointed" to their
position and holding the title of "professor" may generally not be
24 9
dismissed for reasons of redundancy.
In the case of Austria, Finland, and the United Kingdom, HE
legislation contains provisions to the effect that a contract of service
may not be terminated because a member of the academic staff has
exercised his or her freedom to teach or carry out research, precluding
"redundancy" serving as a pretext for "getting rid of' certain members
of staff.2 50 The Bulgarian Higher Education Act of 1995,251 in
Article 58(1)(3), countenances dismissals for reasons of redundancy,
but only if there are no opportunities for reallocation to another
department or re-qualification in a related discipline.
In a number of HE systems, all members or at least senior
members of the academic staff are civil/public servants or public
sector workers (i.e., not "ordinary" employees in terms of private law).
This status may entail their dismissal on operational grounds being
excluded (even where HE legislation does not expressly affirm such
protection). This is the case in Flanders (Belgium), Wallonia
(Belgium), Croatia, Cyprus, Bavaria (Germany), North RhineWestphalia (Germany), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. In
the case of France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Slovenia,
academic staff who are civil servants may (at least in theory) be
dismissed on operational grounds. 252 Concluding the comments on
this indicator, it may be noted that the HE legislation (in the form of
parliamentary enactments) of none of the HE systems assessed
contains a full-fledged provision providing adequate protection,
entailing the consideration of alternatives, the observance of suitable
priority criteria, the following of a formalized procedure, and the

248.

This is, in fact, provided for in terms of the Greek Constitution. See GREEK

CONSTITUTION

1975, art. 16(6).

249.
Ustawa, z dnia 27 lipca 2005 r., PRAWO 0 SZKOLNICTWIE WYZSZYM [Act,
July 27, 2005, Law on Higher Education], DZIENNIK USTAW 2005, No. 164, Item 1365,
as amended, arts. 123-28. Art. 125 does, however, provide for termination "on other
compelling grounds."
144, § 113 (Aus.);
2002, supra note
250.
See UNIVERSITATSGESETZ
YLIOPISTOLAKI (LAG) 2009, supra note 175, § 32 (Fin.); Education Reform Act, 1988,
ch. 40, §§ 202-04 (U.K.).
251.
Higher Education Act 1995, supra note 151.
252.
See CHRISTOPH DEMMKE & TIMO MOILANEN, EUROPEAN INSTITUTE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN CENTRAL PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION: RESTRUCTURING IN TIMES OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFORMATION AND

THE IMPACT ON STATUS DEVELOPMENT 49 (Study Commissioned by the Chancellery of
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Nov. 2012), http://www.eupan.eu/files/
repository/2013021293522_StudyThefuture of public.employment.pdf [http://perma.
cc/97FL-QK8U] (archived Feb. 28, 2016).
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guarantee of procedural safeguards, in circumscribed cases where
contracts may be terminated on operational grounds.
To the extent that HE legislation does not address the issue of
the termination of contracts of service on operational grounds,
recourse needs to be had to the provisions of "ordinary" civil service
and/or labor law. These may provide adequate, some, or insufficient
protection to academic staff in this regard. Adequate protection would
imply that the notice of termination clearly state the grounds of
termination, that alternatives to termination (such as transfer to
another similar position within the institution, transfer to another
similar position in another institution, or retraining) be considered
and that, where termination cannot be avoided, suitable priority
criteria (e.g., length of service or age) be followed. In Germany, for
example, Section 1(2)(2) of the Act on Protection in Cases of Dismissal
of 1969253 obliges the employer of public law status to try to avoid
dismissals by offering employees another suitable position. Likewise,
such employers are required to retain employees where they can be
retrained or where their working conditions can be changed in such a
way as to make continued employment possible. Where dismissal
cannot be avoided, Section 1(3) provides for a mandatory social
selection on the basis of criteria such as length of service, age, etc., to
take place. On the whole, twelve HE systems provide a rather high
level of protection in this context, eleven a medium, and seven a low
25 4
level of protection.
Adequate provision for advancement of academic staff to a
higher position based on an objective assessment of competence
should further be made. Some of the HE systems assessed do so
through a tenure-track system. 255 Article V.29 of the Flemish

253.
KONDIGUNGSSCHUTZGESETZ [KSCHG] in the version of Aug. 25, 1969,
BGBL. I, at 1317, last changed by Art. 3(2) of Law, Apr. 20, 2013, BGBL. I, at 868.
254.
See infra Annex, Indicator E.2.2. (noting that, Full compliance = Croat.,
Fr., Bay. (F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Greece, Ir., Italy, Lat., Lith., Port., Slovn., Swed.;
Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Belg. (fr.), Cyprus, Est., Fin., Lux., Malta, Neth., Pol.,
Slovk., Spain; Non-compliance = Aus., Bulg., Czech Rep., Den., Hung., Rom., U.K.).
Various sources of information have been used to assess compliance regarding this
indicator. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 2014 (2014), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/employmentoecd-employment-outlook-2014_empl outlook- 2014en#pagel [https://perma.cc/UAT8-W9ZM] (archived Feb. 29, 2016); legislative texts as
found in the ILO Employment Protection Legislation Database, i.e., EPLex,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/eplex/termmain.home?
p lang-en [https://perma.cc/QR5E-4KDM] (archived Feb. 29, 2016), or on the websites
of national governments.
255.
For an overview of tenure-track systems (most of them not based on
general legislation) in a number of European countries, see HANS-JOCHEN SCHIEWER
ET AL., TENURE AND TENURE TRACK AT LERU UNIVERSITIES: MODELS FOR ATTRACTIVE
RESEARCH CAREERS IN EUROPE (League of European Research Universities, Advice
Paper No. 17, Sept. 2014), http://www.leru.org/files/publications/LERUAP17 tenure_
track final.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8PB-JEH6] (archived Feb. 29, 2016).
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Codification of the Decretal Provisions concerning Higher Education
of 2013 (Belgium) 25 6 thus provides for a tenure-track system (which
is optional, however), in terms of which a "docent" may, following a
positive evaluation of his or her performance, be promoted to the
position of "hoofddocent." Likewise, Article 24(5) of the Italian Law of
30 December 2010, No. 240, on Rules on the Organization of
Universities, Academic Staff and Recruitment, as well as Governance
25 7
to Enhance the Quality and Efficiency of the University System,
stipulates that certain so-called type "B" researchers, in the third
year of their contract, in the case of a positive evaluation, are to be
appointed as associate professors.
Other HE systems create entitlements relating to promotion
otherwise than through a tenure-track system. Article 18(3) of the
Greek Law on Structure, Functioning, Quality Assurance of Studies
and Internationalization of Higher Education Institutions of 2011258
lays down that
assistant and associate professors have the right to request a vacancy at the
next level after a stay at the rank they hold after six and four years,
respectively ...In this case, the vacancy notice is mandatory ....If assistant
and associate professors are not promoted to the next level, they have the right
to request a re-announcement of the position after a lapse of at least three
years following the decision not to be promoted.

At the opposite end of the scale are HE systems such as that of
Lithuania; Article 65(4) of its Law on Higher Education and Research
of 2009259 provides that "[p]ersons shall gain access to a higher
position in the teaching or research staff by way of an open
competition [only]." Altogether, HE systems fail to adequately deal
with the issue of advancement. Only the Greek arrangements have
been considered to be in "full compliance," while those of sixteen other
260
HE systems are in "non-compliance."

CODEX HOGER ONDERWIJS 2013, supra note 232.
256.
LEGGE, 30 dicembre 2010, n. 240, NORME IN MATERIA DI ORGANIZZAZIONE
257.
DELLE UNIVERSITA, supra note 215.
Law No. 4009 on Higher Education Institutions 2011, supra note 155.
258.
MOKSLO IR STUDIJy ISTATYMAS 2009, supra note 143.
259.
See infra Annex, Indicator E.3. (noting that, Full compliance = Greece;
260.
Between full and partial compliance = none; Partial compliance = Belg. (nl.), Cyprus,
Fr., Italy, Malta; Between partial and non-compliance = Aus., Belg. (fr.), Den., Bay.
(F.R.G.), N.R.W. (F.R.G.), Neth., Slovn., Swed.; Non-compliance = Bulg., Croat., Czech
Rep., Est., Fin., Hung., Ir., Lat., Lith., Lux., Pol., Port., Rom., Slovk., Spain, U.K.).
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Table 5: Country Ranking: Protection of Job Security
(including "Tenure") in Relevant Legislation

Country

Percentage & Score out of
20 in parentheses

1.

Greece

100

(20)

2.

France

77.5

(15.5)

3.
4.
5.
6.

Italy
Spain
Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia
Flanders (Belgium), Cyrus

57.5 (11.5)
55
(11)
52.5 (10.5)
50
(10)

7.
8.
9.
10.

Bulgaria
Belgium
Wallonia (Belgium), Malta, Sweden
Bavaria (Germany), North RhineWestphalia (Germany), Germany,

47.5 (9.5)
46.25 (9.25)
42.5 (8.5)
40

(8)

Hungary

Average
11. Netherlands
12. Denmark, Romania, United Kingdom
13. Austria, Lithuania, Poland
14. Croatia
15. Luxemburg
16. Finland, Latvia
17. Czech Republic
18. Estonia, Slovakia

37.28 (7.46)
35
(7)
27.5 (5.5)
25
(5)
22.5 (4.5)
17.5 (3.5)
15
(3)
10
(2)
7.5
(1.5)

F. The Legal Protectionof the Right to Academic Freedom in Europe:
Overall Results
The following two tables provide an overview of the total scores
and results in the main categories of assessment and further an
overall country ranking for the legal protection of the right to
academic freedom in Europe.
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Table 6: Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom
in Europe: Overview of Total Scores and Results in Main
Categories of Assessment (Percentage and Score out of 20 in
parentheses)
Ratification of
Total
Country

International

Express Protection of

Agreements and

Academic Freedom

Constitutional

in HE Legislation

Protection
1.Austna(Aus.)

t 3.

100

(20)

2. Belum (Be)

19.25

70

(14)

50

(10)

Z1. Belium (flnde-s) B

51 5
5)

74

(14)

50

(10)

.17

70

(14)

50

(10)

75

(15)

100

(20)

22 Bdg-

(Walloni) Me

fr.)

655

a Bulgaria B)
4.Croa((at)

7, 5 (17.5)

S

7.5 (17.5)

69

,7.5

(17.5)

5

62,5 (12.5)

50

(10)

51.5

77.5 (15.5)

75

(15)

7. Dmmark (Den.)

3,5

62.5 (12.5)

25

(5)

&Esto(iaFs)

it

87.5 (17.5)

0

(0)

9. Finland Win)

55

95

(19)

75

(15)

10. Frane F-t.)

63

70

(14)

100

(20)

11.Gekrany(FR.G.)

64.5

87.5 (17.5)

,7.5

(17.5)

11.1. Gernany(Bavana)(

58

z47,5 (17.5)

75

(15)

71

S7.5

100

(20)

55.5

77.5 (15.5)

25

(5)

5. Cypus (Cyprus)
6C

Republic (Czec Rp,)

(Bay. (FRG.))
11.2. Germany (Nrt Rhine-

(17.5)

Wstphaia) (NRW.(FRG.))
12Grece

em)

13. Hungary (Hung.)

36

57.5 (11.5)

25

(5)

14. IaM (Ir.)

52.5

57,5 (11.5)

75

(15)

15. Italy taly)

57.5

95

50

(10)

16. Iatvia IOt)

60

82.5 (16.5)

100

(20)

ith.)

59.5

$7,5

(17.5)

100

(20)

1&. ,mmburg 0m)

47.5

70

(14)

75

(15)

19. Malta Malta)

36

55

(11)

0

(0)

20. Nirlaid (Neth.)

41

62.5 (12.5)

50

(10)

2L Pand (Po.)

54.5

S7.5 (17.5)

50

(10)

22 Po-:l (Port)

61

100

50

(10)

23. Rmania (Rom)

53.5

62.5 (12.5)

75

(15)

24. Sblvamkik)

60.5

90

100

(20)

25. Sbwia n)

52.5

87.5 (17.5)

25

(5)

26. Sin

66.5

100

(20)

75

(15)

27. Sweden (Swed.)

39.5

82.5

(16.5)

25

(5)

2& Unitedl

35

55

(11)

25

(5)

17. Lithuania

fai)n

m (UXC)

(19)

(20)

(18)
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Table 6: Legal Protection of the Right to Academic Freedom
in Europe: Overview of Total Scores and Results in Main
Categories of Assessment (% and Score out of 20 in
parentheses) (cont.)
Protection of Job

Protection of
Institutional
Autonomy in

Country

HE

Protection of

Security

Academic SelfGovernance in

(including
"Tenure") in
Relevant

HE Legislation
LegislationLegislation
1.Austria Aus.)

60

(12)

45

(9)

25

a Belgium(Belg)

42.5

(8.5)

37.5

(7.5)

46.25 (9.25)

al.Belgium (Flandm)(Beg. )

52.5

(10.5)

35

(7)

50

22.Belgh- fWalloia 0ggfr.
)

32.5

(6.5)

40

(8)

42.5 (8.5)

3, Buriaual )

45

(9)

72.5

(14.5)

47,5 (9.5)

4 Croatia
(Croat)

65

(13)

70

(14)

22.5 (4.5)

5. Cyprus (Cyprus)

40

(8)

62.5

(12.5)

50

(10)

6.C

40

(8)

55

(11)

10

(2)

Republic
(CzechRep)

(5)

(10)

7. Dmrark 0:en)

45

(9)

32.5

(6.5)

27.5 (5.5)

&FAoiaFst)

52.5

(10.5)

22.5

(4.5)

7.5

(1.5)

9.
inilard Win)

75

(15)

15

(3)

15

(3)

10.Fran(fr)

35

(7)

32.5

(6.5)

77.5

(15.5)

11.Genmany(FRG.)
11.1. Germ ny (Bavaria)

46.25 (9.25)

61.25 (12.25)

40

(8)

27.5 (5.5)

60

(12)

40

(8)

65

62.5

(12.5)

40

(8)

(Bay.CFMG.))
112. Germany (North Rhine-

(13)

Westphaba) (N.RW.(FR.G.))
12.Geece(Greece)

22.5 (4.5)

52.5

(10.5)

100

(20)

13.Hunay (Hung.)

12,5 (2.5)

45

(9)

40

(8)

14. hland r.
)

62.5

(12.5)

15

(3)

52.5 (10.5)

15. Italy
(Italy)

45

(9)

40

(8)

57.5 (11.5)

16.Latvia (. at)

50

(10)

52.5

(10.5)

15

(3)

ifth.)

55

(11)

30

(6)

25

(5)

18. linburg Om)

45

(9)

30

(6)

17.5 (3.5)

17. Lithuania

19.Malta Malta)

52.5

(10.5)

30

(6)

42.5 (8.5)

20.NWlars (Neth.)

45

(9)

27.5

(5.5)

35

(7)

21.Poland(Pol.)

47.5

(9.5)

62,5

(12.5)

25

(5)

2. PmBal (Port)

45

(9)

57.5

(11.5)

52.5 (10.5)

23. Romania

40

(8)

62.5

(12.5)

27.5 (5.5)

24. Sovala(Slovk)

42.5 (8.5)

62.5

(12.5)

7.5

25. Slovena(Slovn.)

42.5

(8.5)

55

(11)

52.5 (10.5)

or.)

(1.5)

26. Spain (Spain)

42.5

(8.5)

60

(12)

55

(11)

27. Sweden (Swe.)

32.5

(6.5)

15

(3)

42.5

(8.5)

28.UniiI-gdooU.K)

67.5

(13.5)

0

(0)

27.5 (5.5)
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Table 7: Overall Country Ranking: Legal Protection of the
Right to Academic Freedom in Europe
Country
1. North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany)
2. Croatia
3. Spain
4. Bulgaria
5. Germany
6. Austria
7. France
8. Portugal
9. Slovakia
10. Latvia
11. Lithuania
12. Bavaria (Germany)
13. Italy
14. Greece
15. Finland
16. Poland
17. Romania
Average
18. Cyprus
19. Ireland, Slovenia
20. Czech Republic, Flanders (Belgium)
21. Belgium
22. Luxemburg
23. Wallonia (Belgium)
24. Netherlands
25. Sweden
26. Denmark
27. Hungary, Malta
28. United Kingdom
29. Estonia

Total (%) & Grade (A-F)
B
71
C
69
C
66.5
C
65.5
C
64.5
C
63.5
C
63
C
61
C
60.5
C
60
D
59.5
D
58
D
57.5
D
55.5
D
55
D
54.5
D
53.5
D
52.79
D
53
D
52.5
D
51.5
E
49.25
E
47.5
E
47
E
44
F
39.5
F
38.5
F
36
F
35
F
34

VI. ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS: THE STATE OF HEALTH OF THE
LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE

The assessment has shown that by and large the twenty-eight
EU member states formally ascribe to the value of academic freedom.
In general, they have ratified relevant international agreements
providing protection to the right to academic freedom (ICCPR,
ICESCR, ECHR, etc.) and give recognition to the right (or related
rights) at the constitutional level. Table 1 reflects countries to have
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scored an average of 78 percent in this category. Also at the level of
HE legislation, academic freedom enjoys express recognition in most
HE systems, Table 2 showing that an average of 59 percent
compliance was achieved in this category. There are, however, some
HE systems-those of Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Malta,
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom-whose HE legislation
does not or only inadequately refers to academic freedom. Whereas all
HE systems, in a more or less satisfactory manner, expressly provide
for the autonomy of institutions of HE in their HE legislation, rights
of self-governance of academic staff and tenure in the sense of
employment stability are accorded express recognition in fifteen and
eight HE systems, respectively, with a rating of "full compliance"
having been awarded in only three cases and one case, respectively.
If one turns to analyzing the way the right to academic freedom
has been concretized in the HE and other legislation of the states
concerned, it will be noted that performance levels are far less
satisfactory than those identified in view of its formal protection. The
average score for institutional autonomy lies at 46 percent (Table 3),
that for academic self-governance below that at 43 percent (Table 4),
and that for job security (including "tenure") at a mere 37 percent
(Table 5). Many commentators would perhaps disagree and consider
institutional autonomy to enjoy a higher level of legal protection than
is borne out here. However, as has been stressed above, "institutional
autonomy" in the context of this study means "institutional autonomy
as limited by academic freedom and human rights." HE institutions
in many of the HE systems assessed do possess wide competences to
include external members in their governing bodies, to levy and
decide on the amount of study fees, to dismiss academic staff for
reasons of "redundancy," and to freely engage in collaborative
activities with private industry to acquire funding subject to only
limited public control. Such unbridled powers, however, are not
concomitant with institutional autonomy-rather, they expose a
misinterpretation of the concept. Table 3 shows Finland and the
United Kingdom to be the top performers in the category
"institutional autonomy." At the bottom of the table is Hungary,
Hungarian HE legislation reflecting a paternalistic role of the state in
26 1
regulating HE.

261.
A reading of the Hungarian HE Act thus reflects an "omnipresent" role of
the state in the administration of HE institutions. By way of example, the President of
the Republic appoints rectors (Sections 64(2)(c), 73(3)(e) of the Hungarian Act on
National Higher Education of 2011 (2011, 9VI CCIV, TORVtNY A NEMZETI
FELS:OKTATASR6L, MAGYAR KOZLONY 165, Dec. 30, 2011, 41181)) and professors
(Sections 27(3), 64(2)(c)). The state's agreement is required to found business
organizations (Section 12(3)(g)(gc)), or the state is required to perform typical review
functions (such as reviewing the budget of a HE institution), which in many other HE
systems are performed by a (supervisory) organ of the HE institution (Section 73(3)(c)).
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The autonomy of an institution of HE, moreover, cannot be
divorced from the guarantee of academic self-governance. HE
institutions, which possess wide powers, but in which the academic
community-encompassing academic staff, but also students-does
not retain the competence to sufficiently participate in the taking of
decisions directly or indirectly having a bearing on science and
scholarship, can at most be seen to be nominally autonomous, and
they are certainly not in accordance with the standards of the
UNESCO Recommendation. The assessment has revealed that the
HE legislation of European states inadequately protects the right of
"sufficient participation," which is increasingly being eroded by
promoting an "alternative model." At the institutional level, states
achieve an average score of just 49.4 percent (the percentage average
of the sum of the scores for indicators under D.2.) and, at the faculty
and departmental level (where a large-scale failure to regulate
aspects of self-governance whatsoever by way of legislation may be
observed), merely 35 percent (the percentage average of the sum of
the scores for indicators under D.3.) for their implementation of the
right to self-governance.
Legislative changes adopted in the past five to ten years, in some
instances also before that, have accordingly witnessed the powers of
senates (or their equivalents) having been restricted to purely
academic matters (or worse, senates (or their equivalents) having
been replaced by "committees of academics," often presided over by
non-elected administrators); the introduction of institutional boards
with strategic decision-making powers, composed of various
stakeholders, many external and representing government and
corporate interests (academic staff, in the worst case, not being
2 62
represented and/or having no control over candidates appointed);
and the strengthening of the executive powers of rectors and deans
and departmental heads, who frequently come from outside the
institution, academic staff not being able to adequately participate in
their election or dismissal. But also generally, governance structures
in HE institutions increasingly exclude academics, recruiting instead
a new "caste" of personnel with administrative, but little or no
subject-specific academic expertise, responsible for "managing" HE

According to oral information provided to the authors by the official of a
262.
union representing academic staff in HE in New Zealand, a country that has very
recently, in 2015, modified its HE legislation along the lines described-for which
reason the concerns expressed may be transposed to the European context-the
indications are that the reforms in that country will lead to HE institution governance
becoming "whiter and male-dominated" again. As governments and corporate actors
also in Europe do not reflect a high measure of diversity in their respective composition
and as they are to play a significant role, directly or indirectly, in "redesigned"
governance, also European HE institution governance may become less inclusive again.
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institutions and their affairs. 26 3 Interestingly, states such as
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania that are not yet in the tow of Bologna
reforms perform best in the category of "self-governance." The United
Kingdom, a top performer on "institutional autonomy," fares worst on
"self-governance."
Institutional autonomy is also limited by the requirements of
security of employment, including "tenure or its functional
equivalent, where applicable." HE institutions in Europe, however, in
"managing" their affairs, have come to view their academic staff as
strategic capital. If staff are not "useful" in accordance with "strategic
objectives" anymore, they forfeit their right to remain with the HE
institution concerned. The assessment has shown that states achieve
an average score of just 47.3 percent (the percentage average of the
sum of the scores for indicators under E.1.) and merely 43.8 percent
(the percentage average of the sum of the scores for indicators under
E.2.) for the assurance of stable employment in terms of the duration
of contracts of service and the protection against dismissals on
operational grounds, respectively.
While the premise in academia used to be that "the university
does not employ academics, it facilitates their work," this notion
appears to be absent in HE institutions today. As Rebecca Boden and
Debbie Epstein point out, "[a] facilitator provides resources and eases
one's path towards one's goals. But an employer regards employees as
resources-along with other inputs-to be managed to achieve
organizational objectives." 264 The "HE institution as facilitator"
notion underlies the UNESCO Recommendation and its conception of
the right to academic freedom. States in Southern and Western
Europe (Greece, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) are among the
"top" performers in the category "security of employment." Only seven
states altogether, however, achieved a score above 50 percent.

263.
In this vein with regard to universities in the UK, see Dr. Matt Waring
(Cardiff Metropolitan University), researcher on human resource management in HE,
and also a senior trade union official, in a talk on "Management technologies and
academic freedom," delivered on Sept. 9, 2014 at UNIKE (Universities in the
Knowledge Economy) Workshop 4: Management Technologies, held from Sept. 8-10,
2014 at the University of Roehampton, London. See also Thomas Docherty, Thomas
Docherty on Academic Freedom, TIMES HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://
www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/thomas-docherty-on-academic-freedom/2017
268.article [https://perma.cc/RCG5-CWX4] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (holding that
"[m]anagerial fundamentalism has taken hold in universities, with scholars viewed as
resources that must be controlled .... "); Paul Taylor, Humboldt's Rift: Managerialism
in Education and Complicit Intellectuals, 3 EUR. POLIT. SCI. 75 (2003) (referring to the
phenomenon of "supinely acquiescent academics," who disagree with "managerialism,"
but do not "speak out").
264.
See Rebecca Boden & Debbie Epstein, A Flat Earth Society? Imagining
Academic Freedom, 59 Soc. REV. 476, 481 (2011), citing Matt Waring, Labouring in the
Augean Stables? HRM and the Reconstitution of the Academic Worker, 3 INT'L J. MGMT.
CONCEPT. & PHIL. 257 (2009) in this respect.
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Finally, turning to Table 7, showing the overall country ranking
on the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in accordance
with the assessment, it will have to be conceded that it is difficult to
identify clear trends. One HE system-that of North RhineWestphalia (Germany)-scored 71 percent, eight scored between 60
and 69.9 percent, 265 twelve between 50 and 59.9 percent, 26 6 three
between 40 and 49.9 percent, 267 and six between 30 and 39.9
percent. 268 HE systems that used to be steeped in the Humboldtian
tradition with its emphasis on Lernfreiheit (freedom of study),
Lehrfreiheit (freedom of teaching), Forschungsfreiheit (freedom of
research), and further the Einheit von Forschung und Lehre (the
unity of research and teaching)-those of Austria, Bavaria
(Germany), and North Rhine-Westphalia (Germany)-still seem to
26 9
benefit from this in terms of their position in the overall ranking.
The HE systems of Southern and Western Europe-those of France,
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain-also appear in the upper half of
the table. The HE systems of the Benelux states-those of Flanders
(Belgium), Wallonia (Belgium), Luxemburg, and the Netherlandsfeature in the lower half of the table, as do those of Scandinavian
270
countries-i.e., the HE systems of Denmark, Finland, and Sweden.
Also, the HE systems of Anglophone Europe-those of Ireland, Malta,
and the United Kingdom-are found in this part of the table. The
picture is rather diffuse for the Baltic states, as it is for countries of
Eastern Europe. The HE systems of Latvia and Lithuania lie on
positions ten and eleven, respectively, but that of Estonia in place
twenty-eight. Croatia lands on the second place, Slovenia on the
nineteenth. Bulgaria lands on the fourth place, Slovakia on the ninth,
Romania on the seventeenth, and the Czech Republic on the
twentieth.

In the order of performance: Croat. (69%), Spain (66.5%), Bulg. (65.5%),
265.
Aus. (63.5%), Fr. (63%), Port. (610%), Slovk. (60.5%), Lat. (60%). See supra tbl. 7.
In the order of performance: Lith. (59.5%), Bay. (F.R.G.) (58%), Italy
266.
(57.5%), Greece (55.5%), Fin. (55%), Pol. (54.5%), Rom. (53.5%), Cyprus (53%), Ir.
(52.5%), Slovn. (52.5%), Czech Rep. (51.5%), Belg. (nl.) (51.5%).
267.
In the order of performance: Lux. (47.5%), Belg. (fr.) (47%), Neth. (44%).
In the order of performance: Swed. (39.5%), Den. (38.5%), Hung. (36%),
268.
Malta (36%), U.K. (35%), Est. (34%).
269.
On the Humboldtian tradition in Germany, see MITCHELL G. ASH, GERMAN
UNIVERSITIES: PAST AND FUTURE: CRISIS OR RENEWAL? (1997) [German transl.:
MYTHOS HUMBOLDT: VERGANGENHEIT UND ZUKUNFT DER DEUTSCHEN UNIVERSITATEN

(1999)]. For a critical examination of the relevance of Humboldtian ideals in modern
HE, see PETER JOSEPHSON ET AL.,

THE HUMBOLDTIAN TRADITION: ORIGINS AND

LEGACIES (Peter Josephson, Thomas Karlsohn & Johan Ostling eds., 2014).
270.
For a discussion of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in the
Scandinavian countries, see, e.g., Terhi Nokkala & Agneta Bladh, Institutional
Autonomy and Academic Freedom in the Nordic Context: Similarities and Differences,
27 HIGH. EDUC. POL'Y 1 (2014).
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The overall average lies at 52.8 percent-demonstrating that the
state of the legal protection of the right to academic freedom in
Europe is one of "ill-health." While this is disappointing in itself,
what is a matter of greater concern is that, when compared to the
situation that existed prior to the changes in HE legislation effected
during the last ten or more years in the states assessed, 27 1 a
downward trend in protection levels may be observed. The concept of
institutional autonomy is increasingly being misconstrued as
autonomy not subject to the requirements of academic freedom, selfgovernance, and security of employment, including "tenure." Selfgovernance itself has, at all levels in HE institutions, largely become
eroded. The same may be stated to be the case with regard to
employment security, including "tenure," of academic staff. Although
the various changes may in some instances be the result of
"suboptimal legislative draftsmanship skills" (this might perhaps be
so for Estonia, for example), 272 they usually are part of a deliberate
reform agenda for the HE sector implemented by states in Europe.

VII. VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE RIGHT
TO EDUCATION

The academic community has traditionally been-and in many
parts of the world continues to be-a particularly vulnerable target of
direct state repression. 273 In Europe, however, it is nowadays rather
sources of a different nature from which direct threats to academic
freedom emanate, the state having become a (seemingly innocent)
actor in the background. The state has assigned HE institutions fairly
wide-reaching powers (as it were, has delegated many of its powers to
these institutions). In practice, this has had the effect that HE
institutions themselves have become direct violators of academic
freedom. Research funding bodies are yet another source of peril to
academic freedom. It may hence be asked whether the system en
vogue today of research funding having to be applied for internally, or
externally through "independent" research councils/foundations, etc.,
on a competitive basis for virtually all research projects, does not by
its very nature favor research on "fashionable" topics yielding short-

This has become apparent when, in the course of examining the HE
271.
legislation of the states concerned, present laws were compared to those existing prior
to the laws in operation now.
272.
See supra text accompanying note 196 (discussing the provisions of the
Estonian Universities Act of 1995 on the composition of the council of the university at
V.D. above).
273.
On the state of academic freedom in different parts of the world, see
generally Philip G. Altbach, Academic Freedom in a Global Context: 21st Century
Challenges, in THE NEA 2007 ALMANAC OF HIGHER EDUCATION 49 (Nat'l Educ. Assoc.,
2007).
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term results, thus obstructing research of real or long-term
significance for society (elementary research). 274 Likewise, the
reluctance to install effective control mechanisms targeting the
activities of private or corporate actors providing finance to HE
institutions has made it possible for the activities of such actors to
compromise the independence of research in HE institutions. 275 As
has been indicated, in only very few cases does the law in Europe
oblige HE institutions to account to the public for private financing.
HE institutions have become direct violators of academic
freedom because they find themselves in an environment where they
often cannot but violate that right. These days, HE in Europe follows
a neoliberal logic. Whereas it used to be a public good, paid for by the
state, available free of charge to students, and based on the idea that
(also) "knowledge for its own sake" merits pursuit and transmission,
HE has now "become the arm of national economic policy," defined
both as the problem, failing to produce a skilled workforce and
marketable academic output, and the solution, in that it should
a source
of earnings. 27 6 The
upgrade
skills and
create
commercialization of HE is to go hand in hand with reductions in
government spending for and "new public management" methods in
HE.

2 77

States consider that HE institutions will use public money

274.
See Li Bennich-Bjbrkman, Has Academic Freedom Survived? An Interview
Study of the Conditions for Researchers in an Era of ParadigmaticChange, 61 HIGH.
EDUC. Q. 334, 348-52 (2007) (presenting the results of an interview study of academic
staff in Swedish universities, which, according to the author, reflect the general
European experience); see also Justin Thorens, Liberties, Freedom and Autonomy:
Reflections on Academia's Estate, 19 HIGH. EDUC. POL'Y 87, 100 (2006) (critically
discussing the role of research councils and funding decisions).
275.
See Rendel, supra note 68, at 83 (warning, in 1988, before private industry
funding assumed the importance in HE it has at present, that those commissioning
research "may want answers only within their own frame of reference"); David
Robinson, Corrupting Research Integrity: Corporate Funding and Academic
Independence, in GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT: EDUCATION 202, 202 (Transparency
International, Gareth Sweeney et al. eds., 2013), http://files.transparency.org/content/
[https:/perma.cc/PDM4-4UZC]
download/675/2899/file/2013_GCREducationEN.pdf
(archived Feb. 26, 2016) (stating that "[t]he increasing industrial sponsorship of
university-based research is raising widespread concerns about how these
arrangements can corrupt and distort academic research."); Michele Rostan,
Challenges to Academic Freedom: Some Empirical Evidence, 18 (Suppl. No. 1) EUR.
REV. 71, 78-80 (2010) (commenting on the threats posed by research funding by private
actors); id. at 80-85 (commenting on the threats arising from links connecting
academics to the economic sector).
276.
See Jill Blackmore, Globalisation: A Useful Concept for Feminists
Rethinking Theories and Strategies in Education, in GLOBALISATION AND EDUCATION:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 133, 134 (Nicholas C. Burbules & Carlos Alberto Torres eds.,
2000). On the notion that academic freedom also covers pursuing and transmitting
"knowledge for its own sake," see Thaddeus Metz, A Dilemma Regarding Academic
Freedom and Public Accountability in Higher Education, 44 J. PHIL. EDUC. 529 (2010).
277.
On the commercialization of and "new public management" in HE in the
U.K., see, e.g., ROGER BROWN & HELEN CARASSO, EVERYTHING FOR SALE? THE
MARKETISATION OF UK HIGHER EDUCATION or ANDREW MCGETTIGAN, THE GREAT
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responsibly and produce "measurable" outcomes only if they have to
acquire a substantial part of funding through state and non-state
sources themselves (by levying study fees, "selling" academic
"merchandise" and "services" (e.g., marketing intellectual property
rights or carrying out commissioned research), their academic staff
applying for external research funding on a competitive basis and
producing state income-generating publications, etc.), and further if
they have to account for public money "at every inch of the road"
(internal and external audits, staff appraisals, student evaluations of
278
staff, national research assessment exercises, etc.).
This new model-substituting that in terms of which a solid
measure of trust is placed in the competence of academics to be good
teachers/researchers and responsible recipients of adequate financecompels HE institutions "to do well" in HE institution rankings if
they wish to remain able to attract fee-paying students and be
awarded contracts for their academic "merchandise" and "services."
These rankings themselves apply questionable criteria of measuring
excellence. 279 They do not ask, for example, whether students from
UNIVERSITY GAMBLE: MONEY, MARKETS AND THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(2013). Regarding these issues in the U.S.A., see ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE LOST SOUL OF
HIGHER EDUCATION: CORPORATIZATION, THE ASSAULT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE
END OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010). Regarding these issues in Canada, see
HOWARD R. WOODHOUSE, SELLING OUT: ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE CORPORATE
MARKET (2009). Regarding these issues in New Zealand, see Cris Shore & Mira Taitz,
Who "Owns" the University? InstitutionalAutonomy and Academic Freedom in an Age
of Knowledge Capitalism, 10 GLOB., SOC'IES & EDUC. 201 (2012). Generally on these
issues, see Francine Rochford, Academic Freedom and the Ethics of Marketing
Education, in CASES ON INNOVATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL MARKETING: TRANSNATIONAL

AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 160 (Purnendu Tripathi & Siran Mukerji eds., 2011);
HANS G. SCHUETZE ET AL., UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE AND REFORM: POLICY, FADS, AND
EXPERIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Hans G. Schuetze et al. eds., 2012). On
"Commercialization as a New Infringement on Academic Freedom," see William G.
Tierney & Michael Lanford, The Question of Academic Freedom: Universal Right or
Relative Term, 9 FRONTIERS EDUC. CHINA 4, 14-18 (2014).
278.
Therefore, ironically, although neoliberalism customarily advocates
"deregulation," it has entailed a rise of standards and audits in HE in practice.
Frequently, these instruments have awkward consequences for the quality of teaching
or research. The national UK research assessment exercises, for example, require
submission of a certain number of research outputs. In practice, this has meant an
increased "production" of shorter publications on "easy" topics at the expense of more
thoroughly researched, longer (including monograph) publications on "more
demanding" topics. Research is also required to "have impact" beyond the institutional
context. It may well be asked, how it should be shown, for instance, that a feminist
critique has actually changed stereotyped attitudes. See generally Susan Wright, What
Counts? The Skewing Effects of Research Assessment Systems, 29 (spec. ed.) NORDISK
PEDAGOGIK 18 (2009), on the "skewing effects" of research assessment systems. Also
assessments of teaching performance potentially unjustifiably interfere with the right
to academic freedom. See, e.g., Wolfram Hbfling, Die Lehrfreiheit: Gefdhrdungen eines
Grundrechts durch die neuere Hochschulrechtsentwicklung?,41 WISSENSCHAFTSRECHT
92 (2008). Although the article deals with the situation in Germany, most of its
statements are equally applicable in a more general sense.
279.
For a critique of university rankings, see, e.g., Sarah Amsler, University
Ranking: A Dialogue on Turning towards Alternatives, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV'T POL. 155
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disadvantaged backgrounds can still afford good quality higher
education. They do not inquire whether academic staff can exercise
rights of academic freedom. They assess teaching quality
quantitatively, but not by having recourse to scientifically sound
qualitative methods. They do not assess whether research addresses
"the major questions of humanity" and, moreover, does so in sufficient
depth. Instead, the rankings rely upon: the volume of research income
scaled against staff numbers; the "number of papers" published in
"high-quality peer-reviewed" journals; the "number of citations" of
published work; the ability "to help industry with innovations,
inventions, and consultancy;" opinion polls of "experienced
scholars;" 280 and the "satisfaction" of students. On the last point, that
of student satisfaction, it may be noted that this criterion, coupled
with the fact that students are required to pay ever-increasing fees
for their studies, has made them "customers" of HE, quasi-entitled to
good marks and a qualification, with corresponding duties on
teachers "to deliver," relinquishing the ideal of the student as a
mature young adult also bearing responsibilities himself or herself to
28 1
master the subject.

(2013); Barbara M. Kehm, Global University Rankings: Impacts and Unintended Side
Effects, 49 EUR. J. EDUC. 102 (2014); Kathleen Lynch, New Managerialism,
Neoliberalism and Ranking, 13 ETHICS Sci. ENV'T POL. 141 (2013); Brian Pusser &
Simon Marginson, University Rankings in CriticalPerspective, 84 J. HIGH. EDUC. 544
(2013); David Robinson, The Mismeasure of Higher Education? The Corrosive Effect of
University Rankings, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV'T POL. 65 (2013); Konstantinos I. Stergiou &
Stephan Lessenich, On Impact Factors and University Rankings: From Birth to
Boycott, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV'T POL. 101 (2013); Michael Taylor et al., Rankings Are the
Sorcerer's New Apprentice, 13 ETHICS SCI. ENV'T POL. 73 (2013); Susan Wright,
Ranking Universities within a Globalised World of Competition States: To What
Purpose, and with What Implications for Students?, in UDDANNELSESKVALITET I EN
GLOBALISERET VERDEN 81 (Hanne L. Andersen & Jens C. Jacobsen eds., 2012).
See World University Rankings 2013-14 Methodology, TIMES HIGHER
280.
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university(Oct. 1,
2014),
EDUC.
rankings-2013-14-methodology [https://perma.ccL4HW-78V9] (archived Mar. 24, 2016)
(mentioning inter alia the stated parameters; detailing "the essential elements in our
world-leading formula.").
For a critique of the notion of the student as "customer," see, e.g., MIKE
281.
MOLESWORTH ET AL., THE MARKETISATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE STUDENT AS
CONSUMER (Mike Molesworth et al. eds., 2011); Mark Albanese, Students Are Not
Customers: A Better Model for Medical Education, 74 ACAD. MED. 1172 (1999); Marcel
F. D'Eon & Cille Harris, If Students Are Not Customers, What Are They?, 75 ACAD.
MED. 1173 (2000); Lynne Eagle & Ross Brennan, Are Students Customers? TQM and
Marketing Perspectives, 15 QUALITY ASSURANCE EDUC. 44 (2007); Tim Kaye et al.,
Criticising the Image of the Student as Consumer: Examining Legal Trends and
Administrative Responses in the US and UK, 18 EDUC. & LAW 85 (2006); Janice A.
Newson, Disrupting the "Student as Consumer"Model: The New EmancipatoryProject,
18 INT'L REL. 227 (2004); Goran Svensson & Greg Wood, Are University Students
Really Customers? When Illusion May Lead to Delusion for All!. 12 INT'L J. EDUC.
MGMT. 17 (2007). See also Dennis Hayes, Academic Freedom and the Diminished
Subject, 57 BRIT. J. EDUC. STUD. 127, 143-44 (2009) (lamenting that a "diminished"
view of humanity in HE institutions has also entailed a "diminished" view of students).
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The new model in HE also induces HE institutions to compel
academic staff to "deliver" under "target/performance agreements," as
staff output equals revenue. Usually imposed on staff, structured by
revenue considerations, and their very premise being that the
production of scientific truth can "be planned," "target/performance
agreements" more
often than not are highly
arbitrary
282
("wissenschaftsinaddquat"). It may further be noted that HE
institutions these days expect academics to perform so many
administrative tasks-preparing budget plans, seeking funding,
etc.-that this has left them with less time to do what they do best2 83
teaching and carrying out research.
As borne out by the assessment undertaken here, the new model
in HE as described above is easiest implemented by engaging
,'managers" of various sorts "to control" academics/teaching/research,
by excluding academic staff from meaningful participation in
decision-making, and by introducing "executive-style" management
processes in HE. In sum, HE institutions have become subject to
various pressures resulting from the new design of HE. Reacting to
these pressures, these institutions themselves have become direct
violators of academic freedom.
These "developments"-which foreshadow the decline of
European universities and other HE institutions as entities of
genuine public and social significance along the lines of their U.S.
counterparts 284 -have
their basis in legislation designed and

282.
Paragraph 47 of the UNESCO Recommendation on "Appraisal" points out
that the major function of evaluation must be "the development of individuals in
accordance with their interests and capacities," that it must be based "only on
academic criteria of competence," and that it must "take due account of the difficulty
inherent in measuring personal capacity, which seldom manifests itself in a constant
and unfluctuating manner," ( 47(a)-(c), resp.).
283.
See Bennich-Bjbrkman, supra note 274, at 352-54.
284.
At least, such a "decline" regarding HE in the United States has been held
to have taken place. See, e.g., CARY NELSON, No UNIVERSITY IS AN ISLAND: SAVING
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2010); CHRISTOPHER NEWFIELD, UNMAKING THE PUBLIC
UNIVERSITY: THE FORTY-YEAR ASSAULT ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2008); SCHRECKER,
supra note 277; see also IVORY TOWER (CNN Films 2014) (produced by Andrew Rossi).
A decline of universities has generally been held to have taken place. See, e.g., BILL
READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS 21 et seqq., 62 et seqq. (1996) (considering there
to have been a paradigm shift from the "university of culture" to that of "excellence,"
the latter really being a business corporation); THOMAS DOCHERTY, UNIVERSITIES AT
WAR ix (2015) (arguing that there is a war on for the future of the university
worldwide, holding that "[m]oney has systematically replaced thought as the key driver
and raison d'tre of [HE] institution's official existence."). On the decline of universities
in Europe, see, e.g., JOS C. BERMEJO BARRERA, LA AURORA DE LOS ENANOS:
DECADENCIA Y CAIDA DE LAS UNIVERSIDADES EUROPEAS (2007). Specifically regarding
universities in France, see, e.g., BEAUD, supra note 121, regarding universities in
Germany, see, e.g., Barbara Zehnpfennig, Die Austreibung des Geistes aus der
Universitdt, 46 WISSENSCHAFPSRECHT 37 (2013), regarding universities in Spain, see,
e.g., JESUS HERNANDEZ ALONSO ET AL., LA UNIVERSIDAD CERCADA: TESTIMONIOS DE UN
NAUFRAGIO (Jesds Herndndez Alonso et al. eds., 2013).

20161

-MEASURING- THE EROSION OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN EUROPE

679

implemented by the state (i.e., they are the consequence of deliberate
state action). The state, therefore, "pulling the strings in the
background," is the ultimate human rights violator! In fact, the
violation of the right to academic freedom has its root causes in the
violation by states of another-the overarching-right to education.
Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, read with Article 2(1) of the Covenant, provides for
the obligation of states parties-all states examined here having
ratified the ICESCR-to take steps to the maximum of their available
resources, with a view to progressively making HE available and
"equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity."2 85 There is an
obligation to progressively introduce free HE, 28 6 to actively pursue
the development of a system of HE institutions, 28 7 and to
continuously improve the material conditions of teaching staff in
HE.

28 8

Article 13 should not be understood as merely protecting "a right
to receive education." It rather provides the normative basis for a fullfledged, rights-based education system, including in the sphere of HE,
289
also covering the rights of teaching and research staff.
Consequently, to the extent that states-relying on the maximum of
their available resources-are in a position to finance HE in such a
way that it can be made available free of charge and that academic
29 0
staff can properly attend to teaching and carrying out research

285.
ICESCR, art. 13(1), (2)(c).
Id. art. 13(2)(c).
286.
287.
Id. art. 13(2)(e).
288.
Id. With regard to the UK, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights has thus "note[d] with concern that the introduction of tuition fees and
student loans, which is inconsistent with article 13, paragraph 2(c) ... has tended to
worsen the position of students from less privileged backgrounds, who are already
underrepresented in higher education." Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the Crown Dependencies and the Overseas Dependent Territories, 225, U.N.
Doc. E/2003/22 (2003). On the topic of the legitimacy of study fees in HE in the context
of the ICESCR, see generally BEITER, supra note 30, at 387-88, 400-01, 458, 526, 57273, 594, 651.
289.
See, for example, BEITER, supra note 30, at 460-62, supporting such a wide
reading of Article 13 of the ICESCR (citing in support of his view inter alia PIUS
GEBERT, DAS RECHT AUF BILDUNG NACH ART. 13 DES UNO-PAKTES UBER
WIRTSCHAFTLICHE, SOZIALE UND KULTURELLE RECHTE UND SEINE AUSWIRKUNGEN AUF
DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BILDUNGSWESEN 286-88 (1996)).
290.
The obligation generally to have recourse to resources that are "available"
becomes clear from the statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (even if made only with regard to free HE) on the report submitted by South
Korea, to the effect that in that state party "[o]nly primary education is provided free of
charge," but that "given the strength of the Korean economy it appears appropriate
that free education should also extend to the... higher [sector]." Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Republic of Korea,
76, U.N. Doc. E/1996/22 (1996). In the case of the Czech Republic, the Committee
referred to the "constant decrease in the budget expenditure allocated to education and
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and this may be held to be the case for most of the states examined,
keeping in mind that international human rights law envisages
general taxation as the principal model for financing education
(study, teaching and research) and other rights under the
Covenant 2 9 1-they must do so! In such circumstances, the principle
of progressive realization, as a matter of principle, forbids cutbacks of
standards achieved. 292 Hence, state legislation in Europe that
compels HE institutions-in their quest of ensuring their financial
survival- to violate the right to academic freedom also violates
Article 13 of the ICESCR.
Envisaging "a full-fledged, rights-based education system,"
Article 13 of the ICESCR does not only address infrastructure, access,
and costs. Article 13(1) "recognize[s] the right of everyone to
education," stipulating the primary aim of education to be "the full
development of the human personality." 29 3 This relates to the quality
or content of education provided and, by necessary implication, also to
the quality of teaching and research, and, therefore, to the rights and
duties of academic staff in this context. 294 Nobel Literature laureate
John Coetzee remarked that
allowing the transient needs of the economy to define the goals of higher
education is a misguided and short-sighted policy: indispensable to a
democratic society-indeed, to a vigorous national economy-is a critically

+

the consequences thereof on the enjoyment of the right to education" and suggested to
the Czech Republic that it "consider increasing the budget allocation for education."
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations: Czech
Republic,
91, 110, U.N. Doc. E/2003/22 (2003).
291.
The former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to education, Katarina
Tomagevski, has pointed out that "[i]nternational human rights law assumes that
states are both willing and able to generate resources needed for education through
general taxation." KATARINA TOMAkEVSKI, FREE AND COMPUILSORY EDUCATION FOR ALL
CHILDREN: THE GAP BETWEEN PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 21 (Right to Education
Primers, No. 2,2001).
292.
This is clearly borne out by Paragraph 14(e) of the Maastricht Guidelines
on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1997, a document prepared by
international experts on human rights and published in 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1998).
293.
See General Comment No. 13, supra note 8, 4; see also BEITER, supra
note 30, at 470-71.
294.
See General Comment No. 13, supra note 8,
38-40, in support of the
view that Article 13 of the ICESCR covers the right to academic freedom. Observations
to the same effect were made by the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
education, Katarina Tomagevski, in two of her annual reports. Katarina Tomagevski
(Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education), Progress Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Education,KatarinaTomaevski, Submitted in Accordance
with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1999/25,
42-44, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/6 (Feb. 1, 2000); Katarina Tomagevski (Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Education), Annual Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education,
Katarina Tomaevski, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 2001/29, 13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/60 (Jan. 7, 2002).
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literate citizenry competent to explore and interrogate the assumptions behind
2 95
the paradigms of national and economic life reigning at any given moment.

He goes on to point out that it is important to "believe in the
humanities and in the university built on humanistic grounds, with
philosophical, historical and philological studies as its pillars."29 6 A
HE system that is "the arm of national economic policy," does not
value the pursuit and transmission of "knowledge for its own sake"
and does not breathe the full spirit of academic freedom can never
further "the full development of the human personality" of students.
At the same time, it constitutes an assault on the dignity of
academics and their profession. But, what is worse, such a HE system
ultimately erodes the very foundations of civilized society!

John M. Coetzee, Foreword, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN A DEMOCRATIC
295.
SOUTH AFRICA: ESSAYS AND INTERVIEWS ON HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE HUMANITIES
xi, xii (John Higgins ed., 2014).
Id. at xiii.
296.
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ANNEX: LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN
EUROPE-OVERVIEW OF RESULTS FOR ALL INDICATORS FOR INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRIES

A. Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional Protection

Country

1.

1.1.1.

1.1.2.

1.1.3.

1.1.4.

1.2.

(0-1-5)

(0-1.5)

(0-1.5)

(0-1-5)

(0-4)

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

10

(Subtotal)
1.

Austria

2.1.

Belgium:
Flanders

2.2.

Belgium:
Wallonia

3.

Bulgaria

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

4.

Croatia

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

5.

Cyprus

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

6.

Czech Republic

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

(0)

(4)
(4)

7.

Denmark

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

8.

Estonia

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

01.5)

(0)

9.

Finland

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

10.

France

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

11.1.

Germany.
8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

Bavaria
11.2.

Germany- N.R.W.

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

12.

Greece

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

13.

Hungary

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

14.

Ireland

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

15.

Italy

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

16.

Latvia

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

17.

Lithuania

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

18.

Luxemburg

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

19.

Malta

(0)

(1.5)

01.5)

(0)

(4)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(1.5)

(1.5)

01.5)

(0)

(4)

7
8.5

_

(4)

20.

Netherlands

21.

Poland

22.

Portugal

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

01.5)

(1.5)

(4)

23.

Romania

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

01.5)

(0)

(4)

24.

Slovakia

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

25.

Slovenia

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

26.

Spain

10

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(4)

27.

Sweden

8.5

(1.5)

(1.5)

(1.5)

(0)

(4)

28.

U.K.

(0)

.

(0)

(4)

-8.5

7

1

(1.5)
1

(0)

(4)
1

(4)

x
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Table continued
A. Ratification of International Agreements and Constitutional
Protection (cont.)
Country

2.2.

2.1.

2.
LO

(0-1-2)
(0-1-2)
-Subwt--

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-2-4)

1.

Austria

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

4

(2)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

4-

(2)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

3.

Bulgaria

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

4.

Croatia

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

5.

Cyprus

4

(2)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

Czech Republic

7

(2)

(1)

(0)

(Q)

(4)

(0)

(0)

(0)

2

6.
7.

Denmark

4

(2)

8.

Estonia

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

9.

Finland

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

10.

France

4

(2L

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

11.1.

Gerrnan-

9

(2)

(2)

(0)

(1)

(4)

11.2.

Germany, N.R.W.

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

12.

Greece

7

(I)

(1)

(1)

(0)

(4)

13.

Hungary

3

(0)

(1)

(0)

(0)

(2)

14.

Ireland

3

(1)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

15.

Italy

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

16.

Latvia

8

(2)

(2)

(0)

(0)

(4)

17.

Lithuania

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

18.
19.

Luxemburg
Malta

4

(2)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

4_

(2

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

20.

Netherlands

4

(0)

(0)

(0)

(2)

21.

Poland

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

22.

Portugal

10

(

(2)

(1)

(1)

(4)

23.

Romania

4

(1)

(0)

(1)

(0)

(2)

24.

Slovakia

8

(2)

(2)

(0)

(0)

(4)

25.

Slovenia

9

(2)

(2)

(1)

(0)

(4)

26.

Spain

10

(2)

(2)

(1)

(1)

27.

Sweden

8

(2)

(2)

(0)

(0)

28.

U.K.

4

(2)

(0)

(0)

(0)

Bavaria

.

2)

1

(4)
.

4L
(2)
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Table continued

B. Express Protection of Academic Freedom in HE Legislation
Country

10x2
1.

Austria

10x2=20

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

5x2=10

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

3.

Bulgaria

7.5x2=15

4.

Croatia

10x2=20

5.

Cyprus

5x2=10

6.

Czech Republic

7.5x2=15

7.

Denmark

2.5x2=5

8.

Estonia

0

9.

Finland

7.5x2=15

10.

France

10x2=20

11.1.

Germany: Bavaria

7.5x2=15

11.2.

Germany NAW.

10x2=20

12.

Greece

2.5x2=5

13.

Hungary

2.5x2=5

14.

Ireland

7.5x2=15

15.

Italy

5x2=10

16.

Latvia

10x2=20

17.

Lithuania

10x2=20

18.

Luxemburg

7.5x2=15

19.

Malta

20.

Netherlands

5x2=10

21.

Poland

5x2=10

22.

Portugal

5x2=10

23.

Romania

7.5x2=15

24.

Slovakia

10x2=20

25.

Slovenia

26.

Spain

27.

Sweden

2.5x2=5

28.

U.K.

2.5x2=5

5x2=10

0

2.5x2=5
7.5x2=15
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Table continued
C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation
2.1.2.

2.1.1.

12.

2.2.1.

2.2.2.

Country

4

8

(0-2-4)

(Subtotal)

2

6

2

4.5

2

Bulgaria

4

Croatia

4

1.

Austria

2.1.

Belgium:

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

()

()

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(0.5)

2.5

(0)

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

a

(1)

(0)

(0.5)

01)

5

(1)

Flanders
2.2.

Belgium:
Wallonia

3.
4.

(0.5)

(0.5)

(1)
(0.5)

5.

Cyprus

2

2

(1)

(0)

(0)

6.

Czech Republic

4

2

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

7.

Denmark

2

3

()

(1)

(1)

(1)

8.

Estonia

2

6.5

(1)

(1)

(1)

0)

9.

Finland

4

7

j1

(1)

(0.5)

(1)

10.

France

2

3

01)

(0..

(0.5)

(1)

11.1.

Germany2

1.5

(0)

(0)

(0.5)

(1)

Bavaria

I

11.2.

Germany- N.R.W.

2

5

1)

(I)

12.

Greece

2

0.5

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0.5)

13.

Hungary

0

2.5

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(1)

(1)

(0.5)

)

(1)

14.

Ireland

2

15.

Italy

2

3

(0)

(0.5)

(1)

(0.5)

16.

Latvia

2

4

(0)

0)

(0.5)

(1)

17.

Lithuania

4

5

0)

(1)

(0.5)

(1)

18.

Luxemburg

2

5

(0)

(0)

(1)

(1)

19.

Malta

2

6.5

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

20.

Netherlands

2

5

(0.5)

(0.

(1)

(05)

21.

Poland

2

5.5

0)

0)

(0.5)

(0)

22.

Portugal

4

3

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0)

23.

Romania

4

2

(0)

(0)

(0.5)

(1)

24.

Slovakia

4

2.5

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(1)

25.

Slovenia

2

4.5

(I)

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

26.

Spain

4

2.5

(0)

(0)

(1)

27.

Sweden

2

4.5

(0)

0)

(0.5)

28.

U.K.

2

7.5

6.5

(0)

(I)
(0.5)
0.5
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Table continued

C. Protection of Institutional Autonomy in HE Legislation (cont.)

2.3.

2.4.1.

(0-1-2)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

2.4.2.

3.

4.

Country
4

4

(0-2-4)

(0-2-4)

1.

Austria

0)

(0)

0)

2

2

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

01)

(0)

(0)

4

0

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

(0)

(0)

(0.5)

2

0

3.

Bulgaria

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

4.

Croatia

(0)

(1)

(1)

2

2

5.

Cyprus

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

2

6.

Czech Republic

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

7.

Denmark

(1)

(0)

(0)

0

2

8.

Estonia

(1)

(1)

(0.5)

2

0

9.

Finland

(2)

(1)

(0.5)

4

0

10.

France

(0)

(0)

(0)

2

0

11.1.

Germany, Bavaria

(0)

(0)

(0)

2

0

11.2.

Germany N.R.W.

(1)

(0)

(0)

2

4

12.

Greece

(0)
L(0)

(0)

2

0

13.

Hungary

(0I

(1)

(0)

0

0

14.

Ireland

0)

1

0)

4

0

15.

Italy

(0)

(0)

2

2

16.

Latvia

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

4

0

17.

Lithuania

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

18.

Luxemburg

(1)

0)

(I)

2

0

19.

Malta

(2)

(1)

(1)

2

0

20.

Netherlands

(2)

(0.5)

(Q)

2

0

21.

Poland

0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

2

0

22.

Portugal

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

23.

Romania

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

24.

Slovakia

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

25.

Slovenia

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

26.

Spain

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

2

0

27.

Sweden

(2)

(0.5)

(0)

0

0

28.

U.K.

(2)

(1)

0)

4

0

--

0)

1
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Table continued

D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation

Country Conr

.
1223

2.

2

12

(0-1-2)

(Subtotl)
7

2.1.

2.2.1.

2.2.2.

2.2.3.

(0-1.5-3)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

3)

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

l.

Austria

1

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

0

6

(0)

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

2.2.

Belgium: Walonia

0

8

(1.5)

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

3.

Bulgaria

1

9.5

(1.5)

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

4.

Croatia

1

9.5

(1.5)

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

5.

Cyprus

0

7.5

(3)

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

6.

Czech Republic

1

7

(1.5)

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

7.

Denmark

1

3.5

(15)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

8.

Estonia

0

3.5

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

9.

Finland

0

2

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

10.

France

1

3.5

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

11.1.

Gernany Bavaria

2

6

(1.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

11.2.

Germany, N.R.W.

2

7

(1.5)

(0)

(05)

(0.5)

12.

Greece

0

7

(1.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0)

13.

Hungary

0

9

(3)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

14.

Ireland

0

3

(1.5)

(0)

(0)

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0)

15.

Italy

0

6

16.

Latvia

2

7

(1.5)

17.

Lithuania

1

5

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

18.

Luxemburg

0

3.5

(1.5)

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

19.

Malta

0

3

(1.5)

(0)

(0)

(0)

20.

Netherlands

1

3

(0)

(0)

(0)

21.

Poland

1

9

(1.5)

01)

(0)

(0.5)

22.

Portugal

1

9

(1.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

Romania

1

8

(1.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(L)

(0.5)

(0.5)

(1)

(0)

23.

(0)

24.

Slovakia

1

8.5

(1.5)

(0)

25.

Slovenia

0

7

(15)

(0)

26.

Spain

0

8.5

(3)

27.

Sweden

0

3

(1.5)

(0)

(0)

28.

U.I.

0

0

(0)

(0)

(0)

()

(0.5)

(1)

I0)
(0)
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Table continued

D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation (cont.)

Country

2.3.

3.

3.1.1.

3.1.2.

(0-0.5-1)

(0-1-2)

6
(0-1.5-3-4.5-6)
(Subtotal)

1.

Austria

2.1.

(3)

1

(0)

(0)

Belgium: Flanders

(4.5)

1

(1)

(0)

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

(4.5)

0

(0)

(0)

3.

Bulgaria

(6)

4

(1)

(1)

4.

Croatia

(6)

3.5

(1)

(1)

5.

Cyprus

(3)

5

(1)

(2)

6.

Czech Republic

(4.5)

3

(1)

(1)

7.

Denmark

(1.5)

2

(0.5)

(1)

8.

Estonia

(3)

1

(1)

(0)

9.

Finland

(1.5)

1

(1)

(0)

10.

France

(3)

2

0)

(0)

11.1.

Germany: Bavaria

(3)

4

0)

(1)

11.2.

Germany: N.RW.

(4.5)

3.5

(1)

(1)

12.

Greece

(4.5)

3.5

(0)

(1)

13.

Hungary

(4.5)

0

(0)

(0)

14.

Ireland

01.5)

0

(0)

(0)

15.

Italy

0.5)

2

(1)

(1)

16.

Latvia

(4.5)

1.5

(1)

(0)

17.

Lithuania

(4.5)

0

(0)

(0)

18.

Luxemburg

(1.5)

2.5

(1)

(0)

19.

Malta

(1.5)

3

(1)

0)

20.

Netherlands

(3)

1.5

(1)

(0)

21.

Poland

(6)

2.5

(1)

(1)

22.

Portugal

1.5

(0.5)

(1)

23.

Romania

(4.5)

3.5

(0)

(1)

24.

Slovakia

(6)

3

01)

(1)

25.

Slovenia

4

01)

(1)

26.

Spain

27.

Sweden

28.

U.K.

(4.5)
(3)
01.5)
(0)

3.5

0)

1

0

(0)

(0)

0

(0)

(0)
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Table continued

D. Protection of Academic Self-Governance in HE Legislation (cont.)

Country

3.2.1.

3.2.2.

3.2.3.

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

(0-0.5-1)

1.

Austria

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0)

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

(0)

(0)

(0)

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

(0)

(0)

(0)

3.

Bulgaria

(1)

(0.5)

(0.5)

4.

Croatia

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

Cyprus

(1)

(1)

(0)

6.

Czech Republic

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

7.

Denmark

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

5.

8.

Estonia

(0)

(0)

(0)

9.

Finland

(0)

(0)

(0)

10.

France

(1)

(0)

(0)

11.1.

Gernany- Bavaria

()

(0.5)

(0.5)

11.2.

Germanv* N.R.W.

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

12.

Greece

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

13.

Hungary

(0)

(0)

(0)

Ireland

(0)

(0)

(0)

14.
15.

Italy

(0)

(0)

(0)

16.

Latvia

(0)

(0.5)

(0)

17.

Lithuania

(0)

(0)

(0)

18.

Luxemburg

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

19.

Malta

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0)

20.

Netherlands

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

21.

Poland

(0.5)

(0)

(0)

22.

Portugal

(0)

(0)

(0)

23.

Romania

(0.5)

(0.5)

(0.5)

24.

Slovakia

(0)

(0.5)

(0.5)

25.

Slovenia

(1)

(1)

(0)

26.

Spain

(1)

(0.5)

(0)

27.

Sweden

(0)

(0)

(0)

28.

U.K

(0)

(0)

(0)
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Table continued

E.Job Security (including "Tenure") in Relevant Legislation

1.

1.1.

1.2.

(0-2-4)

(0-2-4)

Country
8
(Subtotal)

1.

Austria

2

(2)

(0)

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

4

(4)

(0)

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

4

(4)

(0)

3.

Bulgaria

8

(4)

(4)

4.

Croatia

0

(0)

(0)

5.

Cyprus

4

(2)

(2)

6.

Czech Republic

2

(0)

(2)

7.

Denmark

4

(2)

(2)

8.

Estonia

0

(0)

(0)

9.

Finland

0

(0)

(0)

10.

France

8

(4)

(4)

11.1.

Germany: Bavaria

2

(2)

(0)

11.2. Germany N.R.W.

2

(2)

(0)

12.

Greece

8

(4)

(4)

13.

Hungary

8

(4)

(4)

14.

Ireland

6

(2)

(4)

15.

Italy

4

(2)

(2)

16.

Latvia

0

(0)

(0)

17.

Lithuania

2

(2)

(0)

18.

Luxemburg

2

(2)

(0)

19.

Malta

4

(0)

(4)

20.

Netherlands

4

(0)

(4)

21.

Poland

2

(0)

(2)

22.

Portugal

6

(4)

(2)

23.

Romania

4

(2)

(2)

24.

Slovakia

0

(0)

(0)

25.

Slovenia

6

(2)

(4)

26.

Spain

8

(4)

(4)

27.

Sweden

4

(2)

(2)

28.

U.

4

(0)

(4)
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Table continued
E. Job Security (including "Tenure") in Relevant Legislation
(cont.)

Country

2.

2.1.

2.2.

(0-1.5-3)

(0-1.5-3)

3.

6

6
(Subtotal)

(0-1.5-3-4.5-6)

1.5

1.

Austria

1.5

(1.5)

(0)

2.1.

Belgium: Flanders

3

(1.5)

(1.5)

3

2.2.

Belgium: Wallonia

3

(1.5)

(1.5)

1.5

3.

Bulgaria

1.5

(1.5)

(0)

0

4.

Croatia

4.5

(1.5)

(3)

0

5.

Cyprus

3

(1.5)

(1.5)

3

6.

Czech Republic

0

(0)

(0)

0

7.

Denmark

0

(0)

(0)

1.5

8.

Estonia

1.5

(0)

(1.5)

0

9.

Finland

3

01.5)

(1.5)

0

10.

France

4.5

(1.5)

(3)

3

11.1.

Germany Bavaria

4.5

(15)

(3)

1.5

11.2.

Gerrmany-, N. R.W.

4.5

(1.5

(3)

1.5

12.

Greece

6

(3)

(3)

6

13.

Hungary

0

(0)

(0)

0

14.

Ireland

4.5

l.5)

(3)

0

15.

Italy

4.5

01.5)

(3)

3

16.

Latvia

3

(0)

(3)

0

17.

Lithuania

3

(0)

(3)

0

18.

Luxemburg

1.5

(0)

(1.5)

0

19.

Malta

1.5

(0)

(1.5)

3

20.

Netherlands

1.5

(0)

(1.5)

1.5

21.

Poland

3

(1.5)

(1.5)

0

22.

Portugal

4.5

01.5)

(3)

0

23.

Romania

1.5

01.5)

(0)

0

24.

Slovakia

1.5

0

(1.5)

0

25.

Slovenia

3

(0)

(3)

1.5

26.

Spain

3

(1.5)

(1.5)

0

27.

Sweden

3

(0)

(3)

1.5

28.

U.K.

1.5

(1.5)

(0)

0

.
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